**Lying** Lying is fundamentally defined by its relationship to truth and the speaker's beliefs. It is generally understood as uttering what is false with the purpose of deceiving someone. The essence of a lie implies that the liar is in complete possession of the truth they are hiding; one cannot lie about what they are ignorant of or when they are simply mistaken. The moralist's focus is on the "formal lie," which is saying what one believes not to be true or promising what one intends not to perform – in short, speaking against one's mind. Some sources argue that speaking against one's mind is intrinsically evil, meaning the intention to deceive isn't strictly necessary for an act to be a lie from a moral standpoint; the act itself, the discord between thought and word, is inherently wrong. However, the common definition, supported by philosopher Harry Frankfurt among others, emphasizes the liar's deliberate intention to promulgate a falsehood. A liar knows the truth and deliberately speaks in opposition to it. Lying is described as an act with a "sharp focus". It is "designed to insert a particular falsehood at a specific point in a set or system of beliefs, in order to avoid the consequences of having that point occupied by the truth". This requires a degree of "craftsmanship," as the liar must submit to "objective constraints imposed by what he takes to be the truth" in order to invent an effective lie. Liars are "inescapably concerned with truth-values". When a person lies about something, they necessarily misrepresent both the state of affairs they are talking about and their own state of mind or belief concerning it. Philosophically, lying is often considered a significant wrongdoing. Even in contexts where a verbal lie might be deemed "useful" or "noble" for societal purposes, like Plato's "noble lie," it is distinguished from the "true lie" that one holds in their soul, a lie to oneself about what is most important, which is always to be avoided. Government euphemism is considered a form of lying because it uses words with broader meanings than what is specifically intended, relying on the listener's expectation that if the specific meaning were intended, the more direct word would have been used. **Bullshit** Bullshit, in contrast to lying, is not primarily defined by its falsity. Harry Frankfurt, a key source on the concept, argues that the "essence of bullshit is not that it is false but that it is phony". A bullshitter is "unconstrained by a concern with truth". Whether the statements they make are true or false is "of no central interest to him". The bullshitter's eye is "not on the facts at all," except insofar as facts might help them "get away with what he says". They "do not care whether the things he says describe reality correctly. He just picks them out, or makes them up, to suit his purpose". The purpose of bullshit is different from that of lying. A bullshitter's goal is typically "to make the listener think of him as a certain kind of person, whether it be a patriot, a moral avatar, a sensitive and caring soul, or whatever else advances his personal interests". While a liar attempts to deceive us about the facts or about what they take the facts to be, the bullshitter "necessarily attempt[s] to deceive us about his enterprise". They hide the fact that "the truth-values of his statements are of no central interest to him". The intention is "neither to report the truth nor to conceal it". Bullshitting is described as being closer to "bluffing" than to lying. Both bullshitting and bluffing are modes of misrepresentation, but bluffing, like bullshit, is more a matter of "fakery" than "falsity". A fake or phony thing need not be inferior to the real thing (it could be an exact copy); what is wrong is how it was made – its lack of authenticity. Similarly, bullshit is produced without concern for truth, regardless of whether it happens to be true. Unlike the liar's "craftsmanship" and submission to objective constraints, the person who bullshits their way through a situation has "much more freedom". Their focus is "panoramic rather than particular". They are "not constrained by the truths surrounding that point or intersecting it" and are "prepared to fake the context as well". This mode of creativity is "less analytical and less deliberative," more "expansive and independent, with more spacious opportunities for improvisation, color, and imaginative play". It is described as "less a matter of craft than of art," leading to the notion of the "bullshit artist". Bullshit is characterized as "hot air," which is speech "emptied of all informative content" and "without substance or content," serving no communicative purpose. **Distinctions and Relationships** The fundamental distinction lies in the speaker's orientation toward truth. Both the liar and the bullshitter misrepresent themselves as endeavoring to communicate the truth, and their success depends on deceiving the audience about this. However, the liar is engaged in a game with truth: they know or believe they know the truth and deliberately defy its authority by asserting what is false. They are, in this sense, "responsive to the truth" and "to that extent respectful of it". The bullshitter, conversely, "ignores these demands altogether" and "pays no attention to it at all". They are "neither on the side of the true nor on the side of the false". Because the bullshitter is unconcerned with truth, excessive engagement in bullshitting can be more detrimental to a person's relationship with reality than lying. Lying, by requiring attention to what is true (in order to misrepresent it effectively), keeps the liar engaged with the facts. Bullshitting, which involves making assertions without paying attention to anything except what suits one's purpose, can lead to a person's "normal habit of attending to the ways things are... become attenuated or lost". For this reason, bullshit is argued to be a "greater enemy of the truth than lies are". Bullshit is seen as unavoidable in circumstances where individuals are required to speak extensively about topics of which they are ignorant, such as in public life or due to the perceived civic duty to have opinions on everything. It also has deeper roots in forms of skepticism that deny reliable access to objective reality, leading people to abandon the pursuit of correctness (truth) and retreat into the pursuit of sincerity (honest self-representation), which, if unconstrained by concern for truth, can result in bullshit. People tend to be more tolerant of bullshit than of lies, perhaps because it is perceived as less of a personal affront. One might react to bullshit with an "impatient or irritated shrug," whereas lies can inspire a "sense of violation or outrage". **1. Lying: The Core Concept** * **Definition:** A lie is a statement made with the *intention to deceive*. This is absolutely key. To lie, you must believe that what you are saying is false and deliberately present it as true in order to mislead someone. * **Key Elements:** * **Falsehood:** The statement itself must be untrue. * **Knowledge of Falsehood:** The liar *knows* the statement is false. This distinguishes a lie from an honest mistake or misunderstanding. * **Intent to Deceive:** The primary purpose of the statement is to make someone believe something that isn't true. * **Motivation:** Lies are typically motivated by self-interest – avoiding punishment, gaining advantage, protecting reputation, etc. While altruistic lies (white lies) exist, the core element remains the intent to deceive. * **Example:** Saying "I finished my homework" when you haven't, knowing that it’s false, in order to avoid getting a bad grade. **2. Bullshitting (BS): Frankfurt's Contribution** * **Harry Frankfurt and "On Bullshit" (1985):** The philosophical discussion of BS really took off with Harry Frankfurt's influential essay. He argued that BS is fundamentally different from lying, even though both involve making statements. * **Definition:** A bullshitter doesn’t necessarily care whether what they are saying is true or false. Their primary goal isn't to deceive; it's to *impress*, *persuade*, or simply *appear knowledgeable*. They are concerned with getting away with the performance of speaking, rather than the truth value of their words. * **Key Elements (according to Frankfurt):** * **Lack of Concern for Truth:** This is the defining characteristic. A bullshitter doesn't worry about whether they’re being accurate. They might not even know if what they are saying is true or false, and that lack of concern is central. * **Performance & Impression Management:** The focus is on *appearing* to be someone who knows something. It's a performance designed to create an effect on the audience. * **Engagement with the Subject Matter (often superficial):** Bullshitters often talk *about* subjects, giving the impression of understanding, even if their actual knowledge is limited or non-existent. They might use jargon or complex language to seem intelligent. * **Motivation:** Bullshitting is driven by a desire for social acceptance, status, power, or simply to avoid appearing foolish. It's about maintaining a certain image. * **Example:** A student giving a rambling, vaguely impressive explanation of a philosophical concept they barely understand, using big words and sounding confident, without actually knowing if their claims are correct. Or someone at a party confidently discussing topics they know nothing about to appear intelligent. **3. The Crucial Difference: Concern for Truth** The core distinction boils down to this: * **Liars care about the truth.** They know what's false and deliberately present it as true. Their concern is with manipulating belief. * **Bullshitters don’t care about the truth.** They are indifferent to whether their statements are accurate or not. Their concern is with manipulating *appearance*. Frankfurt argues that a bullshitter cannot lie because lying requires a commitment to falsehood, and a bullshitter has no such commitment. They're operating outside of the realm where truth matters. **4. Overlap & Gray Areas** * **Bullshit can contain lies:** A person might bullshit *and* lie simultaneously. For example, they could make up false information (a lie) to bolster their performance and appear more knowledgeable (bullshitting). * **Intent is often difficult to determine:** It can be challenging to discern whether someone is lying or bullshitting, as motivations are internal. We infer intent based on behavior and context. * **Self-Deception:** Sometimes, people who bullshit may genuinely believe they are saying something true, even if it's not. This blurs the line between BS and honest error. **5. Why Does This Distinction Matter?** Frankfurt’s analysis has implications for: * **Understanding Communication:** It sheds light on how we interact and present ourselves in social situations. * **Evaluating Expertise:** It highlights the importance of genuine knowledge versus mere appearances. In an age of misinformation, being able to distinguish between informed expertise and skillful BS is crucial. * **Moral Philosophy:** It raises questions about responsibility and accountability for what we say. **Suggestions for Further Exploration:** * **Read Harry Frankfurt's "On Bullshit":** This is the foundational text. It’s a relatively short essay, but incredibly thought-provoking. You can find it online or in many philosophy anthologies. * **Explore related concepts:** * **Gaslighting:** A form of manipulation that involves distorting someone's perception of reality – often involving elements of both lying and bullshitting. * **Postmodernism & Relativism:** These philosophical perspectives question the existence of objective truth, which can influence how we understand BS and its implications. * **Rhetoric & Persuasion:** Studying rhetoric can help you analyze how people use language to create impressions and influence others – a key element in bullshitting. * **Epistemology (the study of knowledge):** Consider how the concept of "knowing" is challenged by bullshitting, which prioritizes appearance over genuine understanding. * **Consider contemporary examples:** Think about politicians, social media influencers, or other public figures – can you identify instances of lying and bullshitting in their communication? ---- Frankfurt actually started with "On Bullshit," offering an initial look at what he saw as a pervasive feature of modern culture. He realized later, though, that he had made a big assumption: that everyone just _knows_ why being indifferent to truth is bad. He hadn't really explained _why_ truth is important or why we should care about it. "On Truth" was written to address this very gap, serving as a sort of sequel or necessary foundation for the earlier work. Think of "On Bullshit" as identifying a problem, and "On Truth" as explaining why the problem is, well, a problem! Let's start with the star of his first essay: bullshit. Now, Frankfurt is quick to point out that defining bullshit precisely is a bit tricky because the word is often used loosely, and the phenomenon itself is vast and messy. He looks at other attempts, like Max Black's definition of "humbug" as "deceptive misrepresentation, short of lying, especially by pretentious word or deed, of somebody’s own thoughts, feelings, or attitudes". Frankfurt finds this definition close but ultimately not quite right for capturing the essence of bullshit. He distinguishes bullshit from lying in a fundamental way. A liar, according to Frankfurt, knows the truth and deliberately tries to conceal it by presenting a falsehood. The liar is constrained by reality because they must understand the truth in order to invent an effective lie that deviates from it. So, in a strange way, the liar actually _respects_ the truth by acknowledging its authority, even if only to defy it. The bullshitter, on the other hand, is defined by an _indifference_ to the truth. They aren't trying to present something false _instead_ of the truth; they simply don't care whether what they are saying is true or false. Their focus isn't on accurately representing reality or deliberately misrepresenting it. Instead, the bullshitter is primarily focused on manipulating the opinions or attitudes of their audience. What matters most to them is whether what they say _works_ to achieve their goal, regardless of its truthfulness. Frankfurt suggests that bullshitting involves a kind of bluff or fakery, where the person is misrepresenting what they are _up to_ – they pretend to be conveying information when they aren't concerned with its truth-value at all. He uses the example of a Fourth of July orator to illustrate this. The orator isn't necessarily lying about the facts of American history; they probably don't even care much about whether those specific historical claims are true or false. Their real goal is to project an image of themselves as a patriot or someone with deep feelings. This fits Black's idea of misrepresenting one's own state of mind, but for Frankfurt, the core issue is the indifference to the truth of the _statements_ being made. He also recounts an anecdote about Wittgenstein criticizing someone for saying they felt "just like a dog that has been run over" after having their tonsils out. Wittgenstein's apparent disgust, as interpreted in the story, wasn't because the person was lying (they weren't aware they felt good), but because they were using language that purported to describe a specific feeling without having any genuine knowledge or concern for its accuracy – they were making it up without regard for how things really are. This indifference to correctness, this lack of attention to the relevant facts, is the hallmark of bullshit. Bullshit, Frankfurt argues, is actually a greater enemy of the truth than lying is. Lying, by engaging with the truth (even to defy it), doesn't necessarily erode a person's ability to recognize truth. Bullshitting, however, involves making assertions without paying attention to reality, which can attenuate or destroy the habit of caring about how things actually are. The proliferation of bullshit, he suggests, is often linked to situations where people are required to speak about things they don't know much about. More profoundly, he connects it to skeptical or "anti-realist" doctrines that deny the possibility of knowing objective reality. If you believe there's no objective truth to be known, then the distinction between true and false loses its meaning, and you might as well just say whatever suits your purpose, leading to bullshit. So, that's a bit about bullshit and why it's problematic. But what about truth itself? This is where "On Truth" really shines, explaining why this often-taken-for-granted concept is so incredibly important. Frankfurt starts with a seemingly simple, even "banal," idea: truth has immense practical utility. Both societies and individuals need truthful information to function effectively. How could a society make good decisions about public affairs without knowing the relevant facts? How could natural and social sciences, or even the arts, prosper without respect for honesty, clarity, and accuracy? On a personal level, navigating life's "thicket of hazards and opportunities" requires knowing the truth about everything from what to eat and wear to where to live, how to do your job, raise children, or understand other people. Our success, even our survival, depends on being guided by truth rather than ignorance or falsehood. This practical utility stems from a deeper connection: truth is about reality. When we use truths, we are dealing with the properties of real objects and events. Truths capture and convey the nature of these realities, including their causal powers, allowing us to act with a reasonable expectation of success. They help us understand possibilities, dangers, and what is reasonable to expect, enabling us to "know our way around" and feel "at home" in the world. Crucially, reality and the truths about it are independent of our will, judgments, or desires. The facts "are what they are regardless of what we may happen to believe about them". Facing these facts, even when they are frightening or discouraging, is almost always more advantageous than remaining ignorant. Ignorance and error leave us "in the dark," "flying blind," unable to effectively cope with reality, ultimately leading to trouble. Beyond practical utility, truth is also essential to our understanding of ourselves as rational beings. Rationality, for Frankfurt, is about being appropriately responsive to reasons. Reasons are constituted by facts, and only _true_ statements about facts can provide rational support for beliefs or actions. False statements offer no rational basis for anything. Without the notions of truth and factuality, the concept of rationality itself would have no meaningful substance and would be of little use. To consider ourselves rational creatures proud of this capacity, we must recognize that facts and truths are indispensable for providing us with reasons. Ignoring the distinction between true and false means giving up on our cherished rationality. Frankfurt also explores the relationship between truth, trust, and confidence, noting the linguistic link between "truth" and "troth". While total honesty isn't strictly necessary for social interaction to continue (we navigate environments of falsehood by being careful), a widespread disregard for truth burdens society. Our primary concern with lies, however, is often personal rather than civic. Lies injure us because they interfere with our natural effort to apprehend the real state of affairs, forcing us into an "imaginary world" based on the liar's fabrication rather than reality. This "damages our grasp of reality" and can make us feel "a little crazy," especially when a friend lies to us. Discovering a friend's lie can feel like a betrayal not just by them, but by our own "second nature" of trusting them, revealing our inability to reliably distinguish truth from falsity in this context. Interestingly, Frankfurt includes Shakespeare's Sonnet 138, where lovers lie to each other but know they are being lied to, and know their own lies are seen through. This example challenges the idea that lying always destroys intimacy. The transparency of the deception in the sonnet creates a different kind of deep intimacy, where the lovers "see through" each other's carefully constructed facades. This suggests that not all untruthful communication is equally damaging; the _nature_ of the relationship to truth (conscious manipulation with mutual awareness vs. indifference) matters. This contrasts sharply with the isolation felt by the victim of a lie in a typical scenario. Beyond practical utility and rationality, Frankfurt suggests a deeper, more philosophical importance of truth, relating it to self-identity. We understand ourselves as distinct individuals by encountering external reality – things that resist our will and desires. Recognizing these limits helps us define our own boundaries, powers, and vulnerabilities, clarifying "the specific sort of being that we are". Our sense of identity depends on appreciating a reality independent of ourselves, a world of stubborn facts and truths. If everything bent to our will, we wouldn't be able to distinguish ourselves from the rest of the world, and we wouldn't have a sense of our own specific nature. Therefore, caring about truth is intrinsically linked to understanding who we are and where we fit in reality. Frankfurt even brings in the philosopher Spinoza to suggest that we are driven to respect truth by a kind of love. Spinoza defined love as "Joy with the accompanying idea of an external cause". Joy, for Spinoza, is the feeling that accompanies an increase in our capacity to survive and realize our essential nature – a feeling of enhanced vitality, of being more fully ourselves. Since truth is indispensable for navigating life, understanding ourselves, and living in accord with our nature, recognizing this connection means we inevitably love truth because it is a source of this vital joy. We cannot help loving what helps us stay alive and become more fully ourselves. Therefore, anyone who values their own life, whether they realize it or not, loves truth. An indifference to truth is, in this Spinozistic view, an indifference to one's own life. Comparing the two essays, we see that "On Bullshit" diagnoses a problem rooted in an attitude: indifference to truth. "On Truth" then explains _why_ this indifference is so damaging by detailing the fundamental importance of truth for practical success, rationality, self-identity, and even a deep, Spinozistic sense of flourishing. The prevalence of bullshit, fueled partly by skepticism about objective reality, directly undermines the very foundations that "On Truth" lays out as essential for a healthy society and individual life. We can connect Frankfurt's analysis of bullshit and truth in several ways beyond his explicit statements: 1. **The Corrosive Effect of Indifference:** "On Bullshit" shows that the bullshitter's indifference isn't just harmless noise; it's a profound disrespect for the enterprise of communicating reality. "On Truth" shows that our capacity to cope with reality is entirely dependent on truth. The pervasive indifference to truth described in "On Bullshit" thus directly undermines the crucial relationship with reality detailed in "On Truth." Bullshit isn't just misleading; it erodes the very grounds upon which we must stand to function in the world. If enough people are habitually indifferent to truth, society loses its collective footing in reality. 2. **Sincerity as a Poor Substitute:** "On Bullshit" touches on how, when objective reality is doubted, people might retreat to an ideal of sincerity ("being true to himself"). "On Truth" presents a more robust view of being true to oneself, linked to recognizing our limits and nature by engaging with external, independent reality. The "sincerity" discussed in "On Bullshit," born of indifference to external truth, is dismissed as potentially bullshit itself. This connects the essays by showing how a fundamental misunderstanding of "being true to oneself" (mistaking mere subjective feeling for objective self-knowledge) can contribute to the environment where bullshit thrives. 3. **The Attack on Rationality:** "On Bullshit" identifies indifference to the true/false distinction as the core issue. "On Truth" argues that recognizing this distinction is fundamental to rationality. Therefore, the widespread bullshit described in the first essay represents a direct assault on our capacity for rationality, which the second essay deems our most distinctive characteristic and a significant advantage. The more bullshit we tolerate or produce, the less capable we become, individually and collectively, of thinking and acting rationally, because we lose the necessary basis for reasons. 4. **Bullshit vs. Shakespearean Lies:** While "On Truth" discusses the potential for transparency and a different kind of intimacy in the specific, mutually recognized lies of Shakespeare's sonnet, this serves to highlight the particular problem with _bullshit_. The lovers in the sonnet, despite lying, still operate with an underlying awareness of truth – they know what is being manipulated and see through the facade. Bullshit, however, arises from not caring about the underlying truth at all. The damage caused by bullshit isn't just being given false information; it's being subjected to a performance where the speaker has opted out of the project of representing reality altogether. This fundamental indifference, unlike the conscious, mutually understood manipulation in the sonnet, truly severs the connection to a shared reality and the possibility of genuine communication about it. These essays, read together, offer a powerful argument. They tell us that bullshit isn't just annoying; it's dangerous because it represents an active disregard for the very thing – truth and our connection to reality – that allows us to live successfully, think rationally, build trust, and even understand ourselves. Thinking about this further, here are some ideas and questions you might explore: - How does the digital age, with its speed and volume of information, amplify the conditions that stimulate the production of bullshit? Does the "obligation or opportunity to speak" about things we don't fully know increase dramatically online? - If "indifference to how things really are" is the essence of bullshit, how do social media algorithms and filter bubbles contribute to this indifference, perhaps by prioritizing engagement or emotional response over factual accuracy? - Frankfurt notes that we tend to be more tolerant of bullshit than lies. Why might this be? Is it because its consequences seem less direct, or is there a deeper reason related to the bullshitter's perceived lack of malicious intent regarding the facts themselves? - Given the Spinozistic argument that we implicitly love truth because it helps us flourish, how can individuals and societies cultivate a more explicit and conscious "love of truth" to counteract the pervasive indifference? What practices or attitudes would encourage this? - Frankfurt avoids defining truth directly, taking a common-sense approach. But if skeptical doctrines challenge the very notion of objective truth, how does one defend the importance of something whose nature is contested? Does the pragmatic utility argument from "On Truth" provide a sufficient defense against such skepticism? - How does the "performance" aspect of bullshit, where the speaker is trying to manipulate opinions and attitudes, relate to contemporary concepts of authenticity or personal branding? These essays give us a lot to chew on, reminding us that while bullshit is widespread and often seems trivial, our relationship with truth is anything but. Caring about truth is fundamental to navigating the world and understanding ourselves within it.