_Truth and Method_ (German: _Wahrheit und Methode_), originally intended to be titled _Foundations of a Philosophical Hermeneutics_, is the magnum opus of Hans-Georg Gadamer, published in 1960 when he was sixty years old. It represents the culmination of a lifetime of reading, teaching, and philosophical reflection, solidifying his position as a central figure in 20th-century hermeneutics. The book is described as "powerful, exciting, but undeniably difficult," deeply immersed in German philosophy and scholarship. The book's title itself, _Truth and Method_, has been a source of significant misunderstanding, with the conjunction "and" often misinterpreted as an alternative ("Truth or Method") or even an antithesis ("Truth against Method"). Gadamer clarifies that his aim is not to dismiss or conflict with scientific method, but rather to expose its inherent limits, especially when applied universally to phenomena outside its proper domain, particularly in the human sciences. He emphasizes that the "and" signifies a critical reflection on the relationship between truth and method, aiming to mediate between philosophy and the sciences. Gadamer's fundamental philosophical concern in _Truth and Method_ is encapsulated in the question: "How is understanding possible?". He approaches understanding not as a cognitive procedure or a method to be applied, but as a fundamental _event_ or a mode of being that happens to us, often "behind our back," rather than something we actively do or control. This stands in contrast to the methodical approaches prevalent in the natural sciences, which assume the object can be objectively defined and controlled by a subject. ### Intellectual Context and Key Influences Gadamer's philosophical hermeneutics is deeply rooted in and developed through a critical engagement with several major philosophical traditions and figures: 1. **Martin Heidegger**: Gadamer consistently acknowledges his profound indebtedness to Heidegger, calling his philosophical hermeneutics a "translation" or "transposition" of Heidegger's thought into the academic medium, specifically into the sphere of the human sciences. Heidegger's groundbreaking move was to "de-psychologize hermeneutics" and shift interpretation from being a mere method to being a fundamental _mode of being_. Gadamer adopts Heidegger's concept of the "hermeneutic circle" as having "ontologically positive significance," meaning that understanding always presupposes a prior knowledge or "fore-structure". This "fore-understanding" is not a "prejudice" in the negative sense, but a necessary starting point for interpretation, which makes explicit what is implicit in understanding. However, despite this foundational influence, _Truth and Method_ also marks Gadamer's "silent turn" against his teacher. Gadamer critiques Heidegger for a marginal treatment of the "other" (the _Thou_) and for focusing on an "impersonal Dasein" in his analysis of _Mit-sein_ (being-with). Gadamer insists that understanding is not merely a projection of a solitary Dasein, but a dynamic, dialogical interaction between an I and a Thou. He argues that philosophical hermeneutics can "legitimate" and "pave the way" for Heidegger's later thought by showing how even Heidegger's "leap back behind metaphysics" is made possible by a "historically effected consciousness" that is conditioned by tradition as a "Thou". 2. **Wilhelm Dilthey**: Dilthey is crucial for Gadamer, providing the "starting point" for philosophical hermeneutics, particularly the central question of "How is understanding possible?". Gadamer's work is conceived as a "correction" of Dilthey's hermeneutics of the human sciences. Gadamer criticizes Dilthey's "intellectualism" for reducing the reality of history to a "pure expression of the mind" and for aiming at an objective, methodologically controlled understanding that attempts to distance itself from tradition and prejudice. Gadamer's correction, echoing Heidegger's earlier reproach, aims to demonstrate that tradition is not a hindrance but an enabling "substance" of historical life and understanding, which can never be fully warded off. He argues that Dilthey, despite his efforts, did not sufficiently account for the "forces active in history" that transcend individual power. 3. **Edmund Husserl**: Gadamer's engagement with Husserl's phenomenology, particularly the maxim "Back to the things themselves!", resonated with his desire to move beyond abstract theories. Husserl's concepts of "horizon" and the "life-world" are important for Gadamer, who also acknowledges the intentionality of consciousness in constituting sense. However, Gadamer finds Husserl "not radical enough," arguing that Husserl remained caught in a Cartesian quest for an ultimate foundation and neglected the constitutive role of _language_ in the life-world. Gadamer sees the "hermeneutic turn" within phenomenology as a turn towards language. 4. **Plato and Aristotle**: Gadamer frequently draws on ancient Greek philosophy. - **Aristotle's _phronesis_** (practical wisdom or reasonableness) is a central concept for Gadamer, especially in the context of ethics and application. Unlike _techne_ (technical knowledge), _phronesis_ is concerned with action in particular situations and involves a "seeing" that discloses the situation as meaningful. Gadamer uses _phronesis_ to argue against universal, standardized methods of interpretation. - **Plato's dialectics** and the dialogical nature of inquiry are crucial. Gadamer emphasizes the Socratic _docta ignorantia_ (knowing one's ignorance) as a precondition for questioning and thinking. He sees the Platonic dialogue as a "playful" engagement that reveals truth and induces philosophizing. Gadamer offers a nuanced reading of Plato, distinct from Heidegger's critique of Plato as the origin of the "forgetting of Being," and challenges Plato's "noetic concealment of language" in the _Cratylus_. 5. **G.W.F. Hegel**: Gadamer engages with Hegel, particularly concerning the concept of _Bildung_ (education/formation/culture) as a "rising to the universal". He confronts Hegel's "reflective philosophy" and its tendency toward absolute mediation, aiming to "break the magic spell" of totalizing reflection by emphasizing human finitude and the "remnant that remains unresolved" in historical consciousness. For Gadamer, "dialectics must retrieve itself in hermeneutics," signifying a move from a closed, systematic logic to the open-ended, dynamic nature of understanding in language. He appreciates Hegel's "speculative proposition" for revealing the dialectical movement of language itself. 6. **Augustine and Thomas Aquinas**: Gadamer delves into Christian theology, particularly the concepts of the _verbum interior_ (inner word) from Augustine and Aquinas. He seeks to clarify the "event character" of language and the dynamic relationship between the "center of language" (akin to the divine Word) and human speaking. While recognizing their contributions, Gadamer critiques Augustine's emphasis on the _verbum interior_ for potentially leading to a "relapse into an instrumental conception of language" and a monologue that excludes genuine linguistic mediation. 7. **Ludwig Wittgenstein**: Gadamer identifies a "surprising convergence" with Wittgenstein, especially regarding the concept of "language games" and a shared rejection of "ultimate foundations" in philosophy. He is drawn to Wittgenstein's "pragmatics of language," which views language as a "public practice and shared action," emphasizing the priority of dialogue and rejecting the notion of a "private language". However, Gadamer distinguishes his "listening to language" from Wittgenstein's "critique of language" as therapy, and expresses reservations about the "instrumental view of language" implied by terms like "use" and "rule". ### Core Concepts of Philosophical Hermeneutics Gadamer's _Truth and Method_ develops a sophisticated understanding of hermeneutics through several interconnected concepts: 1. **Understanding (Verstehen)**: At its core, understanding for Gadamer is not a subjective act of a knowing subject mastering an object, but rather an _event_ or a process that happens to us. It is a "form of the realization of Dasein" and is described as being "less active than passive," likened to breathing. All understanding is ultimately self-understanding, but this self-understanding is inextricably linked to understanding the other, rejecting any notion of an isolated self. It is always an "understanding-always-in-other way" (_Immer-anders-Verstehen_), implying a dynamic, non-final process. Furthermore, understanding is always "application"; if it cannot be translated into practice, it is not genuine understanding. 2. **The Hermeneutic Circle**: This is a central feature, embodying an "ontologically positive significance". It describes the circular movement between the whole and the part, where interpretation contributes to understanding by making explicit what is implicit in a given preunderstanding. This process is set in motion by a "disturbance" or "being pulled up short" when our initial expectations or "fore-project" of meaning encounter resistance from the text or situation. This resistance forces us to critically re-evaluate our "prejudices" (fore-understandings) and allows the alterity of the text to emerge. 3. **Historically Effected Consciousness (Wirkungsgeschichtliches Bewusstsein)**: This pivotal concept refers to the realization that our understanding is profoundly shaped by the history in which we are situated. It's a consciousness that is both "affected" by history and itself "effected" (brought into being) by history. This consciousness prevents us from adopting a purely objective stance towards tradition, revealing that our "prejudices" are not necessarily negative but are the very conditions of our understanding. It serves to limit the "omnipotence of reflection" that seeks to achieve absolute transparency or mastery over history. 4. **Fusion of Horizons (Horizontverschmelzung)**: When understanding occurs, the interpreter's own horizon (shaped by tradition and prejudices) and the "foreign and possibly strange horizon" of the text (or other hermeneutic object) are progressively "foregrounded" and then "fused" together. This fusion means that the previously foreign position of the text is integrated into one's thought, shaping how one sees the world. This is not about one horizon dominating another or finding a perfect correspondence, but a transformative integration. This concept is later reformulated as "application" in Gadamer's work, emphasizing the practical and transformative dimension of understanding. 5. **Tradition (Überlieferung)**: Far from being a static or oppressive force, tradition for Gadamer is the "factical horizon of our historical existence" and an active, dynamic process of transmission. It is not something that passively persists but "needs to be affirmed, embraced and cultivated," acting as an "act of reason" through "preservation" (_Bewährung_). Tradition functions as a "Thou" that addresses us, conditions our possibility of questioning and thinking, and acts as a "genuine partner in dialogue". It is a "continuum" made up of multiple traditions and strands, often given to us in a "fragmentary way". 6. **Language**: Language is the "universal medium in which understanding occurs". Gadamer famously states, "Being that can be understood is language". This doesn't mean everything _is_ language, but that anything that can become an object of understanding is mediated through language. Language is not a mere tool of thought, but rather it "speaks us, rather than we speak it". It possesses a "speculative movement" where what is said, though finite, hints at the "infinitude of the unsaid". The experience of language is also an experience of its "boundaries," revealing the limits of our existence and finitude, yet continuously prompting the "undying desire for the right word". Gadamer emphasizes _hearing_ as the "hermeneutic sense par excellence," contrasting it with the traditionally privileged sense of sight, as hearing provides an "avenue to the whole". He argues for an "inseparable connection" between orality and writing, viewing writing as a "phase in the event of understanding" that, despite its fixity, becomes a "between" that interrupts the continuity of the voice. 7. **Play (Spiel)**: Gadamer recovers the concept of play from its traditional opposition to seriousness and work, particularly in the context of aesthetic experience, but extends it to language and ritual. Play is not primarily about the subjective attitude of the players; rather, "the game itself 'presents itself'", dominating the players and leading to an "ecstatic self-forgetfulness" or a "loss of self" where "self-possession" is eliminated. It functions as a "dynamic whole sui generis" that subordinates individual attitudes to its movement. In language, play allows for a "field of play" (_Spielraum_) that enables both speaking and writing within articulated boundaries. ### Philosophical Aims and Stances Gadamer's _Truth and Method_ takes several distinctive philosophical stances: - **Anti-Foundationalism**: Gadamer explicitly renounces the idea of an "ultimate foundation" for philosophy, distinguishing his hermeneutics from methodologies that seek apodictic certainty or a secure, fixed position. He argues that the human understanding, being finite and historical, cannot achieve such an absolute grounding. - **Critique of Methodologism and Objectivism**: While not rejecting method _per se_, Gadamer critically examines the "tyranny" of scientific method when applied inappropriately to the human sciences. He argues that the truth encountered in art, history, and language transcends the domain of scientific method, as it cannot be "dominated, controlled, or possessed". - **Rehabilitation of Humanism**: Gadamer advocates for a rediscovery of the humanistic tradition, emphasizing concepts like _Bildung_ (formation/culture), _sensus communis_ (communal sense), judgment, and taste as alternative models of knowledge. He explicitly contrasts this with Heidegger's distancing from humanism. - **Priority of the Question**: For Gadamer, knowledge and understanding fundamentally begin with questioning. Every assertion is implicitly an answer to a question, and true understanding involves working back to the motivating question. This aligns with his dialogical approach to understanding. - **Ethical Dimension**: Hermeneutics has a strong ethical dimension, particularly in its proximity to practical philosophy (_phronesis_). The ethical imperative lies in the "openness of hermeneutic consciousness" to the alterity of the other, requiring a willingness to be questioned and to consider perspectives "against me". This fosters an "ethical vigilance" that transcends mere individual action to encompass communal and communicative action. - **Finitude and "Infinite Finitude"**: A persistent theme is the recognition of human finitude and the limits of reason. However, this finitude is not a negative or tragic limitation but rather a constitutive element that opens up possibilities and necessitates dialogue. The concept of "infinite finitude" describes how consciousness, by recognizing its limits, paradoxically finds a path to the "beyond" of the other, which is a "being-further that is at the same time a being-other". ### Reception and Critiques _Truth and Method_ has had a significant and complex reception, eliciting both widespread praise and sharp criticism: - **General Reception**: The book quickly gained recognition as one of the most important philosophical contributions of the 20th century, with its "flexibility" and "readiness to confront even the sharpest critiques" contributing to its widespread acceptance. - **Emilio Betti and E.D. Hirsch**: Both Betti, an Italian legal scholar, and Hirsch, an American literary critic, accused Gadamer of compromising the objectivity of interpretation. Betti argued that Gadamer, by emphasizing "prejudice" and "application," confused the objective "meaning" of texts with their "significance" for the interpreter, thereby failing to establish universal, normative rules for interpretation. Hirsch similarly contended that Gadamer's hermeneutics failed to deliver "valid objective criteria" for discerning an "original meaning" (author's intention) from subsequent "significance". Gadamer, however, maintained that understanding is never a purely subjective relation to an object, but "belongs to the being of that which is understood". - **Jürgen Habermas**: A notable debate between Gadamer and Habermas focused on the concept of "tradition" and its relation to reason and critique. Habermas expressed concerns that Gadamer's rehabilitation of tradition might obscure the critical potential of reason and lead to an unreflected acceptance of authority. Gadamer, in turn, clarified that his aim was to show that reason is "situated in tradition and gets worked out in history," not to obscure it. - **Jacques Derrida**: The encounter between Gadamer and Derrida in Paris in 1981 is famously characterized as a "failed dialogue" or "improbable debate" due to profound conceptual differences. Derrida's critiques, which Gadamer initially found "difficult to understand", challenged fundamental aspects of Gadamer's hermeneutics: - **"Good Will" and Metaphysics**: Derrida questioned Gadamer's implicit reliance on "good will" as a "fundamental condition" of communal life and understanding, suggesting it functions like a Kantian ethical axiom, potentially leading to a new metaphysics of will or subjectivity. - **Psychoanalytic Hermeneutics and Context**: Derrida asked how a "psychoanalytic hermeneutics" (i.e., dealing with hidden or multiple meanings) could be integrated into Gadamer's general hermeneutics without an "overall re-structuring" of the very concept of "context". He argued that the possibility of double meaning inherently destabilizes the notion of a fixed hermeneutic context. - **Interruption and Alterity**: Derrida provocatively suggested that the precondition for understanding the other might not be continuity or mediation, but rather "the interruption of rapport, a certain rapport of interruption, the suspending of all mediation". He argued that the "presentation of the other is always a dissimulation of itself," implying that true understanding of alterity requires breaking any pre-existing relation or expectation. Derrida's work highlights the "inexhaustible ambiguity" of language and argues that the "text" itself is not a unified entity inscribing a prior meaning, but a "play of differences" and a "fabric of traces," rendering concepts like "matter at hand" (Sache) as "groundless projections" of the interpreter. Despite the initial perception of misunderstanding, Derrida later re-evaluated the debate as "successful" precisely because the "interruption" it caused was an "epoché that made one hold one’s breath, withhold judgment or conclusion," leaving a "living and provocative trace". - **Richard Rorty**: Rorty, a neo-pragmatist, drew on Gadamer's hermeneutics in his critique of epistemology and foundationalism. He saw hermeneutics as favoring "education or self-formation" (_Bildung_) over fixed knowledge. However, Rorty's interpretation of "effective historical consciousness" as serving "our own uses" of nature and history, rather than Gadamer's emphasis on the event-character of history, shows a subtle but significant divergence. - **Bernhard Waldenfels**: Waldenfels critically questioned whether Gadamer's hermeneutics truly allows the "foreign" to remain foreign, or if it tends to "conquer" and assimilate the alterity it encounters, striving to make the non-understandable understandable. In sum, _Truth and Method_ offers a profound re-thinking of understanding, challenging conventional notions of objective knowledge and advocating for a hermeneutics that embraces historicity, finitude, dialogue, and the transformative power of language and tradition. Gadamer's work, while influenced by his predecessors, rigorously develops an independent philosophical position that continues to be a crucial point of reference and a subject of ongoing debate in contemporary philosophy.