The book plunges us right into what the author calls "strange times" or "turbulent times". Have you ever felt like the world is constantly commemorating the past while, at the same time, everything you thought was stable or important is being questioned or attacked? That's the feeling Roudinesco captures. She points out a never-ending cycle of remembering "great events, great men, great intellectual achievements," alongside a relentless stream of "revisionist attacks" on the very "foundations of every discipline, every doctrine, every emancipatory adventure". It seems that ideas like feminism, socialism, and psychoanalysis are being "violently rejected," and influential figures like Freud, Marx, and Nietzsche are being declared "dead," along with any form of critical thinking that challenges the status quo. It feels as though we're just supposed to tally things up, like a giant ledger book, reducing people and ideas to mere objects. Adding to this whirlwind, philosophy itself is under threat within formal education, seen by some as useless, outdated, or too difficult to quantify scientifically. And yet, curiously, outside of universities and state institutions, there's a booming desire to "philosophize" and "learn to think for oneself". This creates a growing divide between traditional academic philosophy and a public hungry for more "living" forms of teaching, perhaps fueled by a deep-seated fear of losing identity and particularity in the world. Newspapers and periodicals often paint a rather gloomy picture, filled with talk of "the end of history, the end of ideology, the end of towering individuals, the end of thought, the end of mankind, the end of everything". Everywhere you look, you encounter the same types of questions, often presented as stark binaries – for or against Sartre, for or against Aron, celebrating or dismissing figures and ideas from May 1968. There's a pervasive sense of a "new malaise of civilization," asking why young people don't seem to think, why children are difficult, blaming various societal influences, and wondering what has become of leading thinkers. Even fundamental questions about gender, capability, and historical figures are posed in this turbulent environment: Are women capable of supervising men, thinking like men, being philosophers, or possessing the same emotions or instincts? Was Christ linked to Mary Magdalene? Has France declined? Are you for or against figures like Spinoza, Darwin, or Galileo? Is the US good or bad? Were Heidegger or Foucault or Deleuze or Derrida problematic? Was Napoleon like Hitler? The call is often for individuals to proffer thoughts and assess knowledge for themselves. Roudinesco suggests that this widespread "psychologization of existence," which contributes to depoliticization, is a subtle form of what Michel Foucault and Gilles Deleuze called "little everyday fascism". It's an intimate, desired form of fascism that slips inside individuals without them even realizing it, and without openly challenging the core principles of human rights or democracy. In this complex and often unsettling landscape, the book chooses to focus on six prominent French philosophers: Georges Canguilhem, Jean-Paul Sartre, Michel Foucault, Louis Althusser, Gilles Deleuze, and Jacques Derrida. The author explains that, despite their disagreements and distinct paths, they shared a crucial common ground: they all engaged critically with the question of political commitment (which can be thought of as a philosophy of freedom) and the Freudian concept of the unconscious (which can be thought of as a philosophy of structure). They also shared a command of literary style and a passion for art and literature. Their work and lives were marked by this confrontation. These thinkers, the book notes, refused to simply serve the goal of normalizing human beings, a project seen as potentially leading to an "ideology of submission in the service of barbarity". They published their major works before television and modern media gained their current dominance in transmitting knowledge, although Deleuze and Derrida did begin to think about the logic of modern media. The author emphasizes that the book isn't just a nostalgic look back or a simple summary; instead, it aims to make their ideas interact and highlight moments in French intellectual history to show that only through "critical acceptance of a heritage" can one truly think for oneself and invent future thought – a thought that refuses to submit. Let's take a closer look at some of these fascinating figures and their interconnected worlds, as presented in the sources: **Georges Canguilhem:** Michel Foucault held immense respect for Canguilhem, recognizing his significant place in French philosophy despite his seemingly austere focus on the history of science. Foucault noted that understanding Canguilhem was essential to grasping discussions among French Marxists, the work of eminent sociologists like Bourdieu, Castel, and Passeron, and aspects of theoretical work by psychoanalysts, particularly Lacanians. He even suggested that Canguilhem influenced participants in intellectual debates surrounding the May 1968 movement. Canguilhem's book, _The Normal and the Pathological_, is highlighted as his most significant work, capturing the essence of his thought. It explored fundamental themes like life and death, the role of "error" and rationality in the history of science, and the important notions of continuity and rupture, norm and anomaly. He also had a modern perspective on how experimentation and conceptualization relate in medicine. Foucault saw Canguilhem as belonging to a distinct current of French thought – a philosophy of knowledge, rationality, and conceptuality, tracing back through figures like Cavaillès and Koyré. This contrasted with a philosophy of experience, sense, and the subject, represented by thinkers like Merleau-Ponty and Sartre. Interestingly, Foucault pointed out that the more "speculative" current, seemingly remote from political commitment, was precisely the one that actively resisted the Nazis. Canguilhem himself, a hero of the Resistance, echoed this, arguing for a "logical coherence" between political commitment and intellectual activity, exemplified by his friend Jean Cavaillès, a philosopher of the concept who was killed by the Nazis. Canguilhem even provocatively challenged philosophers of existence and the person (like Sartre and de Beauvoir) to demonstrate comparable commitment. Canguilhem's early intellectual path was influenced by Émile Chartier (known as "Alain"), a supporter of Dreyfus and radical pacifist who valued a philosophy of action grounded in freedom, conscience, and reason. Canguilhem became a devotee of Alain, publishing articles under a pseudonym in Alain's journal. He studied alongside notable figures like Jean-Paul Sartre, Paul Nizan, and Raymond Aron at the École Normale Supérieure (ENS). His academic career included work on Auguste Comte and achieving the agrégation in philosophy. As a teacher, Canguilhem had rigorous, even demanding methods. He preferred flexible archives over fixed knowledge and required students to write summaries without notes or feedback to train their critical faculty and memory. Despite challenging authority himself, he demanded submission in the classroom, prioritizing the imparting of knowledge seemingly separate from the practice of liberty. A former student described his method as a critical reflection that takes distance, assesses evidence, yet also intimately engages with the subject – a "true spirit of resistance, grounded in the effectiveness of prohibition and authority". For Canguilhem, rebellion should aim for a higher order of reason and conceptuality, not just subjective liberty. He was influenced by Edmund Husserl's phenomenology, particularly the idea that certain knowledge is grounded in the thinking ego and the concept of transcendental intersubjectivity. Husserl's work, especially _The Crisis of European Sciences_, was seen as a way to protect the human sciences from inhumanity and save a science of man focused on the living being. Husserl's philosophy could lead down two paths: one towards a philosophy of sense and the subject (taken by Sartre and Merleau-Ponty), or another towards a philosophy of knowledge devoid of an ontological or psychological subject (taken by Koyré and Canguilhem). Lacan, notably, tried a middle path combining a subject theory with rationality based on the unconscious. Canguilhem, while acknowledging Husserl, focused his impact on the history of science through medicine and technology, arguing that sciences often arise from technological transformations and that conceptualization is spurred by reviewing failed attempts. Canguilhem's experience during World War Two was transformative. He abandoned his youthful pacifism, seeing peace not as the absence of conflict but as a form of it, requiring one to choose sides in a clash between societal types. He joined the Resistance, acting as a doctor for the Maquis. This concrete action and caregiving profoundly influenced his thinking on normality. He argued that submission to the Nazi-backed Vichy regime was not normality; true normality lay in choosing a radical break, a new norm issuing from life, even if it meant exile or death. He believed that figures of the Resistance, even those who died, understood that "death always demands a reckoning from life," distinguishing heroes from fanatics. This involved a choice of destiny, an "instantaneous rigor of the act," where action becomes a work, akin to Rimbaud's idea of spiritual combat. Canguilhem suggested that his major work, _The Normal and the Pathological_, might not have achieved its significance or been understood as a philosophy of heroism based on conceptual analysis if written in peacetime, despite the core concepts potentially being the same. His thinking on normality was also influenced by Kurt Goldstein's work on brain injury patients, who established new, though narrower, norms of life after injury. Canguilhem agreed, stating that recovery isn't a return to a former state but the establishment of new norms, potentially even superior ones. While he appreciated French psychiatric knowledge, he critiqued surgeon René Leriche's view of continuity between health and illness, instead adopting Goldstein's thesis that the patient's perspective is key to judging normality. Canguilhem's academic career after the war was distinguished; he became Inspector General of Philosophy and succeeded Gaston Bachelard at the Sorbonne, directing the Institute of the History of Science and Technology and influencing students and philosophy teaching. He continually revised _The Normal and the Pathological_ over thirty years, notably making significant changes in 1966, influenced by Michel Foucault's _The Birth of the Clinic_. He recognized Foucault's radical critique of psychiatric thinking and his new way of defining the norm as a historical construct linked to social normativity. While Foucault took from Freud a new perspective on the asylum's structure rather than his norm conception, Canguilhem incorporated Foucault's idea of social normativity challenging biological normativity. Their dialogue, described as an "inversion of filiation" where the master adapted based on the pupil's work, is seen as a high point in postwar French philosophy. Canguilhem admired Foucault greatly, seeing him as a "truly great philosopher" alongside his own ENS schoolmates Sartre and Aron. A striking element of Canguilhem's philosophy, stemming from his resistance to Pétain in 1940 and aligning with his Spinozist leanings, was his stance as a philosopher of "conceptual rebellion". He strongly rejected psychology, viewing it as a "school of submission" that reduced the human spirit to a mere thing or reflex, similar to his rejection of theories based on race or environment. He famously depicted psychology's path as leading downhill towards "police headquarters," contrasted with philosophy's uphill path towards the Pantheon, symbolizing psychology's instrumental nature and service to submission. His fierce critique targeted figures like his former friend Daniel Lagache, who sought to unify psychology and integrate psychoanalysis into it. Canguilhem saw this as a threat to philosophical ideals and a potential path towards managing interpersonal relationships supplanting political/intellectual commitment. Although Canguilhem never fully embraced the Althusser-Lacan generation's ardor, he was not displeased when they used his critique of psychology, especially behavioralism, against what they saw as a science of servitude. He maintained his critical stance against psychology, later attacking cognitivism and biological explanations that reduced thought to brain function, seeing them as a modern "barbarity". He even adopted a strategy of defending Freud's discoveries in veiled terms while doing so. Canguilhem warned future generations about this "permanent calamity" of psychology focused on increasing output without regard for meaning. Drawing parallels to Spinoza denouncing barbarians, Canguilhem called on philosophers to unite against this "liberticide" psychology, especially noting how biological/neuronal arguments are used to justify old discriminations. His philosophy is presented as a modern form of heroism, uniting lofty thought with robust political commitment. **Jean-Paul Sartre:** Jean-Paul Sartre, already known for _Nausea_ before the war, used the novel to explore the subjective experience of melancholy and existence based on phenomenological ideas from Husserl and Heidegger. His return to Paris made neutrality impossible, leading him to briefly form a resistance group, though he continued to write and publish during the occupation, maintaining contact with underground writers. His major work, _Being and Nothingness_, written during the occupation, reflected the world's "thirst for liberty" in a time of defeat and impending death. In Sartrean terms, liberty was a struggle escaping full mastery, complicated by the human tendency for "bad faith". Sartre was noted as the first French theorist to offer a truly phenomenological reading of the Freudian unconscious in 1943, integrating it into his philosophy of human liberty. This placed him on the path of Husserlian interpretation focused on the subject, distinct from the path of concepts taken by Canguilhem and others. Later, Sartre attempted to combine psychoanalysis and Marxist method as tools for investigation, aiming to explain himself and his transition from aesthetics to social engagement. He sought to become a "Freud of a psychoanalysis without the unconscious," grounded in "bad faith". This ambition led him to spend years on biographical work like his study of Flaubert. Sartre's complex relationship with psychoanalysis is further highlighted by his screenplay about Freud, which re-imagined a moment from Freud's life with Josef Breuer and Anna O. (referred to as Cecily in the screenplay). This fictionalized "scene" involved extracting a confession through invention of transference, contrasting with the actual history found in Freud's correspondence with Fliess. Roudinesco suggests that Sartre successfully embodied his conceptual ideas in fiction, making them incandescent. His memoir, _The Words_, also connected him directly to the Roquentin character in _Nausea_, seeing himself as both the analyst of hell and a "phony" yet joyful writer about the human condition. Despite his belief in subjective freedom, Sartre was depicted as ridiculing psychoanalysis, perhaps in response to its expanding market after May 1968, particularly among the elite. This put him in a similar position to Deleuze and Foucault, who also criticized psychoanalysis from different angles (Deleuze/Guattari via Reichian Freudo-Marxism, Foucault via support for Deleuze). Sartre's defense of English antipsychiatry, which was influenced by his own philosophy, further demonstrated his commitment to subjective freedom. Roudinesco laments that his Freud screenplay was not published earlier, suggesting it might have influenced the Lacanian generation. Sartre is contrasted with Lacan in their reactions to the May 1968 student revolt. Sartre became deeply involved in the "imaginary of revolution," almost losing himself, while Lacan adopted a "baroque severity" to understand the collapse of the militant ideal. Foucault saw them as "alternating contemporaries," suggesting that after their era, it was no longer viable to simply assert the subject's radical freedom (Sartre) or determination by structures (structuralists/Lacan); instead, the focus should be on understanding the complex notion of the subject itself. Foucault initially contrasted his generation's "passion for concepts, and for what I would call system" with Sartre's generation's "passion for life, for politics, for existence". However, Roudinesco argues that Foucault's own intellectual path shows these two passions (for concepts and commitment) are intertwined and necessary, provided they serve to reject submission. Sartre and Lacan are symbolically linked by their role in the anti-chauvinistic movement of the 1930s that re-engaged French thought with German philosophy. While neither was active in the Resistance, the experience of radical anti-Nazism shaped their later thinking on commitment and freedom. Lacan famously critiqued Sartre's notion of radical freedom after the war, arguing that freedom comes not from an internal welling up, but from integrating into the human collectivity through logical reasoning. Lacan saw liberty as dependent on a temporality that allows submission to a logical decision when the "time for understanding" arrives. Thus, while both were influenced by Husserl and engaged with German philosophy, Lacan's integration of a non-subjective philosophy of the subject placed him differently than Sartre's focus on an existential subject. **Michel Foucault:** Michel Foucault's _History of Madness_ sparked immediate and often hostile reactions from psychiatrists, psychologists, and historians. Foucault challenged traditional views, arguing that his book was about the "incessant, ever-modified division" between reason and madness, not a history of either in isolation. He posited that medicine became the guardian of this division in the 19th century, labeling it "mental illness". Henri Ey, a prominent figure in French psychiatry, recognized the importance of Foucault's work, calling it "psychiatricidal" while also expressing admiration for its methodology. Despite philosophical disagreements, particularly regarding whether mental illness was a cultural phenomenon or a manifestation of madness/genius, Ey sought a direct debate with Foucault, which Foucault declined. Foucault's theses partially overlapped with the antipsychiatry movement, which also critiqued the notion of mental illness. However, their approaches differed; antipsychiatry movements in other countries often focused on the asylum and political practice, whereas Foucault's critique stemmed from a historical and philosophical analysis of discourse and power. Foucault's approach in _History of Madness_ involved seeking out "transgressive" archives – raw, non-expert documents – to give voice to the excluded side of Western reason, drawing on thinkers like Bataille and Nietzsche. This challenged traditional histories of psychiatry, which were often hagiographic accounts tracing a lineage back to Philippe Pinel. Georges Canguilhem, who served as a rapporteur for Foucault's thesis, immediately saw _History of Madness_ as a "radical revision" of psychiatric thinking and a challenge to the scientific status of psychology, aligning with his own critiques of psychology as a "technology of submission". Daniel Lagache, representing psychology on the examining board, felt targeted by Foucault's work which undermined his project of unifying psychology. Beyond the intellectual critiques, Foucault's work sparked personal attacks, suggesting his interest in madness was linked to his own struggles, experiences with deviance, attempted suicide, homosexuality, brief psychoanalytic attempt, and traumatic childhood memories like witnessing an amputation or hearing about the "séquestrée de Poitiers". These critics suggested the book was a disguised autobiography driven by personal demons. Foucault himself wrote about his internal struggles and a metaphorical journey through "pathways of night" that preceded his major work. Foucault's historical method involved extensive archival research, such as the Erik Waller collection in Uppsala, Sweden, and documents on public assistance in Paris. Critics questioned his use of rhetoric ("grande renfermement") and suggested he imposed pre-determined hypotheses on the material. The polemic often had less to do with the technical use of archives and more with historians of psychiatry feeling their field threatened by his analysis. Foucault later shifted from seeking a "period mentality" to an "ontological truth of madness," requiring a revision of historical understanding. Later historians like Gladys Swain acknowledged Foucault's importance while attempting to construct a different history of psychiatry, focusing on integration rather than exclusion and linking the asylum to a democratic utopia. Swain and Marcel Gauchet, in their book, prioritized Foucault's later work, _The Will to Knowledge_, over _History of Madness_, while launching a "formidable assault" on Freud's discoveries, linking them to "totalitarianism". They cited Foucault as anti-Freudian based on _The Will to Knowledge_, which indeed reflected Foucault's evolving perspective, influenced by Deleuze and Guattari's critique of the Oedipus complex. Roudinesco affirms Foucault's view that the disciplinary essence of psychoanalysis is incompatible with fascist discrimination. Foucault was also attacked by figures like Alain Renaut and Luc Ferry in _1968 Thought_, who accused him (along with Derrida, Lacan, Bourdieu, etc.) of promoting a "totalitarian" thought, linking _History of Madness_ to a Nietzschean-Heideggerian nihilism and accusing him of being antidemocratic for preferring the "ship of fools" (seen as "inegalitarian") to the "chemical straitjacket" (seen as "egalitarian"). This involved misrepresenting Foucault's project and attributing views he didn't hold. Despite the often violent tone of his writing, Foucault engaged in political combats inspired by his work and antipsychiatry, supporting alternative networks against psychiatric power, but also showing himself to be a "man of dialogue" and even adopting a "reformist line" regarding psychiatry. His critique of the "biopower" of experts is linked back to Canguilhem's denunciation of psychology as "police-headquarters psychology". Jan Goldstein's work on the history of psychiatry, while not overwhelmed by Foucault's book, acknowledged its importance in reversing the gaze on madness and identifying the division between reason and unreason. Goldstein detailed the historical context of French psychiatry, including figures like Pinel, Esquirol, Vicq d’Azir, and the clash between physiological and spiritualist schools. _Words and Things_, another key work by Foucault, also generated strong reactions. It posed crucial questions for the post-Sartrean generation about moving beyond existentialist philosophy. The book's critique of humanism revived the debate Sartre had with Heidegger and echoed the Frankfurt School's questioning of reason, aiming to analyze power and resist the "biologization of the mind". _Words and Things_ is seen as the logical successor to _History of Madness_, shifting focus from the history of the "Other" (madness, excluded) to the history of the "Same" (order of things, distinguished/gathered). Foucault controversially suggested that disciplines like psychoanalysis, linguistics, and ethnology dissolved the notion of "man," concluding with the famous line about man being potentially "wiped away, like a face in the sand". Canguilhem notably defended Foucault against Sartre's criticism of this passage, connecting Foucault's conceptual commitment to the heroism of the Resistance. **Louis Althusser:** Louis Althusser's inclusion is framed partly through the tragic event of his strangling his wife, Hélène Rytmann. This event and the surrounding controversy, including media portrayals as a symbol of communism's failure or the beneficiary of an intellectual conspiracy, highlight the tumultuous backdrop against which his life and work are viewed. Althusser found in Foucault's _History of Madness_ and _Birth of the Clinic_ a source of concepts to develop his Marxist theory of history. He also used Foucault's "crepuscular language" to confront his own profound melancholy, which psychiatry had seemingly overlooked or mislabeled. Althusser, a melancholic philosopher whose condition was "debaptized" by psychiatric discourse, saw the possibility of a "theater of the body, of the unconscious, and of excess" in philosophy, aiming to renew revolutionary heroism. This connected to Marx's idea of philosophy needing to transform the world, not just interpret it. His autobiography, _The Future Lasts a Long Time_, published posthumously, recounted the murder scene. The title is interpreted as a reference to eternal time, the "longue durée of death," and melancholy, suggesting unfinished mourning. The book itself is described as unique and challenging to classify, mixing confession, fantasy, and self-reflection, even presenting himself as an impostor. It subverts autobiographical norms and sparked intense negative reactions. Althusser, though a militant communist, primarily engaged in conceptual battles through writing, not physical combat, and his body reportedly fainted away during real political events like May 1968. Althusser had a complex and intertwined relationship with Hélène Rytmann, the Communist Party, the asylum, and psychoanalytic discourse, marked by turmoil, repulsion, exaltation, and fusion. His deep connection with Franca Madonia provided a sense of "real family" but he attempted to integrate her into the "psychical confinement" he shared with Hélène, leading to an explosive situation. His relation to Freudianism was ambivalent; he underwent orthodox psychoanalysis with René Diatkine, who also treated Hélène, creating a complex transference. While benefiting from the analysis, Althusser also positioned himself as a theorist, offering "lessons in Lacanism" to Diatkine, reflecting his dual role as analysand and intellectual figure. Despite being a powerful deconstructor of Stalinism through his writing, Althusser did not physically participate in anti-Stalinist struggles. Derrida, dedicating _Specters of Marx_ to the assassinated communist Chris Hani, is seen as paying a veiled homage to Althusser, a thinker of communism caught in a "universe of crime". **Gilles Deleuze:** Foucault famously predicted that "One day, perhaps, the century will be Deleuzean," seeing him as a philosopher who would renew thought. Deleuze was politically committed to the left and had a distinct academic path, not having attended the ENS like many others. He began as a historian of philosophy, viewing it not as an obstacle but a method for creating concepts, using a provocative metaphor of "sodomy" with authors. Influenced by Nietzsche and various forms of art and literature, he moved towards a critical questioning of established knowledge, earning Derrida's respect. Deleuze was characterized by a paradoxical attitude, a focus on extremes, and a passion for creative genius. He held a mechanistic materialism, believing brain activity could produce concepts and art, but rejected simplistic scientism and comparisons between human and animal behavior. He despised medical power and normative psychology, seeing assessment and instrumentalization of humans as barbarous. He advocated for individuals' right to choose their destiny and manage their medical care freely, arguing that a subject is fundamentally a multiple, deterritorialized singularity ("nonsubject"). Described as "antisecurity" and refractory to destructive tendencies, he admired Sartre's subversive stance. He believed philosophy should foster conflict within oneself and others, not just pointless gratification or destructive struggle. Deleuze's work is marked by inventive concepts and metaphors, contrasting established systems ("theater," "closed field," "zoo") with dynamic, multiple forms ("factory," "free-running pack," "continents," "fluxes," "rhizome"). He aimed to explode classic philosophical representations, focusing on a "primitive scene" of concept creation. He rejected the tragic and schools of thought that reduce singularities, seeing desire as a "work of the unconscious" ordered like "animal and musical territories," not a theater. Following Nietzsche, he sought to overturn Platonism to find Dionysian chaos and, like Heraclitus, emphasized multiplicity and flux, stating "nothing is ever repeated identically". _Anti-Oedipus_, written with Félix Guattari, is presented as a major work that challenged the psychoanalytic conformism of the time, particularly Lacanian dogmatism and Oedipal psychology. Written as an "opera" through letters, its form (rhizomatic rhetoric) embodied its content, contrasting the imperialism of the "One" (symbolic structure) with a plural essence of desire. They sought to rethink history from the perspective of "desiring machines" and "successful" schizophrenia, free from psychiatric control. They proposed "schizoanalysis" as a "materialist psychiatry" that sees delirium related to the "name of History," not just the father. While not initiating a revolution in clinical practice, _Anti-Oedipus_ was seen as innovative by those who viewed life as a chaotic experience. Deleuze strongly rejected ideologies of the end of history and man, seeing them as nihilistic and reactionary. He argued that humans must confront what exceeds them – extreme passions and desires, the Multiple, the clamor of being – to avoid a new servitude in the "invisible neofascism of the One". Having been influenced by Sartre and later joining Foucault's battles for minorities, Deleuze helped Foucault see anti-Oedipalism as a tool to deconstruct "tendentially fascistic forms" of existence. **Jacques Derrida:** The book concludes by paying homage to Jacques Derrida, the last survivor of this generation, who engaged in the practice of bidding farewell to his friends through writing. These "farewells" (_adieux sans Dieu_) are characterized by deep pain, a sense of unfulfillment, and a narrative structure that acknowledges that one person must disappear before the other. Derrida, who felt closest to Deleuze among his contemporaries, used evocative language and structures like parentheses and flashbacks to capture the experience of loss. Derrida's intellectual relationship with Foucault is highlighted by their famous debate regarding Descartes's cogito and the history of madness. Foucault argued that Descartes excluded madness from the cogito, prefiguring the "grande renfermement". Derrida countered that madness was included _within_ the cogito, arguing that thought holds good even if one is mad, and that the division between reason and madness was internal to reason and predated the _grande renfermement_, going back to Socrates. Derrida saw Foucault's interpretation as too structural and sought to deconstruct rigid structuralist applications. Despite this significant intellectual dispute, which occurred in 1963 and saw Foucault respond forcefully to Derrida's critique, the two were later reconciled. Foucault publicly supported Derrida when he was arrested in Prague in 1981. Derrida is placed within the generation of thinkers who questioned the nature of the subject and exposed what lay behind this concept. Rather than accepting the binary of a subject being either completely free or completely determined, they doubted this alternation. These thinkers, including Derrida, criticized the Enlightenment and the logos, pushing philosophical inquiry to its margins and engaging with figures like Marx, Freud, Nietzsche, and Heidegger. Like Foucault, Derrida saw the need to continually question ideals like human rights and democracy to uncover the "dark force" or "little everyday... fascism" that threatens them. His critique of Foucault, while sharp, was framed as a critical engagement acknowledging a debt to the work being critiqued. Derrida's work, along with others of this generation, marked a shift in engagement with literature, questioning the notion of a novelistic universe itself. He notably dedicated his work _Specters of Marx_ to Chris Hani, a communist militant assassinated in South Africa, a gesture interpreted as a potential veiled homage to his friend Louis Althusser, a thinker of communism who ended his life tragically involved in a "universe of crime". **Connecting the Dots:** These excerpts give us a powerful glimpse into a generation of thinkers deeply engaged with the turbulent political and intellectual currents of their time. We see their shared wrestling matches with key concepts like freedom, structure, the unconscious, and the very nature of the subject. They challenged established institutions (philosophy, psychology, psychiatry, academia), re-read foundational figures (Freud, Marx, Nietzsche, Heidegger, Husserl, Descartes, Spinoza), and sought to forge new paths for thought that resisted normalization and submission. Their relationships were marked by intellectual debates and personal complexities, sometimes fierce, sometimes marked by deep respect and friendship. Canguilhem's rigorous conceptual resistance, Sartre's existential freedom and wrestling with psychoanalysis, Foucault's historical critique of power and normalization, Althusser's melancholic engagement with Marxism and the unconscious, Deleuze's philosophy of desiring machines and multiplicity, and Derrida's deconstructive approach and reflections on loss – all represent distinct but interconnected responses to the challenges of thinking in turbulent times. **Further Ideas and Questions to Explore:** Reading about these thinkers and their interactions raises so many fascinating questions! - How do the different "philosophies of commitment" and "philosophies of structure" discussed here relate to each other? Is one necessarily prior or more fundamental than the other, as Canguilhem and Foucault debated? - How do personal experiences and struggles (like Althusser's melancholy, Foucault's "pathways of night") influence philosophical thought? The sources suggest a deep connection, but is it causal, or something more complex? - The critique of psychology as a "technology of submission" runs through Canguilhem, Foucault, and Deleuze. How does this historical critique resonate with contemporary psychology and its role in society? - How did the experience of World War II and the Resistance shape the thinking of this generation, even for those like Sartre, Lacan, and Foucault who weren't active combatants? What does it mean to connect conceptual thought to heroism? - The relationships between master and pupil, and the "inversion of filiation" seen between Canguilhem and Foucault, are highlighted. How do intellectual legacies truly get passed on and transformed? Is it always through critical engagement, as Roudinesco suggests? - The sources mention the critique of psychoanalysis, particularly the Oedipus complex, by Deleuze/Guattari and Foucault. How did this critique impact the study of the unconscious and subjectivity? - The debate between Foucault and Derrida over Descartes's cogito is a dense philosophical point, but what are its broader implications for understanding the relationship between reason and its "other" throughout history? - The idea of "little everyday fascism" seems particularly relevant today. How can philosophy help us identify and resist these insidious forms of submission that don't rely on overt totalitarianism? - How does the "turbulent time" described in the introduction, with its talk of "ends" and attacks on foundational ideas, compare to the intellectual and social climate we experience now? Are there parallels or significant differences?