Harry G. Frankfurt's book "On Inequality" takes a close look at the buzzing discussion around economic inequality, especially in light of recent research highlighting the growing gap between the rich and the poor. While many see this gap itself as a major problem and morally wrong, Frankfurt offers a different perspective. He suggests that economic inequality, _in itself_, isn't the core moral issue. This might sound surprising at first, so let's unpack it. Frankfurt believes that the real challenge isn't that some people have more money than others, but rather that _too many people are poor_ and that _some people have excessively too much_. Think about it – if everyone had enough income and wealth to live well, would it truly matter, from a moral standpoint, if some people had significantly more? Frankfurt argues that it wouldn't. This brings us to his alternative idea: the "doctrine of sufficiency". **The Doctrine of Sufficiency** Instead of focusing on everyone having the _same_ amount of money (economic egalitarianism), the doctrine of sufficiency proposes that what's morally important is that everyone has _enough_. But what does "enough" mean? Frankfurt clarifies that having enough is far more than just having enough to barely get by or to make life marginally tolerable. A person who only has "just enough" to avoid economic misery doesn't truly have enough according to this doctrine. To have enough money means, roughly, that a person is content or can reasonably be content with their amount, such that any distress or dissatisfaction in their life isn't due to having too little money. This could mean they aren't unhappy at all, or they might be unhappy, but the source of their unhappiness isn't something more money could fix – perhaps it's related to non-economic goods like love, meaning, or character satisfaction. Having enough doesn't necessarily mean having a limit beyond which more money would be bad. A person content with enough might still welcome or enjoy having more money; it might bring pleasure. But they wouldn't see getting more as essential to being satisfied with their life, and they wouldn't have an _active interest_ or a restless concern for increasing their wealth. Being content, in this sense, doesn't mean you wouldn't prefer more if offered, or even make minor sacrifices for it, but that the possibility of improving your situation isn't _important_ to you; you aren't anxious or determined to improve it significantly. This idea suggests that it can be rational and reasonable for someone to be satisfied with a certain level of well-being or satisfaction, rather than always striving to maximize it. This contentment can stem from a thoughtful evaluation of one's own life and what truly matters, rather than just settling or being dull. This raises an interesting question: How can we encourage a societal understanding of "enough" that prevents both excessive greed and settling for too little? **Why Economic Egalitarianism is Misguided (According to Frankfurt)** Frankfurt argues that thinking economic equality is morally important for its own sake is a mistake, and actually a harmful one. Here's why: 1. **It distracts from the real problems:** The truly offensive aspects of our economic situation are poverty (many having too little) and excessive affluence or "economic gluttony" (many having far more than they need). These create an "ugly and morally offensive" impression, not just the fact of unequal distribution. Focusing on inequality misses the point that our basic goal should be reducing poverty and excessive affluence. While reducing inequality might be a side effect, it shouldn't be the primary aim. 2. **It's alienating:** Preoccupation with economic equality leads people to measure their own needs and satisfaction not by their personal circumstances or what truly matters to them, but by comparing themselves to others. This external focus on others' wealth is an "entirely extrinsic matter" that has nothing directly to do with what a person needs for a good life. This fixation on comparison separates a person from their own individual reality, needs, interests, and authentic ambitions. It contributes to "moral disorientation and shallowness". This makes you wonder: How much of our dissatisfaction with our own lives is driven by genuine need versus comparison to others? 3. **It masks the importance of sufficiency:** Calculating an equal share is relatively simple compared to figuring out what someone actually needs to have enough. Because egalitarianism seems simpler conceptually, its popularity has unfortunately diverted attention from the much-needed systematic inquiry into the complex concept of "having enough". **Evaluating Arguments for Economic Equality** Frankfurt also examines common arguments used to support economic equality and explains why he finds them unconvincing as reasons for equality being _intrinsically_ valuable. - **Instrumental Arguments:** Some argue that equality is desirable because it helps achieve other good things, like promoting fraternal relationships or preventing other undesirable inequalities (in social status, political influence, ability to use opportunities). Frankfurt acknowledges these might be good _social_ reasons to pursue equality policies, but they value equality only for its _contingent or instrumental connections_ to other things, not for its own sake. - **Diminishing Marginal Utility:** A more complex argument suggests equal distribution of money maximizes overall happiness or "aggregate utility". This is based on the idea that each additional dollar provides less satisfaction ("utility") to a rich person than to a poor one. Frankfurt presents Professor Abba Lerner as a notable proponent of this view. However, Frankfurt argues this argument fails because its core assumptions are false: * Assumption (a): The utility of money invariably diminishes at the margin. Frankfurt counters that this psychological generalization (based on tiring of repetitive consumption) doesn't necessarily apply to money itself, which is versatile. He points out that with certain things (and even money through saving for large purchases), marginal utility can _increase_ due to "warming up" or crossing "utility thresholds". Saving money for a large purchase allows crossing a threshold where the final dollar enables a satisfaction greater than the sum of previous dollars spent individually. He uses examples like saving for an exciting ball game instead of buying slightly better meat daily, or the synergistic effect of combining goods like popcorn and butter, where the combined utility is greater than the sum of their individual utilities. Collectors completing a set also experience this – the final item brings utility related to the completeness that is more than the sum of the individual items' utility. * Assumption (b): The utility functions of all individuals are the same. Frankfurt states this is clearly false, as people have different capacities for enjoyment and different needs. * Furthermore, the argument often ignores inflationary effects of redistribution, which could harm middle classes and offset gains for the poor. - **Minimizing Bad Outcomes (Scarcity):** Frankfurt also shows that in situations of extreme scarcity, egalitarian distribution can actually lead to the _worst_ possible outcome. If there are only enough vital resources (like medicine or food) to save some but not all, distributing them equally might mean everyone dies (e.g., 40 units for 10 people needing 5 units each means everyone gets 4 and dies). In such a case, it's morally required to distribute unequally to maximize the number of people who have _enough_ to survive, even if it means explicitly leaving others to die. He also challenges the idea that when some have less than enough, no one should have more than enough, pointing out that giving small, insufficient amounts to the neediest doesn't actually help them cross the "enough" threshold and might be wasteful. This brings up another question: How do we make difficult moral choices about resource distribution when scarcity makes it impossible for everyone to reach sufficiency? **Equality vs. Respect** A widespread intuition is that economic inequality "just seems wrong". Frankfurt suspects that people feeling this are not reacting to the inequality itself, but to the underlying _poverty_ – the fact that those with less have _too little_, an "absolute qualitative deficiency," not just a "relative quantitative discrepancy". We aren't morally disturbed by inequality between the very rich and the extremely rich, precisely because both groups clearly have plenty. Morally disturbing situations involving inequality, he believes, are only disturbing when they violate the ideal of sufficiency. He thinks the appeal of egalitarianism is partly due to confusing treating people equally with treating them with a certain kind of _respect_. These are different. - **Equality:** A formal characteristic, simply meaning each person has the same as others. It aims for indistinguishable outcomes in some pertinent way. - **Respect:** More personal, dealing with someone based _only_ on the aspects of their character or circumstances that are _relevant_ to the issue at hand. It entails impartiality and avoiding arbitrariness, aiming for outcomes _matched_ to the individual's particularities. Frankfurt argues that while treating people equally and treating them with respect sometimes lead to the same outcome, the underlying moral reason is respect/impartiality, not equality. For example, if dividing a cake among people you know nothing about, you divide it equally not because equality is the default good, but because treating them differently would be arbitrary and disrespectful, given that you have no relevant information to differentiate them. Similarly, if people are entitled to something (like basic rights) simply by being human, they should receive the same because their shared humanity is the _only relevant characteristic_, requiring impartiality, which results in equality. The moral importance here derives from impartially responding to their common humanity (respect), not from equality itself being a fundamental value. The moral importance of respect and impartiality lies in their connection to rationality (treating similar cases alike based on relevance). But more deeply, disrespectful treatment, which ignores relevant facts about a person, feels like a denial of their reality. When significant parts of a person's life are ignored or treated as if they don't count, it can be deeply disturbing, an "assault on his reality," threatening their sense of self and existence for others. Demands for justice or not being ignored often stem from this profound distress, sometimes leading to extreme reactions. In contrast, demands for equality are based on comparing oneself to others ("what other people have") rather than affirming one's own reality, needs, and interests. This external focus distracts from authentic ambitions. **In Conclusion** Frankfurt concludes that economic equality is not a morally compelling ideal in itself. The true moral concerns lie with poverty and excessive affluence, and ensuring everyone has enough to live a life they can be content with. While pursuing equality can be a useful tool for achieving other social or political goods, believing it has intrinsic moral value is a mistake that distracts from what truly matters: the actual conditions of people's lives and whether they have what they need to flourish, based on their own reality and needs, not just how they compare to others. Here are a few more ideas and questions to explore based on these thoughts: - If the moral focus is on sufficiency, how do societies define and measure "enough" in a way that is both practical and truly captures the idea of living a content and fulfilling life, not just avoiding misery? Is "enough" a fixed standard or something that evolves? - Given the argument that focusing on equality is alienating, how can individuals and societies shift their focus towards identifying and pursuing authentic needs and ambitions, rather than being driven by comparison? - How can policies be designed to effectively tackle poverty and excessive wealth, and protect political processes from undue influence by the wealthy, without necessarily aiming for strict economic equality? Could such policies lead to greater equality as a positive side effect? - If respectful treatment is dealing with people based on what's relevant to them as individuals, how does this principle apply in mass society and public policy, where individual particularities can be hard to account for?