**A Fresh Look at a Classic Puzzle** Have you ever wondered about free will? It's one of those topics that scientists and philosophers have debated for thousands of years, and we're still not all on the same page. Some scientists tell us that because everything is determined by natural laws, free will can't exist. Yet, many philosophers insist that we do have it. It feels like a paradox, doesn't it? We feel like free agents making choices, even though science suggests our decisions are determined by prior events and natural laws. Richard Dawkins even noted this perplexity, describing the powerful subjective impression of having free will despite a materialist view where brain states are determined by physical events. The source suggests that maybe the problem isn't free will itself, but how we're looking at it. The author, Dan Barker, proposes a different perspective, calling it "harmonic free will". Think of it not like a strict, predetermined classical music piece, but more like a lively jazz improvisation – beautiful and seemingly free, but built upon underlying structures. This perspective aims to make the paradox disappear. No matter your opinion, you likely _feel_ free. You don't feel coerced by outside forces like a robot or a machine. Science and philosophy, the author argues, should help explain this feeling and experience, not just deny it. This leads to two main questions: "Do I have free will?" and "Why do I feel like I do?". These are seen as residing at different logical levels, like melody and harmony in music, which cooperate rather than compete. **The Traditional Conflict: Determinism vs. Classical Free Will** Traditionally, free will is often understood as "the ability to do otherwise". Imagine choosing chocolate ice cream instead of strawberry. Even though you didn't choose your genetics, environment, or brain wiring, you _feel_ like you could have picked strawberry. You don't feel like a puppet pulled by nature's strings. This traditional idea, which the author calls "classical free will," is seen as a fiction by the author; he is certain it doesn't exist in the sense of rising above nature's cause and effect. On the other side of the traditional debate is determinism. There seems to be more agreement on this definition: the idea that all events, including human decisions, are the necessary result of previous impersonal causes. As philosopher Michael McKenna puts it, determinism means "the facts of the past and the laws of nature entail one unique future". Some interpretations, like those found in Calvinism or certain religious texts, view this determination as intelligent purpose directed by a deity. However, few philosophers or scientists today hold that fatalistic view; they see it as arising from impersonal natural causes. If everything is determined this way, then how can anyone be morally responsible? The concern is that people could simply say, "The universe made me do it". The term "determinism" itself can be tricky, falling prey to equivocation. At the subatomic quantum level, it's debated, with events appearing probabilistic or uncertain ("micro-determinism"). Free will, the author argues, doesn't gain anything from this randomness anyway. However, at the biological, large-scale level where we live, cause and effect seem manifestly true ("macro-determinism"). Our decisions, at this level, arise from material biological processes mostly outside our control. This is why science appears to show that macro-determinism is unavoidable, suggesting you really could not have "done otherwise". Some studies, using EEG and fMRI, even suggest decisions are made seconds before conscious awareness. This, according to some scientists, proves we don't have free will. However, the author notes that some philosophers like Alfred Mele and Mark Balaguer raise doubts about the interpretation of these studies. More fundamentally, the author questions why free will would require consciousness. We know there are time lags in the brain, and consciousness is not a single point in time or place, but perhaps a "consensus" or an "electron cloud" rather than a "hard particle". Trying to pinpoint free will on a simple linear timeline like Experience -> Consciousness -> Decision seems overly simplistic; it's more complex and global. Also, decisions don't always require consciousness or free will; all animals make decisions, and the question of free will often arises _after_ the behavior is judged. **Beyond the Boxing Match: Logical Levels and Acompatibilism** The source suggests that the typical argument between determinists (who say we aren't free due to cause and effect) and libertarians (who say we have transcendent freedom) is a false dichotomy. There's also a middle ground called compatibilism, which tries to find ways for free will and determinism to coexist. Most non-philosophers, interestingly, seem intuitively compatibilist, feeling their decisions go "through them" rather than around them. The author, however, goes a step further, suggesting the whole idea of a conflict is incoherent. Instead of being opposing sides on a line (like a tug-of-war), determinism and free will are seen as concepts existing at different logical levels, like width and height, or asking if a banana is compatible with forgiveness. They aren't incompatible; they are "acompatible" because they address entirely different ideas. The real conflict, in this view, is between determinism and _indeterminism_, and since the proposed understanding of free will isn't indeterministic, it doesn't challenge determinism. Think about chess: arguing about whether "checkmate" exists by only looking at the wooden pieces and subatomic particles misses the point. Checkmate isn't a physical thing; it's a concept within the rules of the game, a different logical level. The debate over free will, like this chess argument, can dissolve into confusion if we insist on arguing horizontally about something that's better understood vertically, across different logical levels. **Free Will as a Product of Judgment and Social Truth** If free will isn't the ability to do otherwise or a transcendent essence, what is it?. The source proposes it's not a "thing" but a quality or a product. It emerges not as a cause, but as an _effect_, specifically a "product of judgment". When we make behavioral judgments, the quality of free will appears, much like aesthetic judgment produces the quality of beauty. These emerge at a higher logical level, a human social level. This idea is likened to the dual nature of light (wave and particle) or how melody (behavior) and harmony (judgment) come together. Free will is seen as the "harmonic result" of these two deterministic components ringing at the same time. Consider simple decisions versus complex ones. Choosing ice cream is simple judgment; deciding who to marry involves more complex, social judgments, especially moral judgments. These moral judgments, involving assessing harm, motives, character, and social rules, add an extra social dimension. Simple judgment might be like a linear equation (3+4=7), while behavioral judgment is raised to a higher order, like adding another dimension (3²+4²=5²). Free will resides in the harmony created by this social dimension, raising human thought above the level of a single individual animal. Many concepts we deal with daily aren't "things" in a physical sense. The center of a donut isn't in the donut itself; it's in the hole. An "average word" doesn't physically exist on the page. "The market" in economics is an "invisible hand," not a tangible object. Free will, too, is seen this way – an invisible result of judgment, not a quantifiable object. Your actions, like reflexes or heartbeats, don't require free will unless you need to _justify_ them. Free will becomes relevant and "exists" only when behavior is judged; it's a "retroactive product of judgment". This perspective frames free will as a "social truth," not a scientific one. Just like marriage isn't a physical change but a social reality created by agreement and pronouncement within a society that recognizes it, free will is pronounced "true" by social agreement. A $100 bill has more value than a $1 bill not because of a material difference in ink patterns, but because of a societal convention – a social truth. Similarly, a verdict in court isn't a scientific fact, but a legal or social judgment declared true, making someone "morally accountable" by verdict. The elephant Mary was physically accountable for her actions, but society assigned her moral accountability through a verdict because she bumped into the human social sphere. When we judge a creature, like the author's chipmunk friend "Little One," we attribute qualities like courage or even "free will" to it, not because of an inherent moral essence in the animal, but because we, as members of a highly socialized species, are making a determination about its behavior. Nothing changes in the chipmunk; the change is mostly in our understanding and judgment. This is like saying sand is soft; the softness isn't in a single grain, but in the collection. Responsibility, crucial to the free will debate, is also seen as an emergent property existing in the collection, in the gaps between people, rather than a property of an individual brain. **Harmonic Free Will: Melody Meets Harmony** The central metaphor is music. Hard determinists are like classical musicians reading a strict score, focused only on the horizontal melodic line of cause and effect. Libertarians or dualists might focus only on a vertical, transcendent element. Harmonic free will suggests embracing both perspectives simultaneously, like hearing the melody and harmony in music. Individual human beings are the result of predetermined evolutionary processes (the melody), but we are also part of a society that transcends ourselves (the harmony). Looking only at the horizontal creates a distorted view of flat determinism; looking only vertically leads to dualism or the idea of something outside nature. Listening to them together – behavior (particle) and judgment (wave), or melody (horizontal) and harmony (vertical) – creates the experience of free will. It's an emergent property, like wetness in water molecules or baseball as a concept not found in particle physics. This view doesn't deny determinism at the individual level; indeed, determinism (at the macro level) is inviolate. But free will, in this context, is not incompatible with determinism because it operates at a different logical level and is not indeterministic. A deterministic free will that is natural poses no threat to determinism. **The Feeling of Free Will: A Useful Illusion** Beyond the social concept, we also _feel_ like we have free will. The source suggests this feeling is the "illusion of transcendence," the sense that we are rising above nature's laws, like a sunrise seems to rise although we know it's the Earth rotating. This feeling isn't power to escape cause and effect, but something else. It might stem from the absence of knowing the future. Even if the future is determined, we don't _know_ it, leaving the present moment feeling uncertain and "open". This lack of certainty, this "absence of knowledge," is where the feeling of free will might reside. It's like the "donut hole" of "now". This uncertainty is essential; if we knew the future, we'd know we aren't free from causality. This also implies an all-knowing being, if one existed, could not have free will because its future would be fixed and known. The feeling is amplified by our brain's ability to imagine multiple plausible futures or "option sets" and deliberate among them, a capacity called "latitude". This deep prospective ability allows humans vast self-expression. When our brains, conditioned by a society that judges behavior based on assumed free will, turn this judgment process back onto themselves, we generate the feeling of having morally accountable free will. Our brain's "interpreter" module might create a sense of self and top-down control by weaving perceptions and reactions into a coherent narrative. This internal dialogue, observing ourselves talking to ourselves, reinforces the illusion of being a disembodied self in charge. This feeling is called a "useful illusion," distinct from a dangerous "delusion". Illusions are rooted in reality (like depth perception from two eyes) and can enhance well-being. Delusions are not rooted in reality and can be harmful. Libertarian or theological free will might be considered a delusion, a guess not rooted in reality. Socially true harmonic free will, however, is an illusion rooted in the reality of human social interaction and judgment. Dispensing with the _illusion_ of free will isn't necessary or desirable; it helps us focus on what matters, while dispensing with the _delusion_ of actual libertarian free will is beneficial. **Responsibility and Meaning** The ultimate cause of actions might be untraceable back to the Big Bang, but immediate or "proximate" causes are identifiable. Society judges _us_ as the proximate biological cause of our actions. Responsibility isn't an individual essence but exists in the collective, in the "gaps between people". Neuroscientist Michael Gazzaniga sees responsibility as a "contract between two people rather than a property of a brain". Like wetness emerges from a collection of water molecules, responsibility emerges when humans interact socially. This social interaction creates a sphere of "behavioral modification" where we are responsible to each other. Even when alone, our internal narrative involves self-judgment, creating the space for free will to appear. Free will, in this view, is meaningful because it is essential to our human way of life. It's a component of moral judgment and accountability. We argue about free will precisely because we want the objects of our judgment to _deserve_ the judgment. Philosopher P. F. Strawson's "reactive attitude" theory aligns with this, seeing moral responsibility as being a "fit subject" for attitudes like gratitude, blame, and forgiveness, concepts originating in our social lives, not just physics. Even those who deny free will must act _as if_ it exists when debating and expecting others to judge their arguments on merit. They take credit for their work because they are the proximate cause, just as humans are the proximate cause of their actions subject to moral judgment. While concerns exist that the idea of free will can lead to harsh justice systems, particularly retributive punishment (like capital punishment), the author argues that the problem lies more with the retributive justice itself or harmful religious doctrines, not necessarily the concept of free will as socially understood. We need ways to protect society from harmful actions, and social judgment provides the framework. Embracing this view of free will offers benefits. It supports moral education, allowing us to praise children for good actions and build self-esteem, which encourages positive values. Guilt, the flip side, also plays a role in acknowledging blame and potential rehabilitation. These feelings are seen as naturally evolved, influencing behavior that affects survival and reproduction. Free will also provides "moral navigation," like depth perception helps us navigate physical space. It allows for nuance in judgment, tempering justice with mercy and leniency, something hard determinism lacks. **Bringing it Together: A Beautiful Composition** The source uses many analogies to describe free will: a resonance of melody and harmony, a social truth, a "rising" sun, a light wave/particle paradox, depth perception, an invisible hand, a pitched fastball, hard/soft sand, a traffic bubble, improvisation, anticipatory uncertainty, an imaginary number, and a "sum over future histories". These different perspectives point to the idea of "self" and being "your own person" within the context of social interaction. What we want from free will, in a valuable sense, is the power to make wise decisions, control ourselves, and be agents responsible for our deeds. This is seen as a natural product of our biological nature enhanced by society. Life without free will, in this harmonic view, would be flat and meaningless. Like jazz needs swing, life needs that element. While scientists might view humans mechanistically, when we act as humans, we behave as if free. So, do we have free will? Yes and no. It's not a scientific truth, but a social one, a human creation like a song. It arises retroactively from judgment. It's not something we physically "have" but something we "experience". It's a useful, beautiful illusion that makes us fully human. It's an illusion rooted in reality, unlike delusions like supernatural entities. It gives life "fullness and color". As a wise teenager put it, if we have the illusion of free will, then we have free will. It's not a mystery, but a fundamental part of being a moral species. Instead of denying free will to combat ideas of cosmic justice, perhaps we should focus on denying the transcendent realm of cosmic justice and championing social justice within the natural human realm. Thinking about the chipmunk again. He might be determined by biology, but his interaction with the author, his growing boldness and anticipation, feels like he has gained "more options," "more latitude". We attribute freedom to him based on our judgment of his behavior. This is a tiny glimpse of the process described – seeing and feeling something special and alive in the interaction, something akin to free will, even in a non-human animal. Free will is meaningful, not as a power to defy physics, but as the complex, multi-layered experience of making choices, being judged, and participating in a social world that gives rise to concepts like responsibility, morality, and justice. It's there, like depth perception or harmony, when you look at the world in a particular way, blending the notes of determined behavior with the rich chords of social judgment. This exploration opens up many avenues for further thought, doesn't it? - How does our understanding of free will influence our legal systems? - Can other social animals exhibit analogs of "harmonic free will"? - How does the concept of consciousness tie into this "feeling" of free will, and what does it mean if consciousness itself is viewed as an illusion? - If moral judgment is the key, how do different societies develop different moral judgments, and what does that say about the "social truth" of free will across cultures?