This book isn't trying to cover all of morality as most people understand it. Think about all the different things people call "moral" or "immoral" – like certain kinds of sexual conduct, or even destroying animal species. Scanlon isn't diving into that whole, vast ocean of ideas in this book. Instead, he's focusing on a specific, narrower part of morality. He refers to this as "the morality of right and wrong" or, as the title of the book puts it, "what we owe to each other". This particular domain is all about our duties to other people. This includes things like obligations to help others and prohibitions against actions that harm, kill, coerce, or deceive them. It's a big and important part of morality as generally understood, but it's presented here as just a part, not the entire picture. Scanlon believes this specific area has a unique unity, characterized by a single way of reasoning and a common motivational basis. This contrasts with the broader sense of morality, which might not have such a unified structure. Now, how does Scanlon approach understanding this "what we owe to each other"? He uses a view called **contractualism**. At its core, this view suggests that when we're thinking about what is right or wrong in this specific moral domain, we're essentially trying to figure out whether certain principles for governing our behavior are ones that no one could **reasonably reject**. Think of it as seeking principles that everyone, ideally motivated, could agree upon for how we should treat each other. This idea of "reasonable rejection" is central. It's not about whether someone _would_ reject a principle based on just anything, but whether they could reject it _reasonably_. Scanlon's version of contractualism is distinct from other theories that rely on ideas of what would be _rational_ to choose under certain conditions, like those proposed by Kant, Rawls, Gauthier, or Hare. While those theories might ask what people would rationally agree to (perhaps behind a "veil of ignorance" or under universalizing conditions), Scanlon's approach focuses on a different kind of motivation: the **aim of finding principles that others, who also share this aim, could not reasonably reject**. This aim provides a direct reason to care about other people's perspectives. It's not because you might _be_ them (like in some veil-of-ignorance scenarios) or because you're maximizing overall preference satisfaction. Instead, you consider their points of view because you are genuinely trying to find principles that _they_, as well as _you_, have reason to accept. This motivational connection between the process of figuring out what's right and the reasons for acting rightly is a strong continuity in Scanlon's view. It's interesting to see how Scanlon's thinking evolved on the motivational basis of this part of morality. He initially thought of it in terms of a desire to act in ways that could be justified to others. However, he realized this wasn't quite right. He came to the conclusion that the notion of **reasons** is actually more fundamental than desires for explaining practical reasoning and motivation. In fact, he argues that desires themselves need to be understood in terms of taking something to be a reason. And contrary to a common idea, having a desire is almost never, by itself, the reason a person has for doing something. This deeper examination of reasons and rationality forms a foundational part of the book. Another key area Scanlon tackles is the relationship between "what we owe to each other" and **value** or "the good". It's often thought that values like individual well-being are separate notions that can either justify moral requirements or conflict with them. A common philosophical view is that to be valuable or "good" means it's something "to be brought about or promoted". Things like states of affairs or well-being are seen as the primary things that are valuable in this sense. Scanlon challenges this idea. He argues that this emphasis on value as purely "to be promoted" gives us a distorted view. When we look at things generally considered valuable, like friendship or intellectual accomplishment, recognizing their value involves reasons beyond just promoting their existence. For example, recognizing human life as valuable isn't just about seeing reasons to promote the state of affairs where more people exist or are well-off. Instead, and importantly for Scanlon's view, it's fundamentally about seeing the reasons we have for treating others in ways that accord with principles they could not reasonably reject. This perspective connects the idea of valuing human life directly to "what we owe to each other," which helps to reduce the apparent conflict between the realm of value (the good) and the realm of rightness. He suggests that our most basic idea of value is broader than just "the good" as something to be promoted. Values like excellence in art or science, personal relationships like love and friendship, and human life itself, have a more complex structure involving various reasons for acting and reacting, not just reasons to promote a state of affairs. This means that duties and rights shouldn't be seen as strange just because they don't fit the simple "to be promoted" model. Let's think about moral motivation and criticism for a moment. Scanlon sees the motivational basis of "what we owe to each other" as the aim of acting in a way that is justifiable to others, on grounds they could not reasonably reject. This is not merely about the activity of _actual_ justification to people you interact with, but the _ideal_ of acting in a way that _is_ justifiable to them. This aim of justifiability isn't just a passive ideal; it's a dynamic force that moves us to develop and refine our understanding of relevant moral reasons. When we criticize someone morally, especially within this domain of "what we owe," Scanlon's view sees this as claiming they have governed themselves in a way that wouldn't be allowed by principles no one could reasonably reject. This includes both consciously acting against such principles _and_ failing to notice relevant considerations the principles require us to take into account. This kind of criticism applies to rational creatures because only they are capable of the kind of "judgment-sensitive attitudes" – attitudes that should ideally be under the control of reason – that morality is concerned with. Moral criticism, in this view, is a special case of rational criticism. It highlights a failure to respond to reasons grounded in the value of others _as rational creatures_, which is why these moral violations are particularly significant for our relationships with others. The question of **responsibility** also plays a role. Scanlon distinguishes between two senses of responsibility. One is responsibility as an idea figuring _within_ moral principles (e.g., is someone responsible for a burden they could have avoided?). The other is responsibility as a condition for _attributing_ an action to an agent for moral assessment (e.g., is someone morally responsible for doing something wrong?). His contractualist account explains both these notions. A potential challenge to this contractualist picture is whether it leaves enough room for **special relationships** like friendship and family ties. These relationships involve being moved by special concern, which seems different from a general sense of obligation owed to everyone. Scanlon argues that a valuable form of friendship, one that captures what we normally mean, _does_ involve recognizing the friend as a person with moral standing, independent of the friendship itself. This recognition places limits on our behavior, meaning that friendship as we understand it doesn't necessarily clash with the requirements of morality in the narrow sense. In fact, compatibility with interpersonal morality is "built into the value of friendship itself". He suggests this idea extends to other personal relations like family ties. The degree of conflict between personal relations and "what we owe to each other" depends greatly on the society one lives in. Another significant area where Scanlon applies his framework is the discussion of **promises**. He offers an account of promises that differs from traditional views that see the obligation to keep a promise as arising primarily from a social practice or convention, like those suggested by Hume or Rawls. While social practices of promising _do_ exist and can be convenient for creating expectations, Scanlon argues they are not essential for explaining _why_ breaking a promise is wrong. Instead, he sees the obligation to keep a promise as a special case of more general duties concerning the expectations we lead others to form about our future conduct. These duties, in turn, are related to broader duties not to lie or mislead. The wrongness of breaking a promise stems from general moral principles, not just the rules of a specific social practice. Think about the value of **assurance**. When you promise something, you're not just stating an intention; you're giving the other person a reason to believe you have a reason to follow through, indicating your awareness of the situation and regard for the moral fact that it would be wrong not to show up. This isn't just about preventing reliance losses; people also value being given assurances and care whether they are genuine. Scanlon suggests that saying "I promise" is a way of quickly conveying complex conditions of mutual knowledge and intent, effectively saying "I will do X. Trust me," indicating your awareness of the wrongness of failing to follow through. While a social practice of promising might incorporate specific limitations (like not binding you if it causes great inconvenience), Scanlon doubts these are built into _our_ particular practice of promising. Such limitations, when they exist, might function as part of the content of the agreement, binding for that reason, rather than as fundamental rules of the practice itself. Difficult cases like undesired promises or promises made when the promisee doesn't expect fulfillment pose challenges. Scanlon suggests that in cases where the promisee doesn't want the promised item and hasn't indicated a desire for it, there's little reason to think an obligation arises. In cases where the promisee doesn't believe the promise, Scanlon suggests that while there might be other obligations at play (like gratitude), the promiser hasn't necessarily wronged the promisee in the specific way a person is wronged by a broken promise in clear cases. This leads to considering related duties like not to **lie** and the duty to **tell the truth**. The reasons here involve the need for information and the ability to rely on what others tell us (from the recipient's side), balanced against providers' reasons like protecting privacy, reputation, or valuable information. Prohibiting lying is easier to justify than requiring the provision of information, as relying on false info is worse than none, and reasons for wanting to be free to mislead are generally weaker than reasons for withholding info. A general principle against intentionally misleading others (Principle ML) is like a generalization of the principle against lying about intentions. Requiring the provision of useful information is a form of aid, and while often easy to do, there are legitimate reasons (like privacy concerns) that can justify not providing information. Bringing it back to the broader picture, Scanlon acknowledges that the term 'morality' is commonly used to refer to a **diverse set of values**. While his contractualist view characterizes a _central_ part ("what we owe to each other"), it doesn't cover everything. He argues this is okay; morality in the broader sense _is_ motivationally diverse. Values like friendship, family ties, ideals of excellence, patriotism, or honor might draw on different sources of motivation than the one underlying "what we owe to each other". They are related, though, and "what we owe to each other" sets limits on what these other values can require. This understanding allows for a kind of **pluralism**, where different people might subscribe to different ideals (like certain conceptions of patriotism or honor) that go beyond the requirements of "what we owe to each other," as long as they are consistent with those requirements. People holding such different ideals can still recognize each other's value, even if their commitments create a distance between them. This gulf is less serious than the one separating us from those unmoved by the requirements of justifiability to others. Finally, Scanlon's account provides a basis for thinking about the **scope** of "what we owe to each other" – which creatures fall within this domain. He suggests that those who can be wronged in this sense include at least all beings capable of judgment-sensitive attitudes. The idea of trusteeship might extend this to non-rational creatures as well. Furthermore, the scope extends to all actual beings – those who exist now, have existed, or will exist. Contractualism provides no reason to exclude future people from having moral claims on us. In summary, Scanlon's book, as seen through these excerpts, presents a contractualist account of "what we owe to each other". This central part of morality is grounded in the idea of acting in ways justifiable to others on grounds they could not reasonably reject. This view sees reasons as fundamental, offers a complex understanding of value beyond just "to be promoted", explains moral motivation as the aim of justifiability, provides a framework for moral criticism and responsibility, and accounts for the priority of "what we owe" while making room for other values and personal relationships. It offers a unique perspective on duties like keeping promises, seeing them as stemming from general moral principles rather than merely social practices. While this account doesn't cover the full spectrum of what people call 'morality,' it illuminates a crucial domain and its distinctive structure. What a journey through these ideas! It makes you think, doesn't it? How do these different forms of value truly relate to each other in our lives? How do we navigate situations where deeply held personal ideals seem to conflict with duties we feel we owe to strangers? And how does this idea of seeking principles that _everyone_ could reasonably accept guide our thinking about complex modern issues involving people we'll never meet, or even future generations? There are certainly many paths for further exploration opened up by this view!