Think of this as a friendly guide to some deep ideas about right and wrong, what our actions say about us, and why we hold each other accountable. Scanlon's book grew out of years of discussions and wrestling with challenging concepts, particularly the famous "doctrine of double effect". He wanted to really understand some tricky distinctions that shape how we think about morality, and he ended up focusing on three key dimensions: permissibility, meaning, and blame. **Getting Started: What's the Big Deal About Intention?** The book kicks off by tackling a really interesting and sometimes confusing idea called the doctrine of double effect. This doctrine suggests that some actions aimed at causing the death of an innocent person, even if done for a good outcome, are always wrong. A key part of this doctrine often hinges on the idea that it's morally worse to _intend_ a harmful consequence than merely to _foresee_ it as a side effect. Scanlon, like many philosophers, found this distinction appealing in some cases, feeling "drawn one way by the apparent ability of double effect to explain particular cases". However, he also felt "intellectually whipsawed" because he couldn't quite explain _why_ an agent's attitude (intending vs. foreseeing) should make such a big moral difference to whether an action is permissible. He explores this question throughout the book, aiming to understand if permissibility really depends on intent in this specific way, and if not, why the idea is so plausible. He ultimately argues that the appearance that intent is relevant to permissibility in the way the doctrine of double effect claims is "illusory". He suggests this arises from not clearly distinguishing between different ways we assess actions and agents. **Dimension 1: Permissibility – What Am I Allowed to Do?** Scanlon focuses heavily on the idea of **permissibility**. He defines it as the question, "May one do X?". This question is often asked when someone is deciding whether to act, but it can also be asked hypothetically or retrospectively about past or imagined actions. What's interesting is that the question of permissibility isn't _limited_ to things the agent was aware of or intended at the time. You can ask if it was permissible for someone to act in a way that posed a risk, even if they didn't know about the risk. While intent might seem obviously relevant because it helps identify what an action _is_ (like whether it's lying or murder), Scanlon argues that this is often a **derivative** kind of relevance, not fundamental. What's fundamentally relevant to permissibility, in many cases, are the _effects_ of the action on the world (or what those effects are reasonably expected to be). Intent is relevant here because it helps predict those effects – he calls this the **predictive significance of intent**. But his main focus is on whether permissibility can depend _directly_ on intent or the agent's reasons, holding the effects constant. He argues that permissibility doesn't generally depend on what the agent _took_ to be reasons for acting, even though it might _appear_ to if we mix up different kinds of moral judgments. He distinguishes between the **deliberative use** of a moral principle (using it to decide what is permissible) and its **critical use** (using it to assess how an agent went about deciding what to do). Permissibility is tied to the deliberative use. The idea is that an action is permissible if it would be licensed by the principles we have reason to accept to guide agents in deciding what to do. Scanlon contrasts this with the idea of an "objective 'ought'," which might say what should happen based purely on the facts, even if no one could know them. Permissibility, unlike the objective 'ought,' is linked to what it is reasonable for an agent to believe and do to check those beliefs in a given situation. While impermissibility normally suggests the agent is at fault for not taking reasons into account, assessments of fault go beyond permissibility by considering things like motives (e.g., malice) or beliefs, even unreasonable ones. **Dimension 2: Meaning – What Does My Action Say About Me (and Us)?** Independent of whether an action is permissible, it can have **meaning**. Scanlon defines the meaning of an action as its **significance, for the agent and others, of the agent’s willingness to perform that action for the reasons he or she does**. Unlike permissibility, which he argues _doesn't_ fundamentally depend on the agent's reasons, meaning obviously _does_. Think about calling a sick relative. The _meaning_ of the call changes dramatically depending on _why_ you made it – because you genuinely care, or just because your mother told you to. The _permissibility_ of making the call (assuming no negative side effects like spreading illness!) might be the same in both cases, but the meaning is very different. The meaning of an action isn't just about the agent's actual reasons; it can also depend on what others reasonably (or even unreasonably) take those reasons to be. It's the significance someone _has reason_ to assign to the action, given the agent's reasons and their relationship to the agent. Meaning isn't always about morality. An action could show commitment to a cultural tradition, which is morally neutral. However, meaning and permissibility are definitely linked. If an action is impermissible (like harming someone intentionally), it has a certain meaning – it shows a failure to respect the reasons that make the action wrong. But meaning can vary even if permissibility doesn't. Intentionally injuring someone and negligently injuring them might both be impermissible, but the intentional act has a meaning showing outright hostility, while the negligent act shows a lack of care. Scanlon introduces concepts like **expression cases** and **expectation cases**, where the permissibility of an action _can_ depend on the agent's reasons, but often in a **derivative** way. For instance, pretending to care about a sick relative only to look good to others is wrong because it violates a more basic principle not to mislead people about your intentions. So, the reasons matter here, but the wrongness flows from misleading others, not directly from the bad reasons themselves in a fundamental way. **Where Permissibility and Meaning Intersect (and Sometimes Get Confused)** One of Scanlon's core ideas is that the appeal of the doctrine of double effect, and the feeling that intent _must_ matter to permissibility in a fundamental way, comes from confusing permissibility with assessments of the agent. When we see someone do something that results in harm, we naturally assess _them_ – their judgment, their motives, their character. This assessment often _does_ depend on their intentions and reasons. But Scanlon argues that this is the **critical use** of moral principles, evaluating the agent's decision-making process, not the **deliberative use**, which determines if the action itself is permissible. Think about someone who "does the right thing for the wrong reason". For example, imagine someone saving a drowning person only to get famous. Scanlon argues the action of saving the person might be permissible, but the agent is certainly open to moral criticism for their reasons. This criticism is about the agent and the meaning of their action (it reveals self-interest, not concern for the person). But this doesn't necessarily make the saving itself impermissible. Scanlon suggests this is because permissibility applies to choices between alternatives that an agent _can_ make, and choosing to act for the _right_ reasons isn't something we can just decide to do in the same way we decide whether to save someone or not. We are responsible for what we take as reasons, and open to criticism for it, but we don't simply _choose_ our ultimate reasons. However, meaning can sometimes influence permissibility in more direct ways, particularly when it affects the claims others have on us. Acts of **discrimination** provide an example. Scanlon considers cases where failing to give someone a benefit might normally be permissible, but doing so _because_ of their race makes it impermissible. While one explanation might link this to a duty to distribute benefits on proper grounds, Scanlon suggests the deeper explanation ties into the **reasonable claims of victims**. What's fundamentally wrong isn't just acting on illegitimate reasons, but acting in a way that makes others unjustifiably subject to your control or violates their claims to be treated based on relevant criteria. **Threats** are another area where intent and meaning seem closely tied to permissibility. What distinguishes a threat from a warning often involves the agent's intent and reasons. Scanlon explains that a threat (or even an offer) changes the **meaning** of the options available to the recipient based on the agent's reasons. For instance, offering a reward might mean helping someone, while threatening a penalty might mean gaining personal advantage. While some objections to threats stem from the impermissibility of the threatened action itself, others relate to the coercive character – the way the threat changes the recipient's choice situation. Scanlon argues that the moral objection often comes down to whether the threat makes the recipient's response "invalid" by depriving it of the licensing power of consent. But this, again, ultimately links back to the reasonable claims of individuals to be free from certain forms of control. The permissibility of a threat hinges on whether the person making it is _entitled_ to inflict the penalty, and this entitlement is constrained by others' claims not to be subjected to arbitrary control. The famous Kantian principle of treating others as **ends in themselves** and never merely as means is also explored. Scanlon suggests this can be understood in two ways. It can be a **general criterion of permissibility**, meaning permissible actions are those compatible with this idea. Understood this way, it doesn't directly make permissibility depend on the agent's internal reasons. Alternatively, it can be understood as a claim about the **meaning** of an action – that treating someone as an end involves taking their status as an end as a reason for acting, and actions done for those reasons have a certain moral significance. The charge "You were just using me!" often invokes a more specific idea of treating someone as a means, usually when their involvement is causally necessary for your plan. Scanlon argues that the wrongness here isn't fundamental to the idea of "using" but rather to principles about involving others in costly ways without their consent or failing to inform them when they have a claim to know. The fact that someone is a "means" might indicate their involvement is costly and requires consent, but being a means itself isn't the fundamental moral issue. **Dimension 3: Blame – What Does It Mean to Be Held Accountable?** Finally, Scanlon turns to **blame**, which he sees as a species of meaning. He offers an account that differs from common views of blame as just negative assessment or a form of punishment. In Scanlon's view, to say someone is **blameworthy** for an action is to say that the action reveals something about their **attitudes toward others that impairs the relations that others can have with him or her**. To **blame** someone is to judge them blameworthy and to understand your relationship with them as being modified in a way that this judgment makes appropriate. Blame often involves doing something wrong, but not always. As we saw with "doing the right thing for the wrong reason," someone can act permissibly but still be blameworthy due to their motives. Blameworthiness depends on the agent's reasons and attitudes. Scanlon argues that we have a **"moral relationship"** with everyone in a general sense. Blame involves adjusting the default attitudes and expectations of this relationship. This might include changes in trust, willingness to cooperate, or readiness to enter specific relationships like friendship. These modified attitudes are justified because the agent's conduct makes the normal attitudes inappropriate. Scanlon calls this a **desert-based view** in a specific sense: the attitudes of blame are justified _simply by the agent's attitudes_ that make them appropriate, without needing further justification like beneficial consequences or the agent having had an opportunity to avoid. A judgment of blameworthiness can be made by anyone, but the content of blame (how one's relationship is modified) depends on one's relationship to the agent and action. Furthermore, Scanlon explores the idea of **standing to blame**. You might lack standing to blame someone if your own conduct reveals a willingness to countenance similar actions, because this shows that the impediment to normal moral relations lies with you as well as the other person. **Blame and Freedom: A Surprising Connection?** A common philosophical puzzle is whether blame requires **freedom** or control over one's actions. Scanlon argues that moral blame, as he defines it, does **not** require that the agent could have avoided being blameworthy. He considers potential reasons for thinking blame requires freedom. One is **psychological accuracy**: blame relies on actions revealing attitudes, and if actions aren't connected to attitudes (e.g., due to external force), then blame might be inappropriate. Coercion, for instance, changes the reasons for acting, which affects both permissibility and the kind of blame that's appropriate. This is linked to Hume's idea of "liberty of spontaneity" – freedom from external constraint, allowing actions to flow from one's character. Scanlon agrees blame requires this connection to attitudes. A stronger requirement might be the need for **adequate opportunity to avoid** being blameworthy. This is sometimes linked to blame if blame is seen as a sanction – something unpleasant that needs justification. Scanlon argues this requirement doesn't apply to his view of blame because blame isn't fundamentally a sanction. It's about the appropriateness of certain attitudes and relationships given what a person is like, and we don't owe it to people to maintain attitudes of trust or friendship if their conduct makes them inappropriate. He distinguishes this from **substantive responsibility**, like when we say "It's his fault!" meaning someone owes others compensation or some burden. This kind of responsibility _can_ require adequate opportunity to avoid. But blameworthiness (attributability responsibility) is justified simply by the person's attitudes, regardless of whether they could have avoided having those attitudes. Scanlon acknowledges that his view of blame might seem "revisionary". However, he emphasizes he didn't formulate it to avoid the free will problem. He simply found this account best fit the features of blame, and then considered if there were good reasons to add a freedom requirement, concluding there weren't persuasive ones for moral blame itself. **Bringing It All Together** Scanlon's book offers a sophisticated look at how we evaluate actions and agents. He makes a compelling case for separating the question of whether an action is permissible from what that action reveals about the person doing it and how that affects relationships. By highlighting the dimensions of permissibility, meaning, and blame, he provides a framework for understanding complex moral judgments that moves beyond relying solely on intuitions about intent or outcomes. **Thinking Further...** This exploration opens up some fascinating avenues for thought: - How might distinguishing between permissibility and meaning help resolve disagreements in real-world ethical debates, like those in medicine or warfare, which often involve difficult choices with foreseen harms? - If blame is fundamentally about impaired relationships, how does this apply in cases involving strangers or large institutions? - Scanlon suggests we don't choose our ultimate reasons. What are the implications of this idea for self-improvement or moral education? - Could Scanlon's framework be used to analyze other moral concepts, like responsibility for outcomes (regardless of fault) or the nature of apology and forgiveness? - Given that blame doesn't require the opportunity to avoid, how does Scanlon's view handle cases where someone acts based on deeply ingrained biases or beliefs they seem unable to change? Scanlon's work provides a powerful set of tools for thinking more clearly about these dimensions of moral life. Even if you don't agree with all his conclusions, reflecting on his distinctions can certainly sharpen your own understanding of right and wrong, what makes us tick, and why our connections with others matter so much in the moral landscape.