Hermeneutics, broadly defined, is the study of the theory and practice of interpreting texts. Dating back to ancient times, it was initially linked to the study of rhetoric and primarily focused on theological-philological and legal texts. In the pre-modern era, this involved explaining and interpreting scripture and other important writings. For instance, medieval biblical exegesis often found multiple layers of meaning in scripture, including literal, allegorical, tropological (moral), and anagogical (mystical) senses. While scholars like Thomas Aquinas emphasized the literal sense as the basis for understanding, the focus often leaned towards theological or spiritual interpretations rather than purely historical or philological ones. A key turn in the evolution of hermeneutics occurred with Friedrich Schleiermacher in the Romantic era. He is credited with freeing hermeneutics from its dogmatic features and establishing it as a general theory of understanding and interpretation, serving as a basis for all historical humanistic sciences. Schleiermacher posed the question of understanding in its radicality, starting from the premise that misunderstanding arises on its own and understanding must be actively sought. For him, understanding was defined negatively, as the overcoming of misunderstanding. Wilhelm Dilthey further expanded this idea, extending the art of understanding to a methodology for the human sciences. He is seen as having introduced the hermeneutical problem into modern philosophical thought. Dilthey aimed to provide the human sciences with a methodological foundation by showing how knowledge originates in life. He viewed history as a grand text with meaning transparent to interpretation if guided by the right method. Dilthey conceived the hermeneutic circle as unfolding between the interpreter and the object, grounded in the objective spirit (shared language, customs, etc.). He aimed for historical knowledge and a standpoint-free objectivity in historical research, but Heidegger and Gadamer would later critique this focus. Dilthey's fundamental question was "How is understanding possible?", a question Gadamer would also take up. However, Dilthey's approach relied heavily on a psychological concept of "empathy" for grasping the experience of others. This brings us to Martin Heidegger, who represents a major shift in the evolution of hermeneutics. Heidegger transformed Dilthey's methodological hermeneutics into philosophical or phenomenological hermeneutics. Unlike Dilthey, Heidegger did not consider hermeneutics merely a method but fundamentally a _mode of being_. He argued that "Dasein is as an understanding potentiality-for-Being, which, in its Being, makes an issue of that Being itself". For Heidegger, we already live in an understanding of Being, and understanding is the originary phenomenon from which misunderstanding derives. His project involved a "hermeneutics of facticity" in the 1920s, aiming to understand existence theoretically and historically. Heidegger's analysis of Dasein disclosed the "fore-structure of understanding" and its basic circular character. He identified a tripartite structure of interpretation – fore-having, fore-sight, and fore-conception – corresponding to the interpreter's position, direction, and scope of looking. For Heidegger, hermeneutics became the interpretation of existence. Hans-Georg Gadamer was a significant disciple and follower of Heidegger, and his philosophical hermeneutics, presented in _Truth and Method_, is often seen as a development of Heidegger's ideas. Gadamer himself described his philosophical hermeneutics as a "transposition" or "translation" of Heidegger's thought into the sphere of the human sciences. He aimed to correct Dilthey's hermeneutics using Heidegger's insights, specifically drawing consequences for the human sciences from Heidegger's concept of the circular structure of understanding derived from Dasein's temporality. Gadamer adopted the view that understanding is a mode of being, not a method. However, while deeply influenced, Gadamer also introduced "essential alterations" and what is sometimes called a "silent turn" against his teacher. Here are some key areas of influence and divergence: 1. **Understanding as a Mode of Being:** Both Heidegger and Gadamer fundamentally agreed that hermeneutics is not merely a method for interpreting texts but is rooted in understanding as a fundamental mode of human existence. Gadamer explicitly builds on Heidegger's disclosure of the fore-structure of understanding. 2. **Critique of Dilthey:** Both Heidegger and Gadamer criticized Dilthey's methodological approach and psychologism, viewing hermeneutics as having a deeper, ontological significance. Gadamer's project in _Truth and Method_ is explicitly framed as a "correction" of Dilthey. He sought to substitute the subject-centered approach with the substance of tradition as the ground of historical understanding. 3. **The Hermeneutic Circle:** Gadamer takes up Heidegger's concept of the hermeneutic circle, acknowledging its ontological significance. However, Gadamer reinterprets and broadens its application, emphasizing its role in textual interpretation and the movement between parts and the whole. The circle is effectuated through the interpreter's projection of meaning based on tradition and validation against the text, leading to a "fusion of horizons". 4. **The Distinction Between Types of Understanding:** A significant divergence lies in Gadamer's move against Heidegger's distinction between "primary" existential-ontological understanding and "derivative" historical or existentiallontical understanding. Gadamer argues that historical understanding, as he describes it, already possesses the existential-ontological thrust, leading to a disclosure of truth (_aletheia_) regarding what it means to be. He uses Aristotle's analysis of _phronesis_ (practical wisdom) to demonstrate the existential-ontological nature of historical understanding. 5. **The Role of Tradition and Prejudice:** Gadamer strongly emphasizes tradition as the horizon of historical existence and the source of the fore-structure of understanding. He famously undertakes a "rehabilitation of tradition and prejudice", arguing that prejudices (pre-judgments) transmitted by tradition are conditions for understanding, not simply obstacles to objective knowledge. This contrasts with earlier views (like Dilthey's aim for objectivity) and leads to a view of hermeneutic work as navigating the polarity between familiarity and strangeness presented by the object within tradition. Tradition ensures continuity but also presents the hermeneutic object as something potentially alien that challenges our understanding. 6. **The Place of the "Other" and Dialogue:** Gadamer's reformulation of understanding includes a strong emphasis on its dialogical nature, particularly the encounter with the "other" and tradition as a "Thou". He sees this as a correction of Heidegger's account, which he felt did not adequately address the other as a condition for questioning and thinking. This dialogical model is central to Gadamer's hermeneutics, contrasting with Dilthey's reliance on empathy. 7. **Understanding as Application:** Gadamer argues that understanding inherently involves application. This means understanding is not complete until it is applied to the interpreter's specific situation. Drawing on legal and theological hermeneutics, he views understanding as a special case of applying something universal (like a text's meaning) to a particular situation. This emphasizes the practical value of understanding and leads to a transformation of the interpreter. 8. **Language:** Both saw language as central and dialogical. For Gadamer, the dialogical structure of language is where a step-by-step unveiling of being occurs. 9. **Relation to Ontology and Metaphysics:** While Gadamer's work is developed from Heidegger's fundamental ontology and _Truth and Method_ has an "ontological turn" guided by language, Gadamer's philosophical hermeneutics distances itself from ontology as a search for what Being _is_. Instead, because there is no Being without the understanding of Being, ontology necessarily becomes hermeneutics, focusing on the question of understanding itself. Gadamer's approach is described as non-metaphysical, unlike Heidegger's anti-metaphysical stance. Truth for Gadamer is presented as an event of understanding, not reducible to objective, verifiable knowledge. In essence, the evolution of hermeneutic understanding, as seen through this lineage, moves from a focus on textual interpretation and method (pre-modern, Schleiermacher, Dilthey) towards a philosophical and ontological understanding of interpretation as a fundamental mode of human existence (Heidegger, Gadamer). Gadamer, while building on Heidegger's foundation, refines and alters the concept, particularly by highlighting the crucial roles of tradition, dialogue with the other, and application in the process of understanding, presenting understanding as a historically effected event that happens over and above the interpreter's will. Here are some further ideas to explore based on this discussion and the provided sources: - The specific ways Gadamer uses Aristotle's _phronesis_ and the concept of application to challenge Heidegger's distinction between primary and derivative understanding. - The debate surrounding Gadamer's claim that his philosophical hermeneutics "legitimates" and "paves the way" for Heidegger's later thought, especially concerning language. - The critiques of Gadamer's hermeneutics, particularly regarding his rehabilitation of tradition and the charge that his view of understanding might appropriate or subjugate the other. - How the concept of the "fusion of horizons" functions in Gadamer's hermeneutics and its relation to the concept of "application". - The connection between philosophical hermeneutics and the concept of "truth" as an event of understanding, contrasting it with scientific notions of truth. - The influence and reception of Gadamer's hermeneutics in specific fields like legal studies, theology, literary criticism, and even its recent engagement with analytic philosophy. - The idea of hermeneutics as a "koiné" or common language in continental philosophy and the challenges that come with this broad acceptance.