The concept of "theoretical conjuncture" refers to a specific, often critical, intellectual and ideological situation that shapes philosophical inquiry and intervention. It implies a dynamic interplay of theoretical elements, problems, and social realities at a given historical moment. ### Althusser's Conception of Theoretical Conjuncture Louis Althusser's work, particularly "For Marx," directly employs the term "conjuncture" in a theoretical and ideological sense. For Althusser, his essays are philosophical texts with theoretical investigations as their objects, aiming to intervene in the "theoretico-ideological conjuncture" of his time. This intervention seeks to draw a "line of demarcation" between authentic Marxist theory and ideological tendencies that are foreign to it. Within this framework, Althusser views the "inflation" of themes like "Marxist humanism" as an ideological phenomenon. While acknowledging ideology as an objective social reality where class conflicts are played out, he criticizes its _theoretical effects_, which he believes are a threat or hindrance to scientific knowledge. The rise of "Marxist humanism," for instance, is seen as a symptom of an inability to grasp the specificity of Marxist theory and a risk of confusing it with pre-Marxist ideological interpretations. It also reflects a failure to resolve concrete political and economic problems, instead masking them with mere ideological formulas. Althusser stresses the vital necessity of _theory_ for revolutionary practice and explicitly denounces empiricism. He distinguishes between: - **Theory (lowercase 't')**: Any theoretical practice of a scientific character. - **'Theory' (in inverted commas)**: The determinate theoretical system of a real science, encompassing its basic concepts in their unity, which may be problematic. - **Theory (capital 'T')**: General theory, or the "Theory of practice in general," which is elaborated from existing theoretical practices of the sciences and transforms ideological products of empirical practices into scientific truths. This grand "Theory" is identified as the materialist dialectic, or dialectical materialism. Theoretical practice, as a specific form of practice, operates on "raw material" (representations, concepts, facts) obtained from other practices (empirical, technical, ideological). The "active side" of this practice, the determinant moment, is the existing 'theory' and method. Althusser argues that scientific practice moves from the abstract to produce concrete knowledge. He highlights a qualitative difference between the "raw material of theoretical practice" (Generality I) and the "concrete-in-thought" knowledge it produces (Generality III), emphasizing the priority of the transformative process (Generality II) over the raw material. This distinction is crucial for understanding Marx's rejection of Hegelian idealism. A truly theoretical problem requires a theoretical solution that generates new knowledge, precisely defining its field, location, and necessary concepts. To analyze these conjunctures and the historical development of theoretical formations, Althusser borrows two key concepts: - **Problematic**: From Jacques Martin, this term denotes the specific unity of a theoretical formation. It reveals the "typical systematic structure" that unifies all elements of a thought, helping to grasp the meaning of its components and connect the ideology to the historical problems faced by its thinker. It offers a way to understand ideological unity without falling into the "empty unity of the described whole" often associated with Hegelian "totality". - **Epistemological Break**: From Gaston Bachelard, this signifies a fundamental mutation or qualitative theoretical and historical discontinuity in a theoretical problematic, coinciding with the establishment of a scientific discipline. The "Works of the Break" (e.g., _Theses on Feuerbach_, _The German Ideology_) demonstrate a rupture with past theoretical presuppositions, even as old words and concepts are temporarily re-enlisted before new ones are fully developed. This rupture fundamentally redefines the meaning of "philosophy" for Marxism. Althusser's distinction between scientific "theory" and "ideology" is central. He considers "humanism" an ideological concept because, while it designates existing relations, it "does not provide us with a means of knowing them," unlike the scientific concept of "socialism". Relying on ideology in place of sufficient theory risks substituting a "feeling" of theory for genuine scientific knowledge. ### Other Perspectives on Theoretical Frameworks and Systems (Implicit Conjunctures) While Althusser explicitly uses "theoretical conjuncture," other philosophers in the provided sources discuss related ideas concerning the nature, formation, and function of theoretical frameworks and systems, which can be seen as shaping or responding to intellectual conjunctures. **Kant's Systematicity and Concepts:** Immanuel Kant emphasizes that concepts are general and discursive, indirectly referring to objects, and that their unity forms judgments, which are indirect cognitions. For cognition to be well-formed, it needs functions of unity. He asserts that the concepts of a theoretical system "spring pure and unmixed from the understanding" and must be interconnected according to a principle or idea, allowing for an _a priori_ determination of their place and completeness. Kant envisioned a systematic combination of judgments formed by the understanding, guided by categories that constitute pure _a priori_ cognition. His "transcendental ideas" of pure reason do not directly relate to objects but to the understanding, ordering concepts and uniting them into the "greatest possible extension," aiming at a "totality of series". This "hypothetical use of reason" is regulative, bringing unity to particular cognitions and approximating universality. **Foucault's Discursive Formations and Truth Regimes:** Michel Foucault's approach involves an "experimental understanding of philosophy" and employs archaeological and genealogical procedures as key methodological influences. He introduces concepts like "discursive formation" to identify and unify groups of statements not through traditional means (author, genre, evolution) but through the "regularity of a practice". He emphasizes that a "discourse" is an abstract order of concepts, rules, and problems that can constitute individuals and generate social institutions. His work explores "truth regimes" and the interaction of concepts and discourses with non-conceptual and non-discursive elements. Foucault's "historical a priori" points to how historical conditions structure possibilities of knowledge. His genealogies "problematize truth and its technologies of power" rather than accepting truth as a given. For Foucault, truth is understood in historical terms, with his archaeology and genealogy serving as methods to uncover it. **Jameson's "Thinking the Totality":** Fredric Jameson, in the tradition of Hegel and Marx, posits that "thinking the totality" is central to any account of human thought. This means acknowledging that "literally nothing can be conceived to exist outside the limits of human history, and that the limits of history are just as literally the limits of thought itself". For him, the concept of totality is an abstract form of society, a "supreme class under which all other classes must be subsumed". Jameson critiques "expressive causality," where a hidden essence (e.g., the Economy or a _Zeitgeist_) is assumed to determine surface phenomena, arguing that such models conjure a "factitious" unity. **Habermas's Communicative Theory and Normative Foundations:** Jürgen Habermas's communicative theory integrates distinct theoretical strands like formal pragmatics, systems theory, and social evolutionary theories to develop a general theory of communication based on universal pragmatic presuppositions. His project aims for a comprehensive explanatory-prescriptive account of modernity, using empirically plausible universalistic theories to address contemporary crises. He seeks to build a non-metaphysical foundation for a progressive account of reason by distinguishing between functional systems and lifeworlds. **Deleuze and Guattari's Concept Creation:** Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari define philosophy as "the art of forming, inventing or fabricating concepts". They argue that concepts are not isolated but are always connected to other concepts and the problems they address, possessing a history of variations. The objects of philosophical concepts are "pure events," and their relation is expressive rather than referential. Concepts are "real without being actual, ideal without being abstract," simultaneously positing themselves and their objects during creation. They are formed on "planes of immanence," which act as filters for chaos. **General Qualities of Theories and Theoretical Inquiry:** - **Theoretical Virtues**: In metaphysics, desirable theoretical qualities include explanatory power, coherence with other theories, and the ability to explain much with minimal assumptions. - **Purpose**: Theory serves as a specific practice that acts on its object to produce knowledge. It should provide intellectual tools for human ends rather than merely pursuing truth. - **Relationships**: Philosophical ideas are not isolated but develop in connection and relationship with each other, forming systems. A theory's comprehensibility and reasonableness are tied to its relation to a specific problem situation. - **Unity of Theory and Practice**: Gadamer, for instance, advocates a "substantial continuity" between theory and practice, arguing that philosophical hermeneutics is both theoretical and practical. Gramsci also emphasized the "unification of theory and practice" as a political dimension of translatability. - **Truth and Reality**: Theories of atonement, for example, explain the efficacy of Christ's death and resurrection to elucidate how God saves from sin. Theological "theories" work by answering questions about a "more" (e.g., a personal god) and how union with it is conceived. While theoretical knowledge can be seen as aimed at dominating existence and serving as a means, ancient "theory" (theoria) meant participating in the total order itself. - **Evolution and Transformation**: Theories and concepts are not static. Genres, for instance, perpetually evolve through internal development and by competing and modifying each other. Conceptual frameworks like Bourdieu's develop over a career, beginning as ideas that "haunt" early work, emerging in empirical analyses, becoming "fully fledged concepts," and finally evolving into different forms. Bourdieu's "theory of practice" aims to integrate the arbitrary nature of language and social phenomena into a stable framework to avoid hyper-relativity, with his concepts acting as a "language which stabilizes the terms of analysis". In sum, a theoretical conjuncture can be understood as a specific configuration of intellectual and ideological forces, problems, and debates that prompts philosophical reflection, the creation of new concepts, and the development or transformation of theoretical systems in response to perceived challenges or societal conditions. These conjunctures are dynamic, often involve explicit distinctions between scientific theory and hindering ideologies, and aim to provide coherent, justifiable accounts of reality, even if those accounts are themselves subject to ongoing contestation and evolution.