Nāgārjuna, a prominent Buddhist philosopher estimated to have lived around the second century A.D., is widely regarded as the founder of the Mādhyamika (Middle Way) school of thought within Mahāyāna Buddhism. His most influential philosophical work is the _Mūlamadhyamakakārikā_ (often referred to as _Karika_ or _Fundamental Wisdom of the Middle Way_), a text that continues to be studied and debated in Tibetan monastic universities. Nāgārjuna is considered by some to be the single most important figure for the formulation of Buddhism in India after the Buddha himself. **Core Doctrine: Emptiness (Śūnyatā)** Nāgārjuna's philosophy gives central focus to the concept of "emptiness" (śūnyatā) or "the Void". This doctrine does not mean that the universe is totally devoid of reality or that everything is simply void, as some non-Buddhist philosophers generally understood Śūnya-vāda. Instead, Nāgārjuna's emptiness essentially means "transience" – that there is nothing to grasp and nothing permanent. It implies that all phenomena are without "self-nature" (svabhāva) or independent reality, as they exist only in relation to other things. Nothing in the universe can stand by itself, whether it be a thing, a fact, a being, or an event. The _Seventy Stanzas on Emptiness_ summarizes Nāgārjuna's basic formulation: all phenomena are devoid of inherent existence because their existence is not found in causes, conditions, aggregations, or individualities. Phenomena exist dependently and non-inherently; they are not mere hallucinations but are merely transitory, flashing into awareness and immediately disintegrating. This realization helps to cease grasping at the supposed true existence of objects. The deepest wisdom available to a bodhisattva is found in the experience of emptiness, which is proclaimed as the "supreme therapy" against greed, hatred, and delusion. Nāgārjuna also applies the concept of "emptiness of emptiness," meaning that the non-inherent existence of dependent arising itself must not exist inherently. This refutes any subtle eternalist interpretation of a teaching meant to refute eternalism. The view of emptiness, however, can itself become a "perversion" (_śūnyatā dṛṣṭi_) if one grasps it as an absolute truth. For Nāgārjuna, "emptiness" is a "view" and a "dependent convention" (_upādāya prajñapti_) that is grounded in and identifiable in terms of "the empty" (_śūnya_), which are the empirically given, dependently arisen phenomena. **Philosophical Methodology: The Middle Way** Nāgārjuna's school, Madhyamaka, is named "the Middle Way" because it refutes all metaphysical propositions by demonstrating their relativity. His method, called Prāsaṅgika, extends the Buddha's dialogue technique to undermine and cast doubts on any proposition, thereby destroying all intellectual formulations about the nature of reality or the self. Nāgārjuna was primarily an empiricist, not just a dialectician. He systematically refuted the substantialist or essentialist thought that emerged in the Buddhist philosophical tradition, particularly from the Sarvāstivāda and Sautrāntika schools. He criticized the Sarvāstivādins for their substantialist interpretation of phenomena (dharma) and the Sautrāntikas for positing a mysterious personality (pudgala) or momentary existences. His arguments often relied on the idea that something "is not evident" (_na vidyate_) or "not available" (_nopalabhyate_) in experience, rather than purely dialectical arguments. He probed every aspect of their speculations—epistemology, ontology, moral philosophy, and philosophy of language—linking disjointed concepts and dissolving hardened ones. He refuted the metaphysical notions of arising and ceasing, eternalism and annihilationism, and appearance and disappearance, which he saw as results of assuming substance or self-nature (_svabhāva_) and absolute "otherness" (_parabhāva_). For Nāgārjuna, a "caused substance" is a contradiction, and self-nature contradicts dependent arising because it is "unmade" and independent. He stated that "in the absence of self-nature, other-nature is also not evident," asserting their mutual dependence and rejecting their substantial existence. Nāgārjuna did not assert a fixed thesis of his own (_svapakṣa_) in the same way he criticized others, leading some scholars like Candrakīrti to interpret him as having "no position". However, Kalupahana argues that Nāgārjuna's philosophical enterprise involved both "analysis" (_vigraha_) and "explanation" (_vyākhyāna_), and he provided "right views" to contrast with the "wrong views" he refuted. His purpose was to clarify erroneous cognition and convert mistaken conceptions into correct beliefs. **Key Concepts and Their Application** - **The Two Truths:** Nāgārjuna explicitly states that the teaching of the doctrine by the Buddhas is based upon two truths: the truth of worldly convention (_loka-saṁvṛti-satya_) and the truth in terms of ultimate fruit (_paramārtha-satya_). He argues that those who do not understand the distinction between these two truths cannot understand the profound mystery of Buddha's teachings. For Nāgārjuna, the conventional world of experience, with its distinct identities and causation, is not an illusion; it is real as experienced. The ultimate truth, however, reveals that things and events do not possess discrete, independent realities, but are empty. He rejects any unbridgeable chasm between these two, stating, "Without relying upon convention, the ultimate fruit is not taught". - **Karma and Moral Responsibility:** Nāgārjuna upholds the doctrine of karma and moral responsibility, contrary to some interpretations that suggest his philosophy leads to their denial. He explains karma as self-restraint and benefitting others, actions that bear fruit in this life and the next. He utilizes the analogy of an "imperishable promissory note" to explain how the responsibility for an action remains even if the action itself is not continuous, emphasizing that karma implies the possibility of consequences without an underlying permanent substance. He explicitly rejects the notion that "self-nature does not perform," arguing that moral discourse and a substantialist worldview are incompatible. - **The Self (Ātman) and the Person (Pudgala):** Nāgārjuna addresses the problem of the self and human personality extensively. He asserts that the belief in a permanent and eternal self (_ātman_) gives rise to notions of possessiveness (_ātmiya_). He, like the Buddha, distinguishes between self-awareness or consciousness (which is dependently arisen) and the reification of a substantial "I" or "mine" (_aham-iti_, _mama-iti_), which leads to egoism and pride. He advocates for the "appeasement" (sama), not complete eradication, of the self and self-hood, as well as dispositions (_saṁskāra_) and obsessions (_prapañca_). He states that the Buddhas have taught both the "conception of self" and the "doctrine of no-self," but have not reified either, explaining them through dependent arising. - **Nirvāṇa and Saṁsāra:** Nāgārjuna's conception of nirvāṇa is central to his philosophy. He rejects an absolutist interpretation of nirvāṇa as a metaphysical state separate from ordinary existence (_saṁsāra_). He famously states that "Nirvāṇa is not even slightly different from saṁsāra. Saṁsāra is not even slightly different from nirvāṇa". This does not imply an essential identity, but rather a denial of any ultimate substance that would make either saṁsāra or nirvāṇa unique entities. Nāgārjuna defines nirvāṇa negatively as "unabandoned and unachieved, uninterrupted and impermanent, unextinguished and non-arisen," using these negations to refute metaphysical notions of existence and non-existence. He argues that true nirvāṇa is to be found "within the world by those who can see what the world really is at bottom". - **Buddha's Teachings and Nāgārjuna's Role:** Kalupahana presents Nāgārjuna as a "grand commentator" on the Buddha's teachings, rather than someone who attempted to improve upon them. He argues that Nāgārjuna's _Karika_ is a superb commentary on the Buddha's _Kaccayanagotta-sutta_, a discourse that elucidates the philosophical middle path of dependent arising against absolutist theories of existence and non-existence. Nāgārjuna’s humility and respect for the Buddha and his early disciples contrasts with the unsympathetic attitude of later Mahayanists. His philosophy is seen as an attempt to clear away the "weeds" of speculative ideas that grew around the Buddha's original message, particularly those from the Sarvāstivāda and Sautrāntika schools. He concludes his treatise by reverently bowing to Gautama, who "out of compassion, has taught the true doctrine for the relinquishing of all views," emphasizing the abandonment of dogmatism. - **Perception and Cognition:** Nāgārjuna's epistemological investigations rejected the idea of a self-perceiving consciousness, similar to Descartes' "cogito," arguing it implied a substantial entity. Instead, he affirmed the Buddha's view that consciousness arises dependently upon sense organs and objects, as "the arising of [visual] consciousness is said to be dependent upon eye and material form". He stressed that perception and its objects are mutually dependent and that analyzing them into discrete, independent entities leads to metaphysical problems. - **Time and Change:** Nāgārjuna critically examined metaphysical notions of time and change. He rejected the analysis of time into discrete moments (kṣaṇa) by the Sarvāstivādins and Sautrāntikas, which he saw as leading to absurd implications regarding causation and impermanence. While not denying empirical change or impermanence, he rejected their interpretation as absolute or substantial entities. **Interpretations and Debates** Nāgārjuna's philosophical legacy has been subject to various interpretations. He is sometimes elevated to the status of a "second Buddha" within Mahāyāna schools, a veneration that Kalupahana argues has reached "ridiculous heights" and reflects an uncritical, dogmatic attitude. This exaggerated view often assumes Nāgārjuna provided a "deeper" Mahāyāna doctrine that transcended or even rejected the Buddha's earlier teachings. However, Kalupahana strongly contests this, arguing that Nāgārjuna was a reformer who clarified and restored the original, non-sectarian message of the Buddha. A significant debate concerns whether Nāgārjuna's philosophy, particularly his concept of emptiness, implies a nihilistic or ineffable ultimate truth. Some scholars, following commentators like Candrakīrti, interpret Nāgārjuna's use of "no-views" as indicating that ultimate truth is beyond conceptualization and language. However, Kalupahana argues that Nāgārjuna's negations were primarily aimed at refuting _metaphysical_ assertions and their inherent contradictions, not at declaring truth to be ineffable or denying the validity of all concepts. For Nāgārjuna, "truth" is "dependently arisen," reflecting a pragmatic epistemology that is empirically grounded.