Think about it – we all feel like we can spot it, but trying to pin down its exact nature? That's where it gets interesting! Frankfurt embarks on a philosophical analysis to try and shed some light on this elusive concept. Now, right from the start, defining bullshit precisely is a bit tricky. The word "bullshit" itself is often used quite loosely, sometimes just as a general term of disapproval without a specific meaning. Plus, the phenomenon is so vast and messy that any attempt at a neat, clear definition is bound to feel a bit forced or restrictive. But even if we can't get a perfect, universally agreed-upon definition, we can still aim for a helpful understanding. It's surprising, isn't it, how little focused inquiry this widespread phenomenon has attracted?. Frankfurt notes that very little work has been done specifically on the subject of bullshit. One obvious place to look is the dictionary, like the Oxford English Dictionary (OED), which does have entries for "bullshit" and related terms like "bull". He also considers Max Black's essay "The Prevalence of Humbug". Frankfurt assumes that "humbug" is quite similar in meaning to "bullshit" for the purposes of his discussion, even though they aren't perfectly interchangeable and might differ in terms of politeness or intensity. Saying "Humbug!" is definitely less intense than "Bullshit!". Max Black suggests several synonyms for humbug, though Frankfurt finds this list of "quaint equivalents" (like balderdash, claptrap, hokum) not particularly helpful. However, Black does offer a formal definition for humbug: "deceptive misrepresentation, short of lying, especially by pretentious word or deed, of somebody’s own thoughts, feelings, or attitudes". Frankfurt uses this as a jumping-off point for his own analysis. Let's break down Black's definition a bit. First, "deceptive misrepresentation". This might sound redundant, but Black likely means that humbug is _intentionally_ designed to deceive; it's not just an accidental misrepresentation. It's deliberate. This means that whether something counts as humbug depends on the perpetrator's state of mind, just like lying. The property of being a lie isn't just about whether the statement is false or its other characteristics, but also requires the liar to make the statement with an intention to deceive. This raises a question: does something only become humbug or a lie because the speaker has a certain intention, or must the utterance itself also have specific features? The sources mention that some views on lying require a false statement, while others say you can lie even if the statement is true, as long as you believe it's false and intend to deceive. This is quite a thought-provoking point – can _any_ utterance be bullshit or humbug if the speaker's intent is right (or wrong, as the case may be)?. Next, "short of lying". This suggests humbug has some characteristics of lies but lacks others. Black's phrase seems to imply a kind of spectrum where humbug is located before lying. But since both are forms of misrepresentation, it's not immediately clear how the difference between them is just a matter of degree. This is a key point that Frankfurt explores further later on. Then there's "especially by pretentious word or deed". Black sees humbug as something done through both words and actions. The "especially" part means pretentiousness isn't absolutely essential to humbug. Frankfurt notes that "pretentious bullshit" is a common phrase. However, he's more inclined to think that pretentiousness is often the _motive_ for bullshit rather than a defining characteristic of its nature. While it often explains _why_ someone produces bullshit, the act of being pretentious itself isn't necessarily required to make an utterance an instance of bullshit. Finally, "misrepresentation… of somebody’s own thoughts, feelings, or attitudes". Black suggests humbug is essentially about misrepresenting oneself. Frankfurt points out that whenever someone deliberately misrepresents _anything_ else, they inevitably misrepresent their own state of mind as well. For instance, if you lie about having twenty dollars, you misrepresent both the money in your pocket _and_ your belief about the money in your pocket. If the lie works, the listener is deceived twice: about the money and about what you believe. However, it's unlikely Black meant that humbug is _always_ about the speaker's mind state. Humbug can be about other things. Frankfurt interprets Black as meaning that the _primary_ intention of humbug isn't to deceive the audience about the _topic_ itself, but rather to give them a false impression about what's going on in the speaker's mind. Creating this false impression of oneself is the main purpose of humbug, according to this interpretation. This interpretation helps explain Black's idea of humbug being "short of lying". If lying is primarily about the topic (e.g., the money in your pocket), misrepresenting your belief about that topic (which you do implicitly when you lie) might be seen as "short of lying" about your belief, especially since you didn't make an explicit statement about your belief. You provide a basis for a false supposition about your belief, even if you don't directly lie about it. This perspective makes the "short of lying" characterization seem more natural. Think about the Fourth of July orator example provided in the sources. The orator speaks bombastically about the country, its founders, and divine guidance. This is presented as a clear case of humbug. According to Black's account, the orator isn't necessarily lying. Lying would require him to intend for his audience to believe things he thinks are false about those historical or religious matters. But the orator doesn't really care what the audience thinks about the facts of history or the deity's role. Instead, as Black's account suggests, what makes the oration humbug is that the speaker intends to convey a certain impression of _himself_. He's not trying to deceive about American history. What matters to him is what people think _of him_. He wants to appear patriotic, thoughtful, sensitive to history and religion, proud yet humble. This seems to fit Black's description of misrepresenting one's own thoughts, feelings, or attitudes quite well. While Black's account seems to fit some classic examples, Frankfurt doesn't believe it fully captures the core nature of bullshit. He agrees that bullshit is "short of lying" and involves the perpetrator misrepresenting themselves, but he feels Black's explanation of these features is off the mark. To develop a more accurate understanding, Frankfurt turns to a story about the philosopher Ludwig Wittgenstein. Wittgenstein's personal motto, from a verse by Longfellow, was about craftsmen working with extreme care on every detail, even unseen parts, because "For the Gods are everywhere". This highlights a dedication to meticulous work, a refusal to cut corners. There was no "sweeping things under the rug". Or, as Frankfurt puts it, perhaps there was no bullshit. This suggests that carelessly made, shoddy goods are somehow similar to bullshit. But how? Is bullshit always produced carelessly, without attention to detail?. The word "shit" might suggest something messy and unrefined, like excrement, which is just emitted, not crafted. The idea of "carefully wrought bullshit" seems to involve a contradiction. Thoughtful attention requires discipline and objectivity, accepting standards rather than indulging whim, which feels contrary to the nature of bullshit. However, Frankfurt points out that carefully crafted bullshit absolutely exists. Look at advertising, public relations, and politics today. These fields are full of what Frankfurt calls "unmitigated" bullshit, and they employ highly sophisticated techniques like market research and polling. These "craftsmen" work tirelessly to get every word and image "exactly right". So, while there's an "inner strain" in the idea of carefully made bullshit, and the bullshitter is "trying to get away with something," the laxity involved isn't simple carelessness or lack of attention to detail. Frankfurt aims to pinpoint this mode of laxity more accurately. The story about Wittgenstein further clarifies this. Wittgenstein intensely disliked what he saw as "nonsense". His friend Fania Pascal recounted visiting him after a tonsillectomy and saying, "I feel just like a dog that has been run over". Wittgenstein's reported response was disgusted: "You don’t know what a dog that has been run over feels like". Now, as Frankfurt notes, this story feels almost unbelievable. Pascal's phrase is quite common, not seemingly provocative enough to cause such strong disgust. Maybe Wittgenstein was joking, and Pascal misunderstood?. But Pascal knew him, and her understanding (or misunderstanding) likely fit her sense of his character. For the analysis, Frankfurt decides to take Pascal's account at face value, assuming Wittgenstein was genuinely being as "preposterous" as she described. Assuming Wittgenstein was serious, what exactly was his objection?. Even if Pascal _doesn't_ know how a run-over dog feels (which Wittgenstein assumes is true), she isn't lying. Lying would require her to say she felt like a run-over dog while actually feeling quite good, knowing that run-over dogs feel bad. Pascal's Wittgenstein isn't accusing her of lying, but of a different kind of misrepresentation. She describes her feeling with a specific phrase ("the feeling of a run-over dog"), but she isn't truly acquainted with that specific feeling. She understands the phrase has a negative connotation (it's a bad feeling), but her characterization is too specific, too particular. She's describing a "distinctive kind of bad feeling" she doesn't actually know. To the Wittgenstein in the story, this specific, unfounded characterization is bullshit. Why would it strike him that way? Frankfurt believes it's because Wittgenstein perceives her statement as being, fundamentally, "unconnected to a concern with the truth". Her statement isn't aimed at accurately describing reality. She doesn't know how a run-over dog feels except in the vaguest sense, so her description is something she's just "making up" or repeating mindlessly without regard for the facts. This mindlessness, this lack of concern for correctness, is what disgusts Pascal's Wittgenstein. He sees her speaking thoughtlessly, without conscientious attention to the facts. Her statement wasn't "wrought with greatest care". The issue isn't that she made a mistake, or even a careless mistake. Her lack of care isn't an inadvertent slip. The problem, as Wittgenstein sees it, is that she offers a description without genuinely accepting the constraints that come with trying to represent reality accurately. Her fault is _not_ that she failed to get it right, but that she wasn't even _trying_. This is crucial because Wittgenstein takes her statement seriously, as an attempt to describe her feelings. He sees her engaging in an activity (describing reality) where truth and falsity are vital, yet she shows no interest in whether her statement is true or false. This is what it means for her statement to be "unconnected to a concern with truth": she isn't concerned with its truth-value. This is also why she's not lying; she doesn't claim to know the truth, so she can't be deliberately promoting something she knows is false. Her statement isn't based on a belief that it's true, nor on a belief that it's false (like a lie). It's this detachment from any concern with truth – this _indifference_ to how things really are – that Frankfurt identifies as the essential characteristic of bullshit. Let's look at some dictionary usages to see how this idea aligns with other uses of "bull" and "bullshit". The OED defines a "bull session" as an informal conversation, especially among males. Frankfurt finds this definition lacking. He argues that the point isn't just gender or informality. What's distinctive about a bull session is that the discussion, while potentially intense, is "not 'for real'" in a certain sense. Participants might try out thoughts and attitudes without being committed to them, seeing how they feel saying certain things and how others react. There's an understanding that statements don't necessarily reflect settled beliefs. The purpose isn't primarily to communicate beliefs, and the usual assumptions about the link between saying and believing are suspended. Bull session talk is similar to bullshit because it's also "in some degree unconstrained by a concern with truth". However, it differs from bullshit because in a bull session, there's _no pretense_ that the connection between what's said and what's believed is being upheld. Everyone knows it's not necessarily "for real". The term "shooting the bull," which refers to bull session conversation, likely stems from "shitting," further suggesting this link to bullshit. Another related usage is the British term "bull" for unnecessary routine tasks, ceremonial, excessive discipline, or "red-tape". Examples include pointless military drills. These tasks are seen as having little to do with the main purpose of the activity they're part of. Spit-and-polish doesn't genuinely help military personnel achieve their real goals, even if imposed by authorities claiming to be dedicated to those goals. So, this kind of "bull" is disconnected from the justifying motives of the enterprise. This is like bull session talk being disconnected from settled beliefs, and bullshit being disconnected from concern with truth. The OED also defines "bull" more broadly as "trivial, insincere, or untruthful talk or writing; nonsense". Frankfurt finds "nonsense" and "trivial" unhelpful and vague. "Insincere, or untruthful" is closer but needs refinement. Other OED definitions include "talk which is not to the purpose; 'hot air'" and "a combination of bluff, bravado, 'hot air' and... 'Kidding the troops'". "Not to the purpose" is also too broad and vague. The reference to "hot air" is more useful. Calling talk "hot air" means it's empty, without substance. It doesn't serve its purported purpose of communication; no information is conveyed, like mere exhalation. Frankfurt sees a similarity between hot air and excrement: hot air is speech emptied of informative content, just as excrement is matter from which all nutrition has been removed. Excrement is like the "corpse of nourishment". Neither can serve its potential purpose (communication or sustenance). A quote from Ezra Pound cited by the OED shows another angle: "Name ‘em, don’t bullshit ME". This is a demand for facts, implying the speaker suspects the other person is making empty claims or bluffing. The OED definition associated with this usage is "to talk nonsense (to); ... also, to bluff one's way through (something) by talking nonsense". This confirms a connection between bullshitting and bluffing. Frankfurt argues that bullshitting is closer to bluffing than to lying. What's the crucial difference? Both involve misrepresentation or deception, and bluffing often conveys something false. However, the core concept for a lie is _falsity_ (deliberately stating a falsehood). For bluffing, and crucially for bullshit, the core concept is _fakery_ or being _phony_. Here's a key insight: a fake or phony thing doesn't have to be inferior to the real thing in terms of appearance or quality. A counterfeit can be an exact copy. The problem isn't _what it is like_, but _how it was made_ – without authenticity. This points to a fundamental aspect of bullshit: it is produced _without concern with the truth_, but it doesn't _necessarily_ have to be false. The bullshitter is faking something, but they might accidentally get the facts right. The sources mention a line from Eric Ambler's novel: "Never tell a lie when you can bullshit your way through". This suggests bullshitting is seen as different from lying and perhaps preferable. The elder Simpson likely didn't mean it was morally better or always more effective. Perhaps it seemed easier to get away with, or the consequences of being caught were less severe. Indeed, people do tend to be more tolerant of bullshit than lies, maybe because we don't take it as personally. We might dismiss bullshit with a shrug, but lies can inspire outrage. (Frankfurt leaves the question of why we're more tolerant of bullshit as an exercise for the reader – a fun question to ponder!). The elder Simpson's advice refers not just to producing an instance of bullshit, but "bullshitting one's way through," which is a larger program of producing bullshit as needed. This might be key to his preference. Lying is a focused act. It's designed to insert a specific falsehood into a system of beliefs to avoid the truth's consequences. This requires skill and constraint because the liar has to work under the guidance of what they believe to be true to make the lie effective. The liar _must_ be concerned with truth-values. Someone bullshitting their way through, however, has much more freedom. Their focus is broad, not limited to a specific point or constrained by surrounding truths. They are willing to fake the context too, if needed. While not necessarily easier, this mode of creativity is different – less analytical, more expansive, improvisational, and even artistic, hence the term "bullshit artist". Perhaps Simpson's father was simply drawn to this more freeform, creative style. So, what does bullshit essentially misrepresent? Not the facts themselves, or the speaker's beliefs about the facts – that's what lies do by being false. Since bullshit doesn't have to be false, its deceptive intent is different. The bullshitter might not intend to deceive us about the facts or their beliefs. What they _necessarily_ attempt to deceive us about is their _enterprise_. Their defining characteristic is that they misrepresent "what he is up to". This is the core difference between the bullshitter and the liar. Both pretend to be communicating the truth. The liar hides their attempt to lead us away from reality; they don't want us to know they're saying something they believe is false. The bullshitter, however, hides that the _truth-values_ of their statements simply don't matter to them. They don't intend to report the truth _or_ conceal it. Their speech isn't random, but the motive guiding it is indifferent to "how the things about which he speaks truly are". To lie, you need to think you know the truth. Bullshit requires no such conviction. The liar responds to the truth, respecting it in a way, even if defying it. An honest person is guided by belief in the truth; a liar is guided by belief in its opposite (falsity). But for the bullshitter, "all these bets are off". They aren't committed to either side of the truth/falsehood distinction. Their attention isn't on the facts, except perhaps as they serve the bullshitter's purpose of "getting away with what he says". They don't care if their statements describe reality correctly; they just pick or invent them to suit their aims. St. Augustine classified lies by their purpose. Most lies (seven out of eight types) are told unwillingly as means to other goals; their falsity isn't the main attraction. He called these not "real lies". The "real lie" is told purely for the pleasure of deceiving, out of a love of falsity. These "real liars" are rare; most people lie sometimes, but few do so purely for the joy of falsity. For most people, a statement being false is a reason (even if weak) not to make it. For Augustine's pure liar, it's a reason _to_ make it. For the bullshitter, it's neither a reason for nor against. People who tell the truth or lie are guided by their beliefs about how things are; they are engaged with reality, whether trying to describe it correctly or deceitfully. Bullshitting, however, involves making assertions without attending to anything but what suits the speaker. Excessive bullshitting can actually erode a person's habit of caring about how things are. Lying and telling the truth are like playing different sides in the same game focused on facts; the bullshitter ignores the game entirely. They don't reject the authority of truth like the liar does; they just pay it no mind. Because of this indifference, bullshit is seen as a _greater enemy of the truth than lies are_. Caring about reporting or concealing facts presupposes that facts are knowable and definite, and that there's a real difference between right and wrong descriptions. If someone stops believing in the possibility of identifying true and false statements, they have two choices: stop making any assertions about facts, or continue making assertions that claim to describe reality but are necessarily bullshit. So, why is there so much bullshit?. Frankfurt notes it's hard to be sure if there's more proportionally now than before, but there's certainly more communication overall. A key factor in its abundance is when people are required to talk about things they don't fully know. Obligations or opportunities to speak can exceed someone's knowledge of the relevant facts. This is common in public life, where people often speak extensively despite some ignorance. The idea that citizens must have opinions on everything, especially in a democracy, also contributes. The lack of connection between opinions and reality becomes even starker for those who feel obligated to judge events worldwide. Deeper sources for the proliferation of bullshit might lie in skepticism, like "anti-realist" views, that deny reliable access to objective reality and the possibility of knowing the truth. These ideas undermine confidence in trying to figure out what's true. One reaction to this loss of confidence in pursuing objective correctness is a shift towards focusing on the ideal of _sincerity_ – trying to be true to oneself rather than representing a common world accurately. The thinking seems to be: if I can't be true to the facts because reality has no inherent nature, I'll focus on being true to my own nature. However, Frankfurt finds this preposterous. It's absurd to think _we_ are definite enough for accurate descriptions while denying determinacy to everything else. We understand ourselves only in relation to other things. Furthermore, facts about ourselves aren't uniquely stable or easy to know. Our natures are actually quite elusive and less stable than other things. Given this, the pursuit of sincerity itself, if based on an indeterminate self and a denial of external reality, can also be bullshit. In summary, Harry Frankfurt's exploration takes us beyond the simple idea of bullshit as just false or insincere talk. He argues that its true essence lies in an _indifference to truth_ itself. It's not about trying to deceive with a specific falsehood (like a liar), but about presenting oneself as engaged in the enterprise of conveying truth while actually having no concern for whether what is said is true or false. It's phoniness rather than falsity that defines it. **Ideas for Further Exploration:** - **Why are people more tolerant of bullshit than lies?** Frankfurt mentions this intriguing question. Is it because we see bullshit as less malicious, more incompetent, or perhaps just so common we've become desensitized? - **The "Bullshit Artist":** Explore the idea of bullshitting as an "art" rather than a "craft". What skills are involved in effectively bullshitting your way through? - **Skepticism and Sincerity:** How have philosophical or cultural trends emphasizing subjectivity or denying objective truth potentially fueled the prevalence of bullshit? - **Bullshit vs. Other Forms of Non-Truth:** How does bullshit compare to things like fiction, poetry, or metaphorical language, which also aren't strictly factual but aren't considered bullshit? (Think back to the Wittgenstein anecdote and Pascal's simile). What distinguishes the acceptable "unconnectedness" to truth in art from the unacceptable "indifference" in bullshit? This exploration opens up so many avenues for thinking about communication, integrity, and our relationship with reality. It seems understanding bullshit is not just about semantics, but about understanding ourselves and our culture.