Let's explore the philosophical backbone of hermeneutics, particularly focusing on its development into what is known as philosophical hermeneutics, drawing upon the concepts and figures mentioned in the provided sources. At its heart, hermeneutics is the study of the theory and the practice of interpreting texts. More broadly, it's understood as the "science and art of understanding". Historically, hermeneutics was associated with rhetoric in ancient times and later with the interpretation of religious and legal texts. A significant shift occurred with figures like Friedrich Schleiermacher, who worked to free hermeneutics from its specific applications (like theological or legal interpretation) and establish it as a more general theory of understanding and interpretation, forming a basis for historical humanistic sciences. Hans-Georg Gadamer notes that Schleiermacher's universal hermeneutics began from the assumption of misunderstanding, viewing understanding as the process of overcoming nonunderstanding, although Gadamer critiques this approach as potentially stagnating or relying on something difficult to achieve like empathic identification. Following Schleiermacher, Wilhelm Dilthey expanded this art to encompass the methodology of the human sciences. Dilthey is credited with introducing the hermeneutical problem into modern philosophical thought and posing a central question for the field: "How is understanding possible?". Dilthey's conception of the hermeneutic circle involved a dynamic between the interpreter and the object being interpreted, grounded in a familiarity with societal norms and language (the "objective spirit"), which allowed the interpreter to infer meaning. The transition to what is specifically called "philosophical hermeneutics" is largely attributed to Martin Heidegger and his student, Hans-Georg Gadamer. Heidegger, influenced by Dilthey, Husserl, and others, introduced a "hermeneutical shift" into phenomenology. He aimed to "de-psychologize" hermeneutics and redefine it not merely as a method for understanding texts or humanistic phenomena, but as a fundamental "mode of being". For Heidegger, human existence (_Dasein_) is characterized by an understanding of Being, an understanding potentiality-for-Being, which makes an issue of its own Being. Therefore, understanding is not just a cognitive tool we use, but an existential structure of being-in-the-world. Hermeneutics, in this sense, becomes the interpretation of existence and serves to illuminate the structure of this fundamental understanding. Heidegger saw the phenomenological call "to the things themselves" as pointing towards the "question of Being" (_Seinsfrage_), which involves the human being in a constant interrogation of experiences and relationships. He viewed language as essential for illuminating existence, although his early views on language differed from later philosophical hermeneutics. The hermeneutic circle, for Heidegger, has a positive ontological significance as the primordial way _Dasein_ enacts its existence. Gadamer, in his seminal work _Truth and Method_, built upon Heidegger's insights, particularly the earlier work found in _Being and Time_. Gadamer explicitly states that philosophical hermeneutics is, in essence, a "translation of Heidegger" into the academic medium, adapting his ontology for the human sciences. However, he also describes his work as a "correction" of Dilthey, addressing the question "How is understanding possible?" that Dilthey raised. Gadamer argues that understanding is not about establishing objective, verifiable truth in the scientific sense. Instead, he sought to describe the "event of understanding" itself – what happens _to us_ when we understand, over and above our deliberate will or method. Gadamer emphasizes that understanding is not a process or method, but more like breathing – a passive, grounding capability inherent to our being. He highlights that understanding is always situated within history and tradition, emphasizing that history does not belong to us, but we belong to it. This leads to the concept of "historically effected consciousness" (_wirkungsgeschichtliches Bewußtsein_), which reflects the influence of history on our understanding. Understanding is never approached from a neutral standpoint; it always involves a "forestructure," presupposing prior knowledge, expectations, or "fore-meanings". While some critics saw this acknowledgment of presuppositions as leading to relativism, Gadamer argued that conscious awareness of one's presuppositions is necessary for critical interpretation and openness to "the things themselves". The hermeneutic circle is central to Gadamer's account as well, describing the necessary movement between the whole and the parts in understanding. However, he distinguishes his view from a simple methodological rule, seeing it as inherent to the structure of understanding itself. Language plays a crucial role for Gadamer, being the medium of understanding and the site where being is unveiled in a step-by-step manner. He emphasizes the dialogical nature of language and understanding, where understanding involves engaging with the "other" (such as a text as a "Thou") and bringing common language into harmony. For Gadamer, this points to a form of truth that is not detached objectivity but emerges from the event of the word and dialogue, recognizing the finitude of language while gesturing towards the infinite unsaid. The "application" of understanding, seen as mediating between "then and now, between the Thou and the I," is the thread that connects different hermeneutic disciplines. Philosophical hermeneutics contrasts sharply with views that seek objective meaning based purely on authorial intention or method. Gadamer critiques approaches that try to separate understanding from the interpreter's own historicity and prejudices, arguing that interpreting is a way of being that cannot be purged of its standpoint. He saw his approach as a philosophy that precedes the technical question of "How should we understand?" by asking the more fundamental question, "How is understanding possible?". While rooted in phenomenology, philosophical hermeneutics has also engaged with and influenced other philosophical traditions and disciplines. It confronts Hegelian dialectics and claims of absolute knowledge by emphasizing finitude and the open-ended nature of dialogue. It has implications for our understanding of history, law, and other human sciences. It has also been a significant conversation partner for figures in analytic philosophy like Richard Rorty and John McDowell. Rorty, for instance, draws on Gadamer's critique of foundationalism ("epistemology") and sees hermeneutics as emphasizing "education or self-formation" (_Bildung_). He views understanding not as objective demonstration but as getting acquainted with a person or vocabulary. Philosophers like Paul Ricœur also engaged with philosophical hermeneutics, developing notions like a "hermeneutics of symbols" which deals with double meanings, and exploring a "hermeneutics of revelation" in relation to theological texts. Ricœur's work highlights the dialectic between "suspicion" (unmasking hidden meanings, as in psychoanalysis) and "recollection" or restoration of meaning, and emphasizes the role of embodiment in interpretation. Revelation, in this context, can be understood hermeneutically as an experience that refigures the self through particular uses of language, potentially revealing something beyond transparent reason. Philosophical hermeneutics thus offers a rich and complex account of understanding, moving beyond method to explore its fundamental nature as a mode of being, shaped by history, language, and our engagement with the other. It is less about finding universal rules for correct interpretation and more about illuminating the conditions and character of understanding itself. Further ideas to explore stemming from these sources might include: - Delving deeper into Heidegger's concept of hermeneutics as a "mode of being" and its connection to _Dasein_ and the _Seinsfrage_. - Examining Gadamer's specific arguments in _Truth and Method_, such as his reinterpretation of the hermeneutic circle and his critique of methodological objectivity. - Investigating the concept of "historically effected consciousness" and its implications for how our historical situation shapes our understanding. - Exploring the significance of language and dialogue in philosophical hermeneutics. - Comparing and contrasting the approaches of Heidegger and Gadamer in more detail, particularly Gadamer's described "silent turn" against certain aspects of Heidegger's thought. - Examining the debates between philosophical hermeneutics and other philosophical schools mentioned, such as deconstruction (Derrida) or pragmatism (Rorty). - Exploring Ricœur's contributions, especially his dialectic of suspicion and recollection and his hermeneutics of revelation.