Setting the Stage: Why _A Theory of Justice_ Mattered So Much** Let's rewind a bit to 1971, the year _A Theory of Justice_ first came out. The world of political philosophy was, well, kind of quiet. Isaiah Berlin noted in 1964 that there hadn't been a truly "commanding work" in the 20th century. Some, like Peter Laslett in 1956, even dramatically declared political philosophy "dead". The field was seen as being in pretty poor shape, stuck in what Mandle describes as a "narrow" view. Enter John Rawls. He had already been publishing some key ideas for years and circulating drafts, so the philosophical world was eagerly awaiting his book. But its impact was even bigger than anticipated. _A Theory of Justice_ didn't just show a new way forward; it burst open the field. It made it respectable again for political philosophers to propose and defend substantive, even controversial, principles about how society should be organized. Rawls demonstrated that philosophy could offer justifications for specific ideas of justice, showing that not all principles were equally valid. He argued against the idea that philosophy should stick _only_ to analyzing concepts or relying purely on _a priori_ (prior to experience) reasoning. Instead, he showed how political philosophy could defend principles by exploring ideas beyond these traditional limits. One of the biggest shifts the book brought about was challenging the dominant view of the time: utilitarianism. Utilitarianism basically says that morality requires maximizing the total or average happiness in society. While some disagreed, many philosophers in the early 1970s just assumed some form of utilitarianism must be right. Rawls's book offered a powerful alternative. Its publication meant that utilitarianism could no longer be taken for granted. Reviewers often compared Rawls's work to philosophical giants like John Stuart Mill and Immanuel Kant. Even today, contemporary political philosophers, despite their disagreements, recognize _A Theory of Justice_ as central to the field. One philosopher, Brian Barry, even called it "the watershed that divides the past from the present". Robert Nozick famously stated in 1974 that political philosophers "must either work within Rawls' theory or explain why not", a statement that remains true today. Mandle, the author of our introductory book, tells us a bit about Rawls himself. John Bordley Rawls, known as "Jack" to friends, was born in Baltimore in 1921. His father was a successful, self-taught lawyer, and his mother was active in the League of Women Voters, showing a strong interest in politics in his family. Rawls studied philosophy at Princeton and even considered becoming a priest before enlisting in the army and serving in the Pacific during World War II, earning a Bronze Star. He was a very modest person, often declining awards and interviews, but accepted the National Humanities Medal from President Clinton in 1999. He began collecting notes for _A Theory of Justice_ around 1950, right after finishing his thesis. The book took about twenty years to develop, with many of his published articles serving as "experimental works" that were later revised or incorporated. Rawls continued to work on his theory, publishing _Political Liberalism_ in 1993 and continuing to write even after a series of strokes. Despite its huge academic influence in philosophy and related fields like political science and jurisprudence, Rawls's work hasn't had much direct influence outside of universities, according to Samuel Freeman. Mandle notes this might be slightly less true in a few European countries and perhaps surprisingly, among some Chinese students during the Tiananmen Square protests. _The New York Times_ was perhaps overly optimistic in 1972 when it suggested the book's political implications might "change our lives". Rawls himself was "pessimistic of philosophy's influence," knowing that practical impact is usually indirect and slow to appear. **What Rawls Thought Political Philosophy Was For** Rawls didn't see the job of political philosophy as being propaganda, trying to manipulate people's feelings if they don't share a certain moral view. Nor was it about building some absolute foundation to prove the possibility of moral knowledge. Instead, Rawls believed the goal was to help us make progress in resolving the many uncertainties and tensions _within_ our existing set of moral principles, beliefs, and even prejudices. Think about it: we're all pretty sure that torturing babies is wrong, and we probably don't need a complex moral theory to tell us that. But in many areas, especially public policy, things are much less certain. Take taxing the wealthy to help the poor, for instance. We might feel conflicted: on one hand, it seems unfair for some to have so much while others lack necessities; on the other, it might feel like an unjust restriction on the liberty of the wealthy. Rawls thought conflicts like these show why we need moral theory – we're unsure about what justice requires. Importantly, Rawls's project isn't about trying to convince moral skeptics or force people lacking a sense of justice to become motivated. It's a contribution to a public discussion within a democratic society, aiming to find the best understanding of justice for addressing fundamental social issues. He's aiming to develop an account of a just society under favorable, though not unrealistic, conditions – what he later called a "realistic utopia". The idea is to show what's possible, to push the limits of what we think is practical in politics. Showing that a just order _is_ possible can influence our attitudes and actions today, giving meaning to our current efforts by providing a long-term goal. **The Core Idea: Basic Social Justice** So, what is _A Theory of Justice_ actually about? While the word "justice" is used in many ways, Rawls's theory, "justice as fairness," focuses on a specific but very important area: basic social justice. Imagine a society where people have lots of different goals and ideas about what makes a good life. These ideas might clash, especially when they require limited social resources. These conflicts aren't just due to people being irrational or immoral; even perfectly reasonable and morally fine goals can make competing demands. Basic social justice, in Rawls's view, is about resolving these conflicts fairly. This often happens through the fundamental institutions of society – what Rawls calls the "basic structure". Justice as fairness asks: what principles should we use to decide if this basic structure is fair?. Rawls's "realistic utopia" idea means that if we can figure out what a just society looks like under good circumstances, we can then tackle the more difficult problems in our actual, less-than-ideal world. **The Original Position: A Clever Thought Experiment** The most famous part of justice as fairness is how Rawls defends his principles: the "original position". This is a thought experiment, a hypothetical situation designed to figure out which principles would be fair. The core idea is to set up this imaginary situation so that _whatever_ principles are chosen there, we can recognize them as just. To ensure fairness, the people choosing the principles (the "parties") are imagined to be behind a "veil of ignorance". This veil hides any specific information about who they are or what their society is like. They don't know their social class, race, gender, talents, wealth, or even their own conception of the good life. This forces them to choose principles that they believe could be justified to _everyone_, because they don't know what position they'll end up in once the veil is lifted. Mandle emphasizes that the original position has a specific and limited purpose. Rawls doesn't think anyone ever was or could be in this situation. While it's part of the social contract tradition, the principles chosen don't bind us like a normal contract based on voluntary consent. It's a tool to help clarify the _content_ of principles for basic social justice. It's not meant for solving everyday moral problems, which often require specific knowledge blocked by the veil. It's also crucial to remember that the parties in the original position are artificial constructs, not supposed to represent "who we really are". _We_, the theorists, set up the features of the original position to help _us_ figure out which principles would be fair by forcing the _imaginary parties_ to consider principles acceptable from _every_ social position. If we can identify what they would choose, we have good reason to think those principles are fair to everyone. The parties are imagined comparing different conceptions of justice, particularly Rawls's proposed two principles against alternatives like average utilitarianism. Rawls argues that because fundamental interests are at stake (like in designing the basic structure), the original position's features force the parties to be especially concerned about the worst possible outcomes. The people in the least advantaged positions are the most vulnerable. By making the parties consider that they might end up in one of these positions, the veil ensures they choose principles that protect everyone's fundamental interests. This focus on the least advantaged is central to the principles Rawls believes would be chosen. **Rawls's Two Principles of Justice** Rawls's core principles have been consistent since his 1958 article "Justice as Fairness," although he made slight changes later. Mandle presents an early version of the principles from _A Theory of Justice_: 1. **First Principle:** Each person has an equal right to the most extensive scheme of equal basic liberties compatible with a similar scheme for others. These are familiar liberties from democracies, like voting rights, rule of law, and freedom of conscience. 2. **Second Principle:** Social and economic inequalities must be arranged so they are both (a) reasonably expected to be to everyone's advantage, and (b) attached to positions open to all. Let's break down the second principle: - **(b) Open to all:** This means positions and offices must be accessible. Rawls clarifies that this requires more than just formal equality of opportunity ("careers open to talents"), which simply means no legal barriers or discrimination based on irrelevant criteria. While important, this isn't enough. Justice requires "fair equality of opportunity," meaning everyone should have a fair chance to attain positions, regardless of social class. The expectations of those with similar abilities and motivation shouldn't be affected by their social background. - **(a) Reasonably expected to be to everyone's advantage:** This part has two layers. Rawls initially formulated it this way, but his _favored interpretation_ of this part is the "difference principle". The difference principle states that structural inequalities are only just _if_ they benefit the least advantaged position. This doesn't mean everyone benefits equally, but that _all_ social positions must be better off than they would be under a more equal arrangement that didn't include those inequalities. The first principle mainly governs political institutions, while the parts of the second principle (fair opportunity and difference principle) apply mostly to social and economic institutions. The first principle also has "priority" over the second, meaning that basic liberties cannot be traded off for social or economic advantages. **Maximin vs. Difference Principle: Clearing Up Confusion** Mandle takes care to clarify a common misunderstanding: Rawls does _not_ argue that the parties in the original position choose the two principles, particularly the difference principle, simply because they are using the "maximin" rule. The maximin rule is a strategy for choice under uncertainty where you pick the option with the best worst-case outcome. Rawls _does_ note that thinking of the two principles as a maximin solution for social justice is a "useful heuristic device", but he's explicit that maximin is "not, in general, a suitable guide for choices under uncertainty". The argument in _A Theory of Justice_ is more nuanced. Given the unique features of the original position and the fundamental interests at stake, it would be rational for the parties to be risk-averse and give special attention to the worst outcome for each possible set of principles. This risk aversion, Mandle explains, is primarily concerned with protecting the basic interests secured by the _first_ principle (basic liberties), not directly arguing for the difference principle itself. The argument for the difference principle comes when comparing Rawls's two principles to "mixed conceptions" that _also_ secure basic liberties but have a different distributive principle. Rawls argues against these mixed conceptions, but, contrary to common belief, he does _not_ use maximin reasoning to argue for the difference principle in this comparison. This is a key point of Mandle's interpretation. **Justice as Fairness is _Not_ Luck Egalitarianism (According to Mandle)** Another significant point Mandle highlights is that justice as fairness is _not_ a form of "luck egalitarianism," contrary to a widespread interpretation. Luck egalitarians believe that justice requires correcting any inequality that isn't someone's fault or is "arbitrary from a moral point of view". This includes things like being born with certain talents or into a certain social class. Mandle argues that Rawls explicitly rejects this view. Rawls states that the "natural distribution [of talents] is neither just nor unjust". It's just a fact of nature. What _can_ be just or unjust is how institutions deal with these arbitrary facts. Justice as fairness puts additional requirements on market outcomes, for instance. Markets alone respond to willingness and ability to pay, not need, and the outcomes they produce depend heavily on the institutional framework (property rights, taxes, etc.). While social and natural inequalities might both seem "arbitrary" from a moral standpoint, justice as fairness treats them differently. Fair equality of opportunity _does_ aim to prevent social inequalities (like class background) from determining people's life chances. But the difference principle _allows_ natural inequalities (like talents) to result in unequal shares of resources _if_ doing so benefits the least advantaged. Rawls does not believe justice requires eliminating all inequalities that arise from factors outside our control. Instead, his view focuses on designing institutions so that when individuals pursue their goals within the rules, the outcomes are fair, particularly ensuring the basic structure doesn't benefit some at the expense of the least well-off. Justice, in this sense, is about the fairness of the social system, not rectifying every instance of bad luck. **Desert and Responsibility** Closely related to the luck egalitarian misunderstanding is the idea that Rawls rejects desert entirely or denies individual responsibility. Critics sometimes claim Rawls thinks no one deserves anything because talents and even the capacity for effort are unearned. This is seen as a "radical distortion" by Mandle. Rawls _does_ say that the distribution of natural talents isn't deserved. But he also thinks the more advantaged _do_ have a right to their natural assets, like everyone else. This right isn't based on some idea that talented people are morally superior. People become _entitled_ to specific resources not based on their moral virtue, but by following the rules of a just basic structure. When you buy something in a just system, the property transfer isn't an assessment of your moral worth. Because the social resources acquired through these procedures don't reflect moral virtue, they aren't a matter of "desert" in the narrow sense Rawls is using the term. Justice as fairness is asking what background institutions are needed for people to acquire shares and pursue goals fairly. Rawls is not saying individuals aren't responsible for their choices or actions within a just framework. **Reflective Equilibrium: How We Justify Our Ideas** How does Rawls actually justify his principles? It's not simply by showing they'd be chosen in the original position. The original position itself needs justification. The reason to care about the original position, Mandle explains, is its contribution to helping us reach "reflective equilibrium". Reflective equilibrium is a method of justification where we work back and forth between our considered moral judgments about specific cases (e.g., that slavery is wrong) and proposed general principles. If our principles don't match our judgments, we can either revise the judgments or modify the conditions of the hypothetical choice situation that led to the principles. The goal is to achieve consistency between our judgments and the principles derived from the original position. It's not about deducing principles from self-evident truths or non-moral premises; Rawls explicitly rejects that. We start from what we already think we know and try to make progress in areas of uncertainty. The original position is a tool, an "expository device," to help us move towards this state of consistency. Rawls recognizes that full reflective equilibrium might be an ideal never fully reached. He aims to show that his principles move us closer to this ideal than utilitarianism or intuitionism. He sees the process as practical, trying to identify the "best approximation overall" among existing views. While intuition plays a role, the goal is to formulate explicit principles and priority rules to structure our sense of justice and reduce the need to fall back on unguided intuition when resolving conflicts. This effort is important because relying solely on intuition means rational discussion stops. Mandle discusses criticisms of reflective equilibrium, such as the idea that it's circular or just "reshuffling moral prejudices". Critics like R. M. Hare argued it makes truth depend on people's opinions. But Mandle explains that Rawls isn't saying whatever we happen to believe is true; the effort is precisely to figure out _what_ we should believe. Rawls also advocates for "wide" reflective equilibrium, which means being open to all relevant considerations (moral, non-moral, abstract, particular) and engaging with the views of others to challenge our own. This approach, Mandle suggests, connects Rawls to a tradition of philosophy like John Dewey's, which sought to address human problems rather than solely focus on abstract epistemological debates. **A Kantian Connection** Rawls notes a "Kantian interpretation" of his theory. This isn't just a side note; it's important later for considering stability. The key idea is that by acting on the principles of justice, people express their nature as free and equal rational beings. Rawls sees the original position as a "procedural interpretation of Kant's conception of autonomy and the categorical imperative". This helps capture elements of Kant's thought without them seeming purely abstract or unconnected to human behavior. This idea that our shared nature as free and equal beings is the decisive element in choosing principles is central to the Kantian reading. **Economic Systems: Property-Owning Democracy** Contrary to a common assumption, Mandle clarifies that Rawls is _not_ a defender of "welfare-state capitalism". While Rawls doesn't rule out some forms of socialism or private property economies as potentially just, he focuses on outlining one possibility: a "property-owning democracy". He later regretted not making this distinction clearer in _A Theory of Justice_. Rawls argues that economic systems don't just satisfy existing desires; they shape people's wants and aspirations. Therefore, evaluating them shouldn't just be based on efficiency or existing preferences. We need a perspective (what he calls an "Archimedean point") that isn't dependent on existing desires, but also not based on purely abstract or perfectionist principles. In a property-owning democracy, the goal is to ensure widespread ownership of productive assets and human capital, rather than just redistributing income after the fact. Rawls describes key functional branches of government needed in such a society: - **Allocation Branch:** Keeps markets competitive and addresses market failures (like monopolies or externalities). - **Stabilization Branch:** Works for full employment and free choice of occupation. - **Transfer Branch:** Ensures a social minimum, a safety net for everyone. - **Distribution Branch:** Uses inheritance and gift taxes to prevent wealth concentration and protect the fair value of political liberty and fair equality of opportunity. These branches highlight that Rawls's vision for economic justice involves much more than just a safety net. It requires actively structuring the economy to maintain competition, ensure opportunities, and prevent excessive concentrations of wealth and power that undermine political fairness and opportunity. **The Role of Individuals: Duties and Compliance** While _A Theory of Justice_ focuses on institutions, it recognizes that the social system is made up of human actions. Rawls discusses the moral requirements that apply to individuals within a just or nearly just society. He distinguishes between natural duties and obligations. Natural duties, like the duty not to harm others or the duty of mutual aid, apply to everyone regardless of their voluntary actions. The most important for social justice is the duty of justice, which requires supporting and complying with just institutions and furthering just arrangements when possible. Obligations, like those arising from promises, depend on voluntary acts within just background institutions (like the institution of promising itself being just). Since the basic structure inevitably applies to us (we're born into it), compliance with its demands is grounded in the natural duty of justice, not a voluntary obligation. This duty requires compliance even with unjust laws, provided the basic structure is reasonably just overall and the laws don't exceed certain limits of injustice. Rawls considers cases like civil disobedience and conscientious refusal in a nearly just society. Civil disobedience is a public, non-violent, conscientious political act that violates the law, usually to protest a serious injustice and appeal to the public sense of justice. Rawls relates his understanding to the Civil Rights movement and Martin Luther King Jr.'s ideas. Conscientious refusal is non-compliance with a legal order, which might be based on political, religious, or other principles. These discussions illustrate the potential conflicts between the duty to comply and other moral requirements within a not-perfectly-just system. **The Development of Rawls's Thought: Towards _Political Liberalism_** Mandle emphasizes that the developments in Rawls's later work, especially _Political Liberalism_ (1993), are less of a radical break from _A Theory of Justice_ than sometimes thought. The most significant driver for these changes was Rawls's own dissatisfaction with the "congruence argument" in Part III of _A Theory of Justice_. The congruence argument aimed to show that in a well-ordered society, individuals' good (their rational plan of life) would align with acting on the principles of justice. Rawls argued that expressing one's nature as a free and equal rational being by acting from justice is a fundamental element of one's good, and that engaging in collective activities of justice is a "preeminent form of human flourishing". However, Rawls came to realize this argument relied on assumptions (like the Kantian interpretation and the idea that expressing our moral nature is our highest value) that are part of a specific "comprehensive doctrine" – a broader set of moral, philosophical, or religious beliefs. Not all reasonable people in a diverse society would necessarily accept this specific comprehensive doctrine. Since justice must be possible in a society with diverse _reasonable_ comprehensive doctrines ("reasonable pluralism"), the justification of the basic structure cannot depend on the assumption that everyone shares a particular comprehensive view, even one Rawls himself continued to endorse. This led Rawls to develop the idea of a "political conception of justice". A political conception is "freestanding"; its justification doesn't depend on any specific comprehensive doctrine. It draws on fundamental ideas shared within the public political culture of a liberal democracy, such as the idea of society as a fair system of cooperation and citizens as free and equal persons. Relatedly, Rawls developed the idea of "public reason". This is the shared framework of reasoning that citizens in a democracy should use when discussing fundamental political questions, particularly constitutional essentials and matters of basic justice. Public reason relies on principles and ideals acceptable to all reasonable comprehensive doctrines, not just one. Citizens have a moral duty ("duty of civility") to appeal to public reasons in their political advocacy. Mandle also explains how the concept of the "two moral powers" (the capacity for a sense of justice and the capacity for a conception of the good) becomes more central in _Political Liberalism_ as the basis for citizens being seen as free and equal. Citizens are understood to have "highest-order interests" in developing and exercising these powers. These interests, rather than simply assuming everyone wants them, now justify the use of "primary goods" (like basic rights, liberties, opportunities, income, wealth, and social bases of self-respect) as the relevant metric for assessing fairness in the original position. Primary goods are what citizens need to develop their moral powers and pursue their various reasonable conceptions of the good. **Addressing Criticisms (Briefly)** Mandle's book also touches on several important criticisms of _A Theory of Justice_. We've already touched on some, like the idea that Rawls is a luck egalitarian or rejects desert. Mandle also discusses: - **Communitarianism:** Critics like Michael Sandel argued Rawls's theory assumes an "unencumbered self," disconnected from community and its values. Mandle argues this misinterprets the original position; the veil of ignorance is a theoretical device for fairness, not a claim about human nature. The need for justice arises from the reasonable diversity of values in a free society, not from individualism or ignorance about our true ends. - **Scope of Principles:** G. A. Cohen criticized Rawls for applying the principles of justice primarily to the "basic structure" of society (major institutions), arguing they should also apply to individual choices within that structure. Cohen believed this limited scope made Rawls's theory insufficiently egalitarian. Mandle notes that Rawls _does_ acknowledge principles for individuals, but argues they are distinct from principles for institutions. He frames the deeper contrast as being about the nature of justice itself: for Rawls, it's fundamentally about structuring social interaction fairly through institutions, not about achieving a specific outcome pattern or eliminating luck through individual compliance. **In Conclusion** Jon Mandle's book offers a comprehensive yet accessible guide to John Rawls's challenging and influential _A Theory of Justice_. It explains the historical context, the key concepts like the original position and the two principles, the method of reflective equilibrium, and clarifies common misinterpretations regarding luck egalitarianism, desert, and the scope of the principles. It also provides crucial insights into how Rawls's thought developed in _Political Liberalism_ in response to internal pressures within his own theory. It shows us that _A Theory of Justice_ is a rich and layered work that has profoundly shaped modern political philosophy. While not without its complexities and points of debate, it offers a powerful vision of a just society as a fair system of cooperation among free and equal citizens. **Ideas and Questions to Explore Further** - How does Rawls's vision of a "property-owning democracy" differ more specifically from welfare-state capitalism in terms of economic policy and the distribution of wealth? - If justice as fairness doesn't aim to convince a moral skeptic, what kind of audience is it addressed to, and what counts as a successful justification within that framework? - Explore the specific arguments Rawls makes in the original position to choose the two principles over utilitarianism and other alternatives. - Delve deeper into the details of fair equality of opportunity. What specific institutions or policies would it require to ensure that people's life chances aren't determined by their social class? - Consider the limitations on the duty to obey unjust laws in a nearly just society. How do we determine when injustice "exceeds certain limits"? - How precisely does the idea of "public reason" function in a diverse society, and what are the challenges of applying it in practice? - Examine the relationship between Rawls's theory of justice for institutions and principles of justice or right that apply to individuals. Why does Rawls think these need to be discussed separately? - How does Rawls's account of the "moral person" and the two moral powers provide a foundation for his political conception of justice and the use of primary goods? - Investigate the criticisms of reflective equilibrium in more detail. Is it possible to justify moral principles without relying on some form of external foundation or prior intuition?