Both "What We Owe to Each Other" by T.M. Scanlon and "What We Owe Each Other" by Minouche Shafik address fundamental questions about the obligations individuals have to one another and to society. However, they approach this central theme from distinct perspectives and with different methodologies, as evidenced by the provided excerpts. T.M. Scanlon's "What We Owe to Each Other" presents a detailed and systematic philosophical theory known as contractualism. Scanlon's core idea is that the moral permissibility of an action depends on whether it can be justified by principles that no one could reasonably reject. This framework aims to provide a "standardized, universal rulebook" for ethical guidance. Scanlon's central question is not whether we owe things to each other, but rather _what_ those things are. He begins with the premise that we do have mutual obligations and seeks to identify their content through the lens of reasonable rejectability. According to Scanlon, respecting the value of human (rational) life requires us to treat rational creatures only in ways allowed by principles they could not reasonably reject, given that they too are seeking principles of mutual governance. The methodology of Scanlon's work, as described by Michael Schur, involves imagining a scenario where individuals need to agree on a set of rules for their society. Each person has the power to veto any proposed rule. The rules that pass are those that no one can reasonably reject. This process requires individuals to be "reasonable," meaning they are willing to constrain their own interests to the same degree that others are. Scanlon's contractualism is presented as a more accessible alternative to Kant's rules-based ethics, focusing on mutual agreement and justification rather than abstract reasoning about universal maxims. Scanlon places his faith not in abstract reasoning but in our necessary relationships with other people, emphasizing figuring things out together by asking, "Do you agree that this is okay?". Scanlon's theory is rooted in the idea of symmetry and mutual justification. He shifts the Rawlsian concept of a veil of ignorance to a later stage, suggesting that reasonable people can equate their own needs and desires with everyone else's even after knowing their own circumstances. The ultimate goal is to find a "basis of justification that others also have reason to accept". The "we" in Scanlon's title primarily refers to rational creatures seeking principles for mutual governance. The "owing" signifies moral obligations determined by the criterion of reasonable rejectability. Minouche Shafik's "What We Owe Each Other", on the other hand, takes a broader societal and practical approach, using the concept of the social contract as its central framework. Shafik explores the root causes of societal disappointment by examining expectations and mutuality, the value of collective provision, and the need to adapt mutual obligations in a changing world. Shafik's central question is encapsulated in the query: "How much does society owe an individual and what does an individual owe in return?". She also asks, "To whom do we feel mutual obligations?". Her book aims to provide answers to these questions to address contemporary political, economic, and social challenges. Shafik's methodology is not based on a philosophical thought experiment like Scanlon's but rather on analyzing the existing and evolving social contract in different spheres of life. She conceptualizes mutual obligations as "concentric circles," starting with immediate family and friends, extending to the community, the nation-state (with its duties of citizenship like paying taxes and obeying laws), regional entities like the European Union, and finally, the world, where obligations are weaker but become apparent in crises like climate change. Shafik's notion of "we" is more expansive and context-dependent than Scanlon's. It encompasses various levels of social organization and identity, highlighting the different kinds of obligations that arise within these different circles. The "owing" in Shafik's title refers to a broader set of reciprocal expectations and responsibilities that underpin social cohesion and well-being, including duties of citizenship, community involvement, and even global solidarity. **Comparison and Contrast:** 1. **Focus and Methodology:** Scanlon's work is a work of moral philosophy, developing a specific theory of right and wrong based on the principle of reasonable rejectability. His methodology is primarily theoretical, involving a thought experiment to derive moral principles. Shafik's work is more sociological and policy-oriented, examining the concept of the social contract and mutual obligations in practical terms across different levels of society. Her methodology involves analyzing societal expectations and the balance of what individuals and society owe each other. 2. **Central Question:** While both books address mutual obligations, Scanlon's focuses on the _justification_ and _content_ of these obligations through a specific moral criterion. Shafik's focus is on _identifying_ and _adapting_ these obligations within the framework of the social contract in response to societal challenges. 3. **Scope of "We":** Scanlon's "we" primarily refers to rational agents engaged in the project of establishing morally justifiable principles for mutual governance. Shafik's "we" is more inclusive and differentiated, encompassing various communities and levels of belonging, each with its own set of mutual obligations. 4. **Nature of "Owing":** In Scanlon's framework, "owing" signifies moral duties that are binding because their underlying principles could not be reasonably rejected. In Shafik's context, "owing" encompasses a wider range of reciprocal expectations, duties, and responsibilities that constitute the social contract and contribute to the functioning of society. 5. **Philosophical Underpinnings:** Scanlon's contractualism draws heavily from Kantian ethics, emphasizing rationality and universalizability, albeit in a more practically applicable form. Shafik's work is rooted in the tradition of social contract theory, which examines the implicit agreements that structure societies. 6. **Emphasis on Change:** Shafik explicitly addresses the need for mutual obligations to adapt to a changing world. While Scanlon's principles are intended to be universal, their application and interpretation might evolve in different contexts, but the primary focus is on the foundational principles themselves. In essence, Scanlon's "What We Owe to Each Other" provides a philosophical framework for determining the fundamental moral obligations we have as rational beings by focusing on the idea of reasonable rejectability. Shafik's "What We Owe Each Other" examines the broader societal contract and the reciprocal expectations and duties that exist within different communities, emphasizing the dynamic nature of these obligations in the face of contemporary challenges. While both books explore the crucial theme of mutual obligations, they do so through the distinct lenses of moral philosophy and social contract theory, respectively. ----- First off, it's crystal clear that both authors believe there's something fundamental about the idea of _mutual obligations_ – the things we owe to each other – in structuring society and our interactions. Shafik uses the well-known concept of the "social contract" as her main lens, defining it as the policies and norms that govern how we live together. She sees this contract as something that evolves and needs redefining, especially in times of crisis. Scanlon, on the other hand, uses the phrase "what we owe to each other" to describe a specific, central part of morality, distinct from other moral values or ideals. His work is about figuring out the philosophical basis for this part of morality. Now, while both use similar starting points, their paths diverge quite a bit! Think of Shafik as the social architect and historian. She looks at history to show us how major crises, like the Great Depression or World Wars, forced societies to redraw their social contracts, leading to big changes like the New Deal or the creation of welfare states. She highlights influential thinkers and movements connected to institutions like the London School of Economics (LSE), where she serves as Director, showing the lineage from the Webbs and Beveridge, who shaped the welfare state, to Hayek, who championed individual liberty and free markets, influencing figures like Thatcher and Reagan. Shafik argues that today's world, buffeted by technological shifts, demographic changes, the climate crisis, and global pandemics, is another moment where our existing social contract is clearly "no longer working". Her book is an attempt to understand _why_ it's broken and to suggest a "direction of travel" for a new one fit for the 21st century. She structures her exploration around the different stages of life – children, education, health, work, old age, and the relationships between generations – making these big, sometimes abstract, policy issues feel personal and accessible. She's big on using evidence, drawing heavily on academic research, but also expressing her own judgments. Shafik's vision for a new social contract involves providing guaranteed basics, sharing risks more effectively, and ensuring everyone contributes, emphasizing that this isn't just about the welfare state, but about investing in people and building a new system of risk sharing. She also stresses the vital role of political accountability in making this happen. Scanlon, our philosophical explorer, digs much deeper into the very foundations of morality. He's not primarily concerned with specific policies or historical periods in the way Shafik is. Instead, he's trying to understand _what makes an action morally wrong_ and _why_ moral standards have the kind of authority they do. His answer centers on contractualism, specifically the idea that an action is wrong if it would be disallowed by principles that others could not reasonably reject, assuming they are similarly motivated to find principles for mutual governance. This is a much more abstract concept than Shafik's policy discussions. Scanlon distinguishes his approach from other philosophical theories like utilitarianism or divine command theories, seeing them as rival accounts of the property of moral wrongness itself. He spends considerable time analyzing core philosophical ideas like reasons, values, and well-being, arguing that things are valuable not just because they are "to be promoted," but because there are complex reasons to act and react in certain ways concerning them. He also carefully unpacks ideas like responsibility, distinguishing between being responsible _for_ something (attributability, often for blame) and being responsible _to_ something (substantive responsibility, concerning burdens or obligations). Scanlon shows how specific moral duties, like keeping promises or telling the truth, can be understood within this contractualist framework, based on the generic reasons people have for wanting to be able to rely on others' words and intentions. He also tackles the sticky issue of moral disagreement and relativism, suggesting that while there can be variability in moral conclusions, it often arises from differing reasons, values, or conceptions of ideals, rather than a complete lack of objective moral grounding. So, how do these two perspectives enrich each other when we look at them together? 1. **The 'Why' Powers the 'What':** Scanlon provides a profound philosophical justification for Shafik's call for a new social contract. Shafik shows us that the current contract is failing in practical terms – economically, socially, environmentally. Scanlon explains _why_ having a functional, justifiable framework for living together (a social contract) is morally imperative. It's not just about practical outcomes; it's about recognizing each other as rational beings and structuring our interactions based on principles we could all reasonably accept. So, Shafik gives us the urgent "what needs fixing," and Scanlon provides a deeper "why we must fix it" that goes beyond mere pragmatism. 2. **Real-World Complexity Meets Philosophical Framework:** Shafik's global examples and focus on life stages illustrate the messy, complex reality of social contracts. Different countries balance individual and collective interests differently. Decisions about things like childcare funding or healthcare interventions involve difficult trade-offs and conflicting values. Scanlon's contractualism provides a philosophical framework for navigating these complexities. His idea of assessing principles based on whether they can be reasonably rejected, considering the burdens imposed and the reasons individuals have, gives us a way to think systematically about these trade-offs and potential disagreements. It suggests that debates about policy aren't just battles of competing interests, but ideally, attempts to find arrangements that are justifiable to everyone involved. 3. **Beyond Utilitarianism in Policy:** Shafik's discussion of issues like healthcare funding involves assessing benefits and costs, which might sound a bit utilitarian (maximizing good outcomes). However, Scanlon explicitly pushes back against purely teleological (outcome-focused) conceptions of value and argues that contractualism offers a different, more intuitive way to understand morality. Reading them together suggests that designing a social contract based solely on maximizing overall well-being might miss crucial moral considerations related to fairness, individual rights, and principles that are justifiable from each person's perspective, regardless of aggregate outcomes. Scanlon's "threshold of reasonable rejection" idea, while he expresses doubt about a fixed threshold, highlights that some burdens on individuals might be unreasonable to impose, regardless of the benefits to others. 4. **Disagreement isn't Just Political Friction:** Scanlon's detailed analysis of the sources of moral disagreement adds depth to Shafik's observation that crises like the 2008 financial crash spawned populist backlashes and culture wars. Scanlon suggests that disagreements can stem from fundamental differences in understanding what makes something morally authoritative, or even from valuing different ideals. This implies that debates about the social contract are often not just about disagreeing on the "right" policy, but about deeper, sometimes unarticulated, differences in values and moral frameworks. Simply presenting more evidence, while crucial as Shafik emphasizes, might not resolve disagreements rooted in these deeper differences, though it is a necessary starting point. In short, Shafik gives us the urgent contemporary context and the historical sweep of social contracts in practice, while Scanlon provides the rigorous philosophical toolkit to understand the moral underpinnings of mutual obligation. Together, they paint a richer picture, showing that rebuilding our societal arrangements isn't just a technical or political task, but a profound moral challenge that requires both practical wisdom and philosophical clarity about what we truly owe to each other. **Where could we take this exploration next?** - Could we apply Scanlon's "reasonable rejection" framework to some of the specific policy challenges Shafik raises? For instance, how would principles for regulating gig economy work, or funding long-term elderly care, be assessed based on whether they could be reasonably rejected by different affected parties (workers, employers, families, future generations)? - Shafik talks about the tension between individual and collective interests. Scanlon's contractualism aims to balance these by considering reasons from each individual's point of view when formulating principles. How successfully can this philosophical balancing act translate into practical policy design that addresses real-world power imbalances and diverse needs? - Scanlon discusses how different societies might develop different moral standards based on differing reasons or values. How does this philosophical idea square with Shafik's global perspective, showing how similar policy challenges (like raising children or caring for the elderly) are addressed differently around the world? Are these differences simply variations in "acceptable" principles within a broader moral framework, or do they reflect deeper disagreements about fundamental values? - Shafik points to technology and demography as key forces pressuring the current social contract. How might Scanlon's analysis of reasons and values help us think through the moral implications of disruptive technologies like AI, or the challenges posed by aging populations, in a way that informs the design of a new social contract? There's clearly so much more to think about when these two important conversations are brought together! They invite us to consider not just _what_ kind of society we want to build, but _why_ it would be the morally right way to live together.