Self-consciousness is a complex and often elusive concept, explored from various philosophical and psychological perspectives within the sources. It involves our awareness of ourselves, but the nature of this awareness and the "self" it apprehends is understood differently depending on the framework. One significant dimension of self-consciousness discussed in the sources relates to the encounter with others. According to Sartre, human reality is fundamentally "for-itself". However, we also experience modes of consciousness that seem to point to a different ontological structure, one that is our being but is not "for-me". Shame is presented as a primary example of such a mode of consciousness. Shame, for Sartre, is a non-positional self-consciousness, conscious (of) itself as shame. It involves a shameful apprehension of something, and that something is oneself – "I am ashamed of what I am". While complex forms of shame can appear reflectively, shame is not originally a phenomenon of reflection. Instead, it is, in its primary structure, shame before somebody. The presence of another person in one's consciousness, even as a catalyst, is incompatible with the reflective attitude because reflection can only encounter one's own consciousness. Thus, Sartre argues that the Other is the indispensable mediator between oneself and oneself. Through shame, one discovers an aspect of one's being. One is ashamed of oneself as one appears to the Other. By the mere appearance of the Other, one is put in the position of passing judgment on oneself as on an object, because it is as an object that one appears to the Other. This object seen by the Other is not merely an empty image; it "touches" one deeply. Shame is presented as recognition – recognizing that one is as the Other sees one. This implies that one's freedom escapes and becomes a given object. Thus, shame is shame of oneself before the Other, and these two structures are inseparable. Sartre concludes that one needs the Other to fully realize the structures of one's being, suggesting that the "For-itself" refers to the "For-others". Sartre further explains that in shame or pride, one lives, rather than knows, the situation of being looked at. Shame is the recognition that "I am indeed that object which the Other is looking at and judging". The bond between one's unreflective consciousness and the Ego being looked at is not one of knowing but of being. Beyond any knowledge one has, one is this self that another knows. This self exists in a world made alien by the Other's look, as the Other's gaze encompasses one's being and surrounding instrumental things, turning them toward the Other in a way that escapes oneself. Shame is seen as the revelation of the Other, not as an object, but as a consciousness in which and by which one's own consciousness makes itself what it is. Shame-consciousness provides indubitable witness to the existence of the Other. However, when one constitutes the Other as an object, the Other's subjectivity is degraded into a property of that object, recovering oneself as a free source of knowledge and the Other appears as affected by that knowledge. This knowledge in the Other is then seen as subjective, relative, and purely an image, no longer touching oneself. Shame motivates a reaction that surpasses and overcomes it, involving a comprehension of being-able-to-be-an-object for the subject for whom one is an object. This comprehension is the consciousness (of) one's "being-myself," or reinforced selfness. Shame, fear, and pride are described as original reactions, different ways of recognizing the Other as a subject beyond reach, and they include a comprehension of one's selfness that can motivate constituting the Other as an object. Kristin Sealey's analysis highlights the convergence between Sartre's and Levinas's descriptions of shame, both identifying it as a revelation of an aspect of ourselves we'd like to hide, describing this aspect as "degraded" (Sartre) or a mode of "diminished beings" (Levinas). However, Sealey argues that Sartre's formal ontology, interpreting consciousness as radically free, betrays his concrete descriptions. Shame, in this analysis, escapes Sartre's parameters of reflective or prereflective experience. Shame, in this view, calls into question the presupposition of intentionality and full ownership of oneself. Under the Other's gaze, consciousness is "held hostage" to the self with which it must identify. Sealey suggests Levinas's formalization of identity, understanding the subject as dense with him- or herself, better recognizes what is signified in Sartre's descriptions. Sartre's description of being-seen reveals consciousness becoming a reified "something," taking on an interiority that compromises the essential emptiness of the for-itself. This modification is suffered as something imposed. Outside the encounter with the Other, prereflective self-consciousness is pure exteriority, never "there" with itself, but always beyond itself in the projected world. Reflective self-awareness involves projecting an ego-object with which one identifies, but consciousness is still at a distance from this object. However, under the gaze, the reference turns inward, becoming "pure self-reference," trapped in the physical body-object the Other sees. While there is a distance between consciousness and its objectified being for the Other, and between consciousness and the reflective ego-object, the distance in shame makes recognition in the way possible with the ego impossible. Shame involves an unmediated, pure reference to one's being-for-others; one is this self, imposed and alien, yet undeniable. Shame is described as an immediate shudder, a noncoincidence between consciousness and its being-for-others. This noncoincidence is precisely the "angst" of responsibility to acknowledge what the Other sees is oneself. Sealey argues that shame falls outside reflective and prereflective modes, and Levinas's analysis, which includes the internal trauma of identifying with a forever other self in the meaning of identity, is better suited to describe this "new dimension". Levinas's view of shame reveals the subject rooted in a position of non-freedom, or passivity, before the weight of existence, revealing an aspect over which the subject has no ownership – the "thereness" of the "I" beyond free intentional movement. Shame reveals the subject as exposed, naked, bound to a self simultaneously strange and intimate. Both Sartre and Levinas highlight embodiment in shame, as it is the body the Other sees, and the subject feels enchained or burdened by their body. Beauvoir's personal reflections, anticipating Sartre's description of shame, involve the painful recognition of her own critical consciousness appearing as egoism and lack of certitude in the eyes of her pious sister. She feels ashamed for her lack of certitude and for being an egoist. This experience of shame serves as evidence of the subjectivity of the Other. However, unlike Sartre's suggestion that sadism alternates with masochism, Beauvoir strives for a relativist stance, acknowledging differences and maintaining relationships, seeking a third alternative beyond attempting to dominate the Other. Hegel's philosophy offers a distinct perspective on self-consciousness, viewing it not as a static unity but a "movement". Self-consciousness, in Hegel's sense, is not present from the beginning but is the "sublation of a self-alienation" or a "countermovement to a forgetfulness enveloping us". Initially, individual self-consciousness is immediate, related to external objects (like desire). On a second level, self-consciousness relates to _another_ self-consciousness, and the process of recognition takes place. Recognition involves a unification of individuality and universality. A consciousness comes to recognize itself by recognizing another consciousness and being recognized by that other consciousness (mutual recognition). This acknowledges a different viewpoint on oneself, that of the other. It is a moment of genuine self-consciousness, not possible without such an encounter. The encounter is described as bittersweet: the other confirms one's existence by making one its object, but also threatens to impose a foreign picture that cannot be controlled. Recognition finds completion in universal self-consciousness, which is Spirit. Language is essential here, as it is the "existence of Spirit" and enables connection, communication, justification, and recognition between self-consciousnesses. While conscience might return to the individual realm, conversation with others leads beyond it. Articulating convictions and giving reasons are necessary and happen through language. Self-consciousness, in its movement, steps outside itself and returns. The Hegelian master/slave dialectic, an instance of this struggle for recognition, is seen as a cogent means to understand concepts like projection, where self-consciousness goes out of itself, collapses boundaries with the other, to return to itself, achieving identity by dissolving the projection. This dialectic highlights the fluid engagement of self-consciousnesses and the existential impact of our social reality. Jung defines the ego as the central complex of the field of consciousness, constituted partly by inherited disposition and partly by unconsciously acquired impressions. It is the subject of conscious attempts at adaptation. While the ego, as a conscious factor, could theoretically be completely described, this would only capture the conscious personality, missing unknown or unconscious features. Most people confuse self-knowledge with knowledge of their conscious ego-personalities, taking it for granted they know themselves when the ego only knows its own contents, not the unconscious. The ego, when referring to the "I" of all people, is already an abstraction. Alan Watts, drawing on Eastern thought like Zen Buddhism, discusses the concept of the ego. He defines the ego not as a synonymous with our living organism, but as something abstract, like an hour or an inch, used for convenience and social communication. The fallacy is treating this abstraction as if it were real and physical. The ego is a composition of ideas and images about ourselves, no more us than the idea of a tree is a tree. There is a physical tension or "contraction" (sankoca in Sanskrit) that is the root of the "feeling of the ego," serving as the physical referent for the psychological image of ourselves. Watts argues that the ego cannot be transcended because it doesn't properly exist; you can't act upon a nonexistent thing. Awkward self-consciousness arises when there is a conflict between the idea of ourselves and the immediate, concrete feeling of ourselves. When one is no longer identified with the idea of oneself, the relationship between subject and object changes; the knower doesn't feel separate from the known, realizing one has no other self than the totality of things one is aware of. Buddhist philosophy also critiques the notion of a solid, inherent self. Connate ignorance is identified as the root of cyclic existence, involving the superimposition of existence onto phenomena, including persons, despite their inherent nonexistence. Analytical meditation is described as a practice to identify the self (or self-entity) and the belief in it. By examining the aggregates (form, feelings, discriminations, compositional factors, consciousness), one looks for the "I," checking if any part or the whole constitutes a concrete, knowledgeable, or beautiful "I". However, through this examination, the "I" cannot be found; there is no concrete self. The absence of inherent nature is the absence of a self-entity. Reflecting on this lack of a concrete "I" is said to reduce pride. The sources also touch upon the ethics and challenges related to self-consciousness. Excessive self-consciousness can be related to a lack of self-confidence and a constant worry about how others perceive oneself. This is characterized as being self-centered or having an "attachment to self," driven by a desire for recognition rather than genuine concern for others. Worrying about being judged by others is presented as a self-centered lifestyle focused solely on the "I". Excessive self-consciousness can stifle one's actions, acting like a straitjacket that prevents innocent behavior due to fears of judgment or ridicule. In contrast, self-respect (or self-esteem) is highlighted by Rawls as perhaps the most important primary good. It has two aspects: a sense of one's own value and the worth of one's life plan, and confidence in one's ability to fulfill intentions. Without self-respect, nothing seems worth doing, leading to apathy and cynicism. Shame is defined as the feeling experienced when self-respect or self-esteem is injured, a painful loss of a prized good. Rawls distinguishes shame from regret, where regret is a general feeling from losing any good, while shame is specifically evoked by shocks to self-respect. In a well-ordered society based on justice as fairness, democracy in judging each other's aims is the foundation of self-respect. Scott Peck distinguishes self-love from self-esteem, proposing self-love is always good while self-esteem can be questionable. Self-love allows acknowledging mistakes and chastising oneself without failures defining one's worth, recognizing the need for growth. Self-esteem, on the other hand, might lead to denying unbecoming behavior out of concern for how one is perceived. From a Kantian perspective on virtue, knowing oneself (moral self-cognition) involves developing an "evaluative distance" from oneself. This prevents reacting to fears and insecurities with arrogance (contempt for others as a defense). It involves impartiality in appraising oneself against the moral law and sincerity in acknowledging one's inner moral worth or lack thereof, aspects seen as part of humility. Thus, knowing oneself and taking proper attitudes toward oneself is central to Kantian virtue. Foucault, while exploring self-concern and self-formation through the ancient "care of the self," contrasts it with the modern emphasis on "know thyself". He suggests that the ancient practice of "care of the self" (epimeleia heautou) was primary, with "know thyself" (gnothi seauton) subordinated to it and understood in practical terms of knowing one's place or limitations as part of caring for oneself. This involved actions exercised on the self by the self to purify, transform, and transfigure oneself, constituting the subject actively. Foucault argues that in modernity, this was reversed due to shifts like Christian morality emphasizing self-renunciation through self-knowledge and secular philosophy focusing on external laws or the epistemological subject (like Descartes), leading "know thyself" to obscure "care for oneself". The modern self is compelled to seek truth in science, but Foucault proposes that understanding the self as something to be cultivated, as an artist, allows for an individualistic and voluntaristic ethics challenging normalization, without relying on scientific truth. The very attempt to define the self or ego proves challenging. Watts and Jung describe the ego as an abstraction. Russell questions whether we are truly acquainted with our "bare selves" or just particular thoughts and feelings, finding acquaintance with the "I" difficult to disentangle. Foucault, in his analysis of modernity, questions if the "self" is a fiction created by discourses of power. Marsiglio notes that "self" is often used as an elusive label without committing to a definitive philosophical stance. Self-consciousness, therefore, is not a single, easily defined phenomenon. It encompasses our awareness of ourselves, which is deeply intertwined with our social interactions and the perception of others. It involves complex psychological dynamics like shame, pride, anxiety, and attachment to a conceptual idea of self. Different traditions offer distinct paths for relating to this awareness, from analytical meditation aimed at dissolving the belief in an inherent self to the cultivation of an ethical relation to oneself through practices of care or achieving self-respect based on the value of one's life plan. Ultimately, understanding self-consciousness requires navigating diverse philosophical and psychological frameworks, many of which highlight its paradoxical, elusive, and relational nature.