"The Transcendence of the Ego" refers to Jean-Paul Sartre's early philosophical essay (1936-1937) where he critiques Edmund Husserl's concept of the transcendental ego and proposes an alternative understanding of consciousness and the ego. According to Sartre, as discussed in the provided sources, the ego is not a fundamental, transcendental structure of consciousness but rather an object that appears within the field of consciousness, much like any other object of experience. Sartre's argument, as presented in the sources, stands in direct opposition to Husserl's phenomenology, which posits a transcendental ego as the necessary condition for the possibility of experience. Husserl's phenomenological reduction ("epoché") aims to bracket the existence of the external world to reveal the absolute existence of consciousness and its transcendental structures, including the ego as a unifying pole. Sartre, however, finds Husserl's epoché to be both unfounded and unnecessary for understanding intentionality, which he sees as the core of consciousness. The sources highlight Sartre's view that consciousness is absolute and fundamentally characterized by intentionality, meaning it is always directed towards something other than itself; it is a "reflection of objects of experience". In "The Transcendence of the Ego," Sartre argues that the ego is not a part of this absolute consciousness but rather an object that consciousness intends towards. He contends that positing the ego as a transcendental feature introduces an "opacity" into consciousness, compromising its inherent spontaneity and its absolute existence. If the ego were a transcendental center, consciousness would no longer be purely self-conscious and would possess an aspect of which there is no immediate self-awareness. According to Sartre, as understood from the sources, consciousness is a "spontaneity" that "bursts forth," constantly moving towards objects in the world, including what we perceive as our "I" or ego. This movement is described as "ecstatic," signifying a going-outward beyond itself. The "I" or ego, therefore, is not a stable, internal entity that underlies our experiences but rather a "transcendent object for consciousness," appearing much like any other object in the world. Sartre suggests that the ego is "for consciousness" and arises as a consequence of consciousness's engagement with the world. The sources indicate that Sartre uses the distinction between positional and nonpositional consciousness to support his critique. Consciousness is always nonpositionally conscious of itself while being positionally conscious of an object. When consciousness reflects on itself, it takes the "I" as an object of this reflective act. However, the reflecting consciousness is not identical to the "I" it reflects upon. This non-coincidence is fundamental to Sartre's understanding of consciousness as a perpetual escape from being. By arguing for the transcendence of the ego, Sartre aims to root human existence firmly in the world. He sees Husserl's transcendental ego as potentially leading to an "escapist doctrine" by pulling a part of the individual out of the world and diverting attention from "real problems". For Sartre, the ego is an appearance within the world, and understanding it as such keeps consciousness grounded in its worldly existence. In summary, "The Transcendence of the Ego" posits that the ego is not a transcendental subject or an inherent structure of consciousness, as Husserl argued, but rather a transcendent object that appears within the field of consciousness. Consciousness, for Sartre, is a spontaneous, intentional, and absolute reality that constantly transcends itself towards objects, and the ego is one such object it encounters in the world. This early work by Sartre lays the groundwork for his later existential phenomenology, where the nature of consciousness and its relationship to being is further explored.