At the heart of Beauvoir's argument is the idea of **ambiguity**. This isn't the same as saying life is absurd or meaningless, though we'll touch on that too. Ambiguity, as she presents it, means that our meaning is never fixed; it's something we have to constantly create and win. This stands in contrast to many philosophies that try to mask or smooth over the paradoxical aspects of the human condition. ### The Human Condition: Caught Between Subject and Object Beauvoir begins by echoing the sentiments of Montaigne, who suggested that the continuous work of our lives is building towards death, and that "Life in itself is neither good nor evil, it is the place of good and evil, according to what you make it". This immediately sets the stage for a philosophy centered on human agency and responsibility. Man, Beauvoir explains, is a being caught in a fundamental paradox. Like Montaigne's "thinking reed," we are rational animals who escape our purely natural condition, yet we remain part of the physical world that can crush us. We experience ourselves as pure consciousness, an internal power immune to external forces, but also as objects, just one individual among many in a vast collectivity on which we depend. This duality is deeply felt; we have the unique ability to grasp the timeless truth of our existence, yet our actual moments of existing are fleeting, suspended between a past that is gone and a future that is not yet. Historically, philosophers have often tried to resolve this tension. Some tried to merge mind and matter, while others accepted the split but prioritized the soul over the body, or denied death or life itself. Philosophies and ethics aimed to eliminate this ambiguity by urging people to become pure inwardness or pure externality, to escape the physical world or merge into it. Even Hegel, with his ambitious system, tried to reconcile these aspects – preserving the moment in time, integrating nature and spirit, finding the individual within the collectivity, and seeing individual death canceled out in the life of Mankind. But Beauvoir feels these attempts, while ingenious, often lead to a "marvelous optimism" that overlooks troubling aspects of reality, like wars and suffering. Today, Beauvoir suggests, this paradox of our condition feels more acute than ever. We see ourselves as the ultimate purpose of all action, yet the demands of life force us to treat each other as mere instruments or obstacles. Our mastery over the world grows, but we feel increasingly overwhelmed by forces we can't control. We wield the atomic bomb, designed to destroy us. We each have the intensely personal experience of our own life, yet feel utterly insignificant within the immense global collectivity. We've reached brilliant heights of grandeur, only to see it horribly violated. Despite the "stubborn lies" that try to obscure this, the truth of life and death, solitude and connection, freedom and servitude, insignificance and importance constantly surfaces. Events like Stalingrad and Buchenwald serve as stark reminders of this multifaceted truth. Since we can't escape this fundamental ambiguity, Beauvoir proposes that we must try to face and **assume** it. Strength for living and reasons for acting must come from knowing the genuine conditions of our lives. ### Existentialism: Embracing Ambiguity Existentialism, Beauvoir argues, is defined precisely by its affirmation of this irreducible ambiguity. Philosophers like Kierkegaard, in his opposition to Hegel, and Sartre, in _Being and Nothingness_, fundamentally defined man as a being whose being _is not to be_, a subjectivity that realizes itself only by being present in the world, an engaged freedom, a "surging of the for-oneself which is immediately given for others". However, existentialism is often charged with being a philosophy of the absurd and despair, trapping man in "sterile anguish" and "empty subjectivity," offering no basis for making choices. Critics point to Sartre's declaration that man is a "useless passion," vainly trying to become God by achieving the synthesis of the "for-oneself" and the "in-oneself". Beauvoir concedes this is true, but argues that _all_ optimistic ethics acknowledge an element of failure in the human condition. Without some failure, some distance from perfect self-coincidence, the idea of "having-to-be" (a moral imperative) wouldn't make sense. You don't offer ethics to a perfect being like God, nor can you offer it to man if he's defined purely as a given nature. Even ethics claiming to be psychological or empirical surreptitiously introduce flaws into their definition of man. Hegel, too, noted that moral consciousness exists because of disagreement between nature and morality; it would disappear if ethical law became natural law. So, while existentialist ontology might describe man's passion as useless and definitive failure, Beauvoir argues that this failure, as described by Sartre, is also ambiguous. Man "makes himself a lack of being in order that there might be being". This doesn't mean unhappiness is inflicted from outside; man chooses this lack. It is his very being. ### Freedom: The Source of All Value A cornerstone of existentialist ethics is the concept of **freedom** as the origin of value. When man accepts this fundamental "lack of being" in order to genuinely _exist_, he gives up the dream of external validation from an ideal God or unconditioned values existing outside of him. He understands that being "right" isn't about conforming to an external standard, but about being right **in his own eyes**. Value, in this view, is the "lacking-being of which freedom makes itself a lack". Value appears _because_ freedom makes itself a lack. Desire creates what is desirable, and the project (our self-projection into the future) sets up the end. Human existence itself makes values spring up in the world, providing the basis for judging our enterprises. This puts Beauvoir's position beyond both pessimism and optimism, as the original springing forth of existence is pure contingency; there's no inherent reason to exist or not exist before existence itself. Lack of existence cannot be evaluated because it's the basis _of_ evaluation. Since existence isn't justified from outside, declaring it unjustifiable from outside doesn't condemn it. The truth is, there is nobody outside of existence. Man exists, and the question isn't _if_ his presence is useful or if life is "worth" living (these questions are meaningless), but _whether_ he wants to live and under what conditions. ### Responsibility in a World Without God This leads directly to addressing the famous assertion by Dostoevsky (and used by some believers today) that "If God does not exist, everything is permitted". The claim is that removing God and re-establishing man at the center of his destiny eliminates ethics. Beauvoir argues the opposite: **God's absence doesn't authorize license; it imposes greater responsibility**. Because man is abandoned on earth and his acts are "definitive, absolute engagements," he bears responsibility for a world he makes, where his successes and failures are inscribed. A God can forgive, erase, and compensate, but if God doesn't exist, man's faults are "inexpiable". Claiming that earthly destiny has no importance relies on the "inhuman objectivity" that existentialism rejects. It's up to man to give his life and his existence importance. He alone feels his success or failure. If someone argues that nothing _forces_ man to justify his being in this way, they are using the notion of freedom "dishonestly". Even a believer is free to sin; divine law is imposed only when he chooses to save his soul. Beauvoir notes that in Christianity there are the damned, suggesting a parallel to earthly consequences. A life that doesn't seek to ground itself remains "pure contingency," but it _is_ permitted to give itself meaning and truth, and this brings "rigorous demands within its own heart". ### Subjectivity and Solidarity Another common charge against existentialism is that it's subjective, even solipsistic, trapping man within himself. Beauvoir counters that the fact of being a subject is universal; the Cartesian _cogito_ is both deeply individual and objectively true. By saying values reside in human freedom, existentialism continues the tradition of Kant, Fichte, and Hegel, who saw the essence of right, duty, and the thinking/willing subject as identical. Humanism, in this tradition, sees the world not as a foreign given, but as willed by man as his will expresses his reality. While Kant and Hegel saw genuine reality or ethical substantiality tied to the universal human person or totality, existentialism places the source of values in the **plurality of concrete, particular men** projecting themselves from their specific situations. These situations are as radically particular as subjectivity itself. This immediately raises the question: How can men, originally separated, get together?. This, Beauvoir admits, is the "real situation of the problem," but stating it doesn't mean it can't be resolved. Ethics exists _because_ there's a problem to solve. Philosophies that deny the separation of men offer invalid ethics precisely because this separation exists. An **ethics of ambiguity** refuses to deny that separate existents can be bound to each other and that individual freedoms can forge laws valid for all. ### Freedom, Disclosure, and The Universal Willing oneself free and willing to disclose being are intertwined. Freedom realizes itself by engaging with the world. Man's project towards freedom takes shape in definite actions. This movement of disclosure is a constant "conquest of existence over being". Science, technics, art, and philosophy are examples of this. It's by assuming themselves as such that they become genuine, and where the word "progress" finds its meaning. Freedom, as the source of values, requires the realization of concrete ends and particular projects, but it also requires **itself universally**. It's not an external, ready-made value, but a cause of itself, summoned by the values it sets up. It cannot deny itself, as that would deny the possibility of any foundation. To will oneself moral and to will oneself free is the same decision. The initial, spontaneous freedom of existence, this "upsurging," can seem absurd, like the random swerving of an Epicurean atom. To justify this spontaneity, it must be founded by choice. One cannot deliberately will _not_ to be free (that's contradictory), but one _can_ choose **not to will oneself free**. This happens through laziness, heedlessness, capriciousness, cowardice, or impatience, where the meaning of the project is contested at the moment it's defined. The spontaneous movement becomes a "vain living palpitation," a flight, an absence. To convert this into presence and will, one must assume the project positively, adhere to the concrete movement of spontaneity thrusting towards an end. This constant tension, this founding oneself through the project, requires effort. Fleeing this "anguish of permanent choice" into the object itself, engulfing one's presence, is the "servitude of the serious," a failure to fulfill moral freedom. ### The Problem of Evil This concept of choosing _not_ to will oneself free is crucial for understanding the possibility of evil. Philosophies that define man as purely positive struggle to account for evil. But existentialism, defining man first as a **negativity**, as being at a distance from himself, allows for this possibility. Man can escape himself, escape his freedom, through a "perpetual playing with the negative". It is precisely because an evil will is possible that the words "to will oneself free" have meaning. Existentialism, like religions, gives a real role to evil. This might make its judgments seem "gloomy," as men dislike feeling in danger. But real dangers, failures, and "earthly damnation" give meaning to words like victory, wisdom, and joy. Nothing is decided in advance; man has something to lose and can lose, therefore he can also win. The possibility of not fulfilling the human condition is inherent in it. Dishonesty is stopping this process of self-creation at any moment. ### Fleeing Freedom: Different Forms of Dishonesty Beauvoir identifies several ways people can flee their freedom or live dishonestly, often linked to their situation: 1. **The Child:** Lives in a world of readymade values imposed by adults. Feels irresponsible and defenseless. This is a natural, universal, temporary situation necessary for development. While education involves a kind of violence in imposing structure, it must ultimately respect the child's growing freedom. 2. **The Enslaved or Mystified:** Individuals denied the means to act on the world. Their world seems "given". If mystified into believing their situation is natural or god-given, their submission isn't a _resignation_ of freedom, as they can't conceive of another possibility. However, once a possibility of liberation appears, _not_ exploiting it is a "resignation of freedom which implies dishonesty and which is a positive fault". Beauvoir critiques conservatives who would leave such people in ignorant peace; the cause of freedom is universally human, and abstention from helping is complicity, a form of tyranny. External action can aim to make the oppressed aware of their freedom; history shows they then tend to decide against oppression. 3. **Certain Women (in historical context):** Historically, many women sheltered in the shadow of men, adopting values without question, enabling a childish irresponsibility based on a feeling of being unaccountable. While seemingly charming, this implies deep complicity. Unlike actual children, the Western woman of Beauvoir's time often _chose_ or consented to this situation. 4. **The Adolescent:** Experiences a "crisis" when the world of readymade values collapses and the human-made nature of reality is revealed. They discover their subjectivity and must assume it, deciding their attitude towards their newfound freedom. This is the moment of "moral choice". 5. **The Serious Man:** This is a significant form of dishonesty. The serious man masks the fact that he _chooses_ the values he lives by, pretending they are unconditioned, external truths. He denies his subjectivity. By refusing to recognize he freely establishes the value of his ends, he becomes a slave to those ends. He forgets that freedom itself is the ultimate end. He gives absolute, unqualified meaning to "useful". This leads him to be dangerous, a tyrant. He ignores the subjectivity and freedom of others, sacrificing them to his chosen Thing or Cause (like the army, a highway, or the revolution itself). He justifies his actions by disputing the "serious" of others, not his own. This path leads to fanaticism, whether of the Inquisition, vigilantes, or political movements that empty politics of human content and impose the State _against_ individuals. 6. **The Adventurer:** Assumes his subjectivity positively but dishonestly refuses to recognize it transcends toward others. He encloses himself in false independence, a servitude, believing he can act for himself without or against others. He becomes a chance ally for free men, or an enemy. 7. **The Passionate Man (Maniacal Passion):** Sets an object up as an absolute, seen through his subjectivity. Subjectivity is asserted vividly, populating the world with meaning. But he seeks possession, being. This creates a hell; nothing exists outside his project, preventing modification of choices. Dependent on an object that can escape him, he tragically feels his dependence. He makes himself a lack of being _in order to be_, remaining at a distance, never fulfilled. While admirable for choosing his end without external law, his solitude is injurious. Realized as separation, communication is impossible. An obstacle to communion of freedom. He, too, tends toward tyranny, believing only his passion's object is real and others are insignificant. He may treat others as things, using them as means or obstacles. If his passion is widespread, it becomes fanaticism, often blended with the serious. Maniacal passion is a "damnation" for the individual and a form of separation for others, leading to struggle and oppression. Beauvoir notes that a conversion is possible within passion itself, by accepting the distance from the object as the condition for its disclosure. Joy is found in this separation. Genuine love accepts the other in their otherness and freedom. This is a renunciation of possession, a willing of the other's being _as other_. Such "generosity" cannot be applied to pure things; it must be directed towards other existences through the object (thing or man). 8. **The Intellectual/Artist (Seeking Salvation Outside the World):** Some attempt to fulfill themselves outside the world through contemplation, critical thought, or creative activity, hoping to escape ambiguity and achieve an absolute. - _The Critic:_ Attempts to oppose the serious everywhere, setting up objective truth as a timeless, universal value. Defines himself as independent mind, thinking he escapes earthly criticism. But this attitude is ambiguous. The critic is a man in a particular situation, his "objective truth" is his own choice. His criticisms are actions in the world of men; he takes sides. If he doesn't assume the subjectivity of his judgment, he falls into the trap of the serious, becoming a "shameful servant of a cause to which he has not chosen to rally". - _The Artist/Writer:_ Try to eternalize existence, not attain being (like engineers or maniacs). The lack of being in the work returns to the positive; time stops, meaning appears. Existence is confirmed and justifies itself ("finality without end"). The creator is then tempted to see himself as absolute, justified, needing no one else. If the work becomes an idol he fulfills himself through, he falls into the serious, becoming an "intellectual animal". Beauvoir notes the problem when aesthetic justification of horrific subjects risks making the horror itself seem not evil. The artist must be situated in the world, a "man among men," and must first will freedom universally. There is no way to escape this world. Morality must be realized within it. Freedom must project itself through content whose value it establishes. The end is valid only by returning to the freedom that established it. Freedom must not be lost in a goal, nor dissipate without aiming. It must desire that there be being. Willing oneself free and willing that there be being are the same choice: choosing oneself as a presence in the world. This choice implies the bond of each man with all others. ### The Bond with Others and Universal Solidarity The idea that our freedom is intrinsically linked to the freedom of others is crucial and refutes the charge of solipsism. While initially, others might seem like limits or enemies ("Each consciousness seeks the death of the other"), a reasonable perspective reveals that others, by taking the world from me, also give it to me. To will that there be being is to will that there be _men_ by and for whom the world has human meaning. We build on a world revealed by others, and our projects interfere with theirs. Making being "be" is about communicating with others through being. Freedom needs an open future, and its ends can be extended only by the freedom of other men. We need the freedom of others to avoid hardening into the "absurdity of facticity". Even tyrants, who fail to honestly assume the consequences of this need, still need the freedom of others. Existentialism condemns the tyranny and conflict arising from focusing solely on individual power because the subjective movement of a project inherently "establishes a surpassing of subjectivity". A man finds justification only in the existence of others. This need for justification is inherent; moral anxiety comes from within. The me-others relationship is as fundamental as the subject-object relationship. This bond means that willing oneself free implies **willing others free**. This isn't an abstract formula but points to concrete actions. However, others are separate and sometimes opposed, leading to difficult problems in our relations. ### Freedom and Liberation: The Challenge of Oppression The call to "will freedom" is concrete because freedom realizes itself by engaging in the world. This engagement is a constant struggle, a "movement of liberation". All men are interested in the elimination of oppression because each needs all men to be free. Beauvoir discusses the situation of the oppressed who are unaware of their servitude, mystified into believing their situation is natural. While they might live morally within their limited world, it's necessary to bring them the "seed of liberation" from the outside, to furnish them with the means of transcendence through revolt. This is not imposing a new world on them, but putting them "in the presence of his freedom," allowing them to decide freely against oppression. The urgency of liberation is greatest for the oppressed, as revolt is the only way their freedom can achieve positive development. However, every man is affected by oppression and cannot fulfill himself morally without participating in the struggle against it. The oppressor attempts to justify oppression, often dishonestly. They might defend it by pointing to the cultural content it preserves (e.g., lace, representing civilization). But this content's value is tied to the human hands and subjectivity that created it, and genuine appreciation requires its "surpassing" into the future, even if that means destroying hardened forms of the past. The past is an appeal to the future. Oppression might also be justified by utility, claiming it fosters production or exploitation of resources. But utility has no absolute meaning; it's only useful _to man_, and man must be free to define his ends. The benefits of oppression are not real benefits as long as the oppressor's reign lasts. Finally, the oppressor might highlight the difficulty of respecting all freedoms simultaneously. But this difficulty means man must accept constant struggle, not prefer the "sleep of slavery". Oppression must be rejected at any cost. ### The Antinomies of Action: Violence, Sacrifice, and Doubt Since we cannot count on the oppressors' conversion, liberating action often involves acting on their "objective presence," treating others "like things". This immediately presents an ethical problem: How can we treat others as objects while willing freedom universally?. Action involves sacrifice and violence, which are not natural or easy. Freedom's drive is indefinite, but death ends it. Heroism involves absolute renunciation. Individual relationships make people irreplaceable, and violence causes the wrench of loss and suffering. Violence undergone feels like a crime to the one practicing it, leading to the difficult truth that "No one governs innocently". Leaders often mask this crime, justifying violence by necessity or utility. The lie of historical materialism claims history is fatal, removing anguish, regret, and the possibility of revolt. But this necessity is often a weapon, not a genuine faith. Leaders know soldiers are free and must be "fettered". The first sacrifice imposed is the soldier's freedom, even freedom of thought. New violence invades the mind to mask the original violence. Justifying violence by utility means the end sets up the means. Victory validates sacrifices, defeat makes them pointless outrage. But this relies on the "spirit of seriousness," giving "useful" absolute meaning. This reduces problems to technical calculations, but human material isn't just matter; man is both means and end. "Useful" must be useful to _man_ himself. The utilitarian idea that the "cause of Man" justifies sacrifices relies on reabsorbing each man into mankind. But is the cause of Man that of each man?. The choice to use violence, to make sacrifices, must be made in doubt, without perfect knowledge of factors or necessity. It's a free choice, a wager with risks that must be assumed. The means define the end; if contradicted at the moment it's set up, the enterprise fails. Using oppressive means to defend democracy denies the values being defended. An end justifies the means _only_ if it remains present, fully disclosed in the current enterprise. Judging sacrifice and violence is an ethical choice, not a mathematical one. Suffering is incommensurable with conquests, present death with future life. We are left with the "anguish of free decision". Beauvoir offers a method, not recipes: in each case, confront the values realized with those aimed at, the meaning of the act with its content. Unlike politicians, scientists and artists are concerned with the element of failure. A politician risks becoming a dictator not by their ends, but because ends are set up through their will, confusing the cause with their own triumph. "Political necessity" is often police laziness and brutality. Ethics must not follow this "line of least resistance"; action must be freely consented, making facility difficult. This is where opposition plays a necessary role, either by rejecting the regime's ends or, in a second type, by accepting the goal but criticizing the subjective movement aiming at it, forcing a perpetual contestation of means by end and end by means. While liberation may dialectically pass through dictatorship and oppression, tyranny and crime must not triumph; their only justification is the conquest of freedom, and the assertion of freedom against them must be kept alive. ### The Individual as an End and the Complexity of Action Beauvoir argues that a key principle is treating the individual as an **absolute end** of our action. This aligns with traditions like Christian charity and Kantian moralism. We are interested in individuals as such, not just members of a group. While abstract revolutionary goals might seem to scorn focusing on individual joys (like an old man's wine or a child's laugh), these individual moments are where the meaning of production, wealth, and liberation is ultimately found. We must love life on our own account and through others to justify it. However, this doesn't mean fulfilling every individual's will. We must fight those who will the enslavement of others. We must guide those who flee their freedom (addicts, suicidal individuals), making them aware of its demands. But if circumstances prevent us from helping them engage their freedom, forcing them is problematic; violence is justified only if it _opens_ concrete possibilities for the freedom we're trying to save. Dictatorship against an invalid is justified only by their improvement. The problem is complex: we must not enable flight from freedom, but man's existence _is_ an "abortive movement" asserting itself _through_ failure. Prohibiting error risks depriving man of life. Violence is inadmissible if it uses ignorance to deny freedom. Those striving to enlighten others (elites) must respect the freedom of the ignorant, which is also absolute, even when exercised in darkness. Arguments against universal suffrage based on incompetence are sophisms; people decide in the dark, and the ignorant have interests they are "competent" to decide upon. Denying a group freedom (like colonial natives' right to self-determination, based on fear they would choose idleness harmful to the economy) is "the most consummate and inacceptable form of oppression". Ultimately, we cannot decide the "good" for individuals or groups _a priori_. No behavior is initially authorized; existentialist ethics rejects all previous justifications and principles of authority. The precept is to treat the other as a freedom so that their end may be freedom, risking inventing original solutions in each case. The problem is complicated because the freedom of one person often concerns others. When freedoms conflict (like parents' freedom vs. children's future), difficult choices arise. While particular solidarities (like fighting for one's own group) are fitting, they must not contradict the will for universal solidarity, and finite actions must be open to the totality of men. When choosing among freedoms, we must confront the human interest involved in abstract goals and reject idealisms that prioritize a Form over man. Judging complex political situations requires analyzing whether the violence and sacrifice serve the claimed end, acknowledging the uncertainty and inherent failure, and constantly questioning if the means contradict the end. ### Conclusion: Finiteness, Struggle, and Justification Is this ethics individualistic? Yes, in that it gives absolute value to the individual and their power to found existence, opposing totalitarianism that prioritizes an abstract Mankind. But it is _not_ solipsistic, as the individual is defined by relationships to the world and others, and freedom is achieved only through the freedom of others [34 struggle "pure gullibility"?. Beauvoir argues this charge comes from a false, inhuman objectivity. Within humanity, people can be fooled, but Mankind itself creates the criteria of truth and falsehood. Unlike in Plato's system where earthly things are mystifications compared to perfect Ideas, here, the "glorification of the earth is true as soon as it is realized". When men attach value to things, events, or one another, they have that value absolutely. Refusing to love anything leads to suicide; if one lives, it's because of some attachment, and life is justified to the extent that it justifies the world. This justification, though vast, is always finite, like existence itself, limited by death. This finiteness gives Beauvoir's doctrine its austerity and sadness. Unlike abstract, comforting systems that offer "the consolations of death," existentialism offers no evasion. Its ethics are lived in the truth of life, offering a path of "salvation". Despite the vastness of the world, our ignorance, risks, and individual weakness, we are absolutely free _today_ if we choose to will our existence in its finiteness, which is "open on the infinite". Real will comes from within, needing no external guarantee. "Do what you must, come what may" means the result is not external to the good will. If each man did what he must, existence would be saved in each, without needing a paradise after death. ### Further Ideas and Questions to Explore: This is just a glimpse into the complex ideas presented. Beauvoir's ethics of ambiguity raises many questions and points towards further exploration. Here are a few ideas to ponder: 1. How does one practically navigate the "anguish of free decision" when confronted with the necessity of violence or sacrifice in ethical choices? Are there guidelines beyond the abstract method of confronting meaning and content? 2. Beauvoir discusses historical examples like the Resistance and revolutionary movements. How might her ethics apply to modern, less overtly dramatic situations – like ethical choices in business, technology development, or environmental action? 3. How can we distinguish between a "genuine" positive action that involves negativity and tension, and a "dishonest" turn to the serious? Is this distinction always clear in practice? 4. The text suggests that the individual's project must be open on the totality of men and universal solidarity. How does this universal aim relate to the emphasis on particular situations and solidarities (negro for negro, Jew for Jew, etc.)? 5. Beauvoir critiques various ways of fleeing freedom. How might her analysis be applied to contemporary forms of avoidance or denial in society? 6. If value springs from human freedom, how do we collectively establish values or moral norms? Does this process always involve the kind of conflict and negotiation implied by the separation of freedoms? ### Freedom and Disclosure: A Two-Way Street Beauvoir tells us something profound: the act of **willing oneself free** is essentially the same as the act of **willing to disclose being**. Think about it this way: when you assert your freedom – your ability to choose, to project yourself into the future – you aren't just making an internal decision. You are, in that very movement, bringing the world into focus _for yourself_. The world isn't just a jumble of stuff; it becomes a world filled with meanings, values, and possibilities, all seen through the lens of your active, choosing existence. This relationship, this constant back-and-forth between your freedom and the world revealing itself to you, is a **positive and constructive movement**. It's not static; it's a process of _surpassing_. Beauvoir sees human activities like science, technics (technology), art, and philosophy as concrete examples of this. They are "indefinite conquests of existence over being". They aren't aiming at some fixed, perfect end point, like "absolute Knowledge" or "perfect beauty," because that would just set them up for failure as the target would always recede. Instead, their value comes from the very effort of **pursuing this expansion of existence** and seeing that effort itself as something absolute. Science, for instance, goes wrong if it tries to _possess_ being, like hoarding facts in a box. Its truth lies in being a _free engagement_ with what's given, where each discovery opens up the possibility of _new_ discoveries. Similarly, technics isn't about simply accumulating comfort or saving time (you can't save existence, which only happens by _being spent_!). Technics is justified when it helps existence thrust itself further ahead, transforming things into instruments and opening up new possibilities for humanity. And art, as we touched on earlier, shouldn't just create idols; it should **reveal existence as a reason for existing**. It takes the fleeting, the "transitory," and makes it appear absolute, perpetuating this revelation across time. So, all these constructive activities only gain genuine meaning when they are seen as part of this **movement toward freedom**. And the beautiful thing is, this movement isn't abstract at all! Think about it: discoveries, inventions, industries, culture, paintings, books – they all concretely fill the world and open up real, tangible possibilities for people. ### Oppression: The Denial of Disclosure Now, wouldn't it be wonderful if this free unfurling of possibility were open to everyone? Beauvoir imagines a future where constructive activity is possible for all, where everyone can freely aim at their own future. But sadly, today, that's not the reality for many. Some people can only justify their lives through **negative action**. This happens in situations of **oppression**. Oppression isn't a natural phenomenon; you aren't oppressed by floods or earthquakes. Those are natural obstacles you must assume as part of the human condition, risks implied by living. When a door won't open, you can accept not opening it and your abstract freedom remains intact, though it's an empty freedom. But you _can_ revolt against **other men**. Oppression occurs when other human beings deliberately cut off your transcendence, when they force you to spend your energy in vain, repetitive, or meaningless tasks. They keep you "below the level which they have conquered," essentially changing you into a thing by denying you access to the future they are building. Your life becomes "a pure repetition of mechanical gestures," just "not dying," indistinguishable from "absurd vegetation". Your effort to perpetuate yourself isn't integrated into a larger project of surpassing. The oppressor feeds on your potential and refuses to acknowledge you as a freedom. In such a situation, the oppressed person has only one real option: to **deny the harmony of a world that tries to exclude them**. They must prove their humanity and freedom by **revolting against the tyrants**. The goal of revolt isn't just to escape the present situation; it's to reclaim the future that was stolen. Revolt is a necessary **negative movement** that clears the ground for a return to the positive, for action, escape, political struggle, or revolution. The oppressed individual becomes fully engaged in this struggle because their very possibility of fulfilling their freedom depends on it. Beauvoir stresses that this isn't just a matter of objective, economic fact (though oppression often has economic roots). The revolutionary sees that the oppressive situation, like the distribution of wealth or the power of a party, is a _human_ fact, created by human will, and therefore it _can_ be rejected. This rejection doesn't just affect the oppressed; it challenges the oppressor's future as well. ### The Complexities of Action and Sacrifice However, the path of action, especially revolutionary action, is fraught with difficulty. It immediately raises the question of **antinomies** (contradictions). Beauvoir rejects the idea of a purely abstract, "natural" freedom that exists no matter what you do. Such freedom, if not consciously chosen and acted upon, is just "vain living palpitation," a flight rather than a will. To be genuinely free, you must **will yourself free**, which means converting this spontaneous freedom into a **moral freedom** by engaging with the world through concrete projects. This requires constant effort and tension; your project is never _given_ value, it **founds itself** through your willing it. If your freedom comes up against an insurmountable obstacle, simply battering against it is useless, a "vain contingency" that exhausts your freedom without content. But resignation, which transforms projects into "phantoms," is also deeply sad. It saves an abstract idea of freedom but empties it of all real content. People who avoid doing anything out of fear of defeat don't embody freedom; that's just "gloomy passivity". True freedom, in the face of failure or obstacles, means **renewing your engagement in the world**. It's about aiming at an end, yes, but through that end, aiming at the very movement of existence itself. It means that even in failure, you can "keep your taste for an existence which he originally felt as a joy". The value of a provisional end is confirmed by its being part of a larger, indefinite movement of freedom. This leads to the question of **sacrifice**. If every choice involves risk and potential failure, what about the cost, especially when others are involved? Beauvoir is clear: nihilism, which denies all value, or rationalistic optimism, which believes everything will be retrieved in some grand future totality, both fail to account for the "bitter truth of sacrifice". If nothing matters, why sacrifice anything? Sacrifice only has meaning if the things sacrificed – our projects, our lives, the concrete reality of the world – have real, irreducible value. Democratic societies, by valuing each individual, understand this; they restore a "sacred character" to human life after periods of violence. But here's the rub: if the individual is a unique value, then sacrificing them has full meaning. This is where the problem gets thorny. How do you reconcile the value of the individual with the demands of collective action, especially in revolutionary situations? ### The Problem of the Future: Myth vs. Reality Part of the difficulty lies in how we think about the **future**. Beauvoir identifies two ways of conceiving the future. 1. **The Human, Finite Future:** This is the future that is a "definite direction of a particular transcendence". It's the future that flows directly from our present projects, surpassing them but still linked to them. This is the future that is "given at each moment," the future of Heidegger. It's the future we have a concrete hold on, even if that hold extends beyond our individual death through the institutions or movements we build. We have to justify the goals we set in this future based on the freedom that projects them, not on some mythical end. 2. **The Mythical, Infinite Future (Future-Thing):** This is a dream of a future where all conflicts are resolved, where humanity retrieves itself in "Glory, Happiness, or Justice". It's a future that _doesn't_ prolong the present but arrives like a "cataclysm". Beauvoir traces this myth from Christian ideas of the Kingdom of God to 18th-century humanism and the idea of progress, seeing it reflected in Hegel's system and concepts like the unity of the World or a finished socialist State. The danger of the mythical future is that it becomes a **thing** to which the present is sacrificed. If the future is an infinite, perfect totality, then the present, with its struggles and individual lives, seems merely "transitory existence which is made in order to be abolished". It becomes just a means to an end, a negative that must be eliminated for the positive future to arrive. This is the logic that allows people to justify present oppression, lies, and violence in the name of a perfect future state, arguing that "the end justifies the means". Those who project themselves into this Future-Thing find the "tranquillity of the serious" because they don't have to deal with the messy ambiguity of the present. But Beauvoir argues this mythical future is a fallacy. Man is fundamentally a negativity, a lack of being. No future state can eliminate this original lack or the "anguish he feels in the face of his freedom". The world will always be a "battle-field" with opposing choices and the struggle for freedom will be permanent, not a temporary state before a final peace. Relying on this distant, uncertain future for justification is dishonest. We must justify our existence and our actions **within our own finite existence**, affirming a **human, finite future**. ### Ambiguity: Winning Meaning This is where the concept of **ambiguity** is crucial. Beauvoir is adamant: ambiguity is **not** the same as absurdity. - To say existence is **absurd** is to say it can _never_ be given meaning. - To say existence is **ambiguous** is to say its meaning is _never fixed_, that it must be **constantly won**. Absurdity would truly challenge any ethics. But ambiguity, this condition of being a lack of being that exists by making itself be, is precisely _why_ ethics is possible and necessary. It's because our condition isn't given or fixed that we have the task and the possibility of creating meaning and value. This means action must be lived in its truth, which includes being conscious of the **antinomies** it involves – the tension between means and ends, present and future. It doesn't mean you give up, but that you accept the struggle. Just as art and science progress _through_ failures, not despite them, human transcendence must cope with the fact that it must found itself without ever being able to fully _complete_ itself. Every project, every action, must be treated as an **absolute** in its finiteness. We reflect the infinite _within_ our finite existence. This requires that the moments of action constitute a unity, where means and ends don't contradict each other. Because liberation is a movement that realizes itself by tending to conquer, it cannot use means that destroy its own meaning. This is why, in certain oppressive situations, the only genuine action might be **rejection** – an unconditional refusal of what denies freedom. The French Resistance, for example, wasn't primarily about positive effectiveness at first; it was a negation, a revolt, a martyrdom, in which freedom was confirmed absolutely in the very act of rejection. However, returning to positive construction after rejection is harder because the antinomies reappear. The tension between ends and means, present and future, must be lived constantly. One cannot hide from the "outrage of violence" that construction might involve, nor pretend it's not happening. Beauvoir suggests that what distinguishes a tyrant from a person of good will isn't certainty, but the opposite. The tyrant is certain of their aims, while the person of good will constantly questions: "Am I really working for the liberation of men? Isn't this end contested by the sacrifices through which I aim at it?" Freedom, in setting up its ends, must constantly measure them against its ultimate goal: itself, freedom. ### The Ethical Imperative: Willing Freedom for Self and Others Beauvoir's ethics, therefore, doesn't provide easy "recipes". Like science or art, it offers methods, principles to guide action, but requires invention and decision in each specific case. A key principle is that the **individual as such is one of the ends our action must aim at**. This aligns with traditions of Christian charity, Epicurean friendship, and Kantian ethics, valuing each person not just as part of a group, but as an individual. To will man free is to will **there to be being**, to will the **disclosure of being in the joy of existence**. The concrete meaning of liberation is tied to the assertion of the "joy of existence" in each person. If the simple pleasure of an old man drinking wine counts for nothing, then grand goals like production and wealth are empty myths. We must love life "on our own account and through others". However, this doesn't mean fulfilling every individual's whim, especially if it involves enslaving others or fleeing their own freedom. This is where the ambiguity of freedom makes things complicated. How do we help someone who is destroying themselves (a drug addict, a suicidal person) without becoming a tyrant? Beauvoir argues that violence (like forced intervention) is only justified if it **opens concrete possibilities for the freedom** you are trying to save. It's a fault you must "get yourself pardoned for," and it's only possible and accepted when there's a concrete bond and responsibility (parent, friend, doctor). Forbidding someone error can be taking away their life, their very way of existing through failure and assumption. Childhood is different from oppression; it's a natural, temporary stage of development where authority helps open the future, not bar it. Even then, the child's freedom must be respected. So, the primary precept is to **treat the other as a freedom so that his end may be freedom**. This is a guiding wire, requiring original invention in each situation. You have to take the risk. When it comes to political action, Beauvoir contrasts abstract moralizing or following rigid ideology with a concrete analysis that asks: **what will this action mean for concrete, living individuals?** She gives examples like the choice between sacrificing miners for party propaganda or saving their lives. If a movement claims to serve man, it must prioritize saving concrete lives over uncertain future gains, otherwise it falls into the same trap as the serious politician who prefers the Idea (of the party, of progress) to its human content. Beauvoir's ethics, then, is fundamentally **individualistic** in that it gives absolute value to the individual and their capacity to lay the foundations of their existence. But it is absolutely **not solipsistic**, because the individual is defined by their relationship to others, and freedom is achieved _through_ the freedom of others. This ethical stance requires assuming one's freedom through constructive and negative (rejection of oppression) movements, constantly reconquering freedom from facticity. It's a continuous battle against failure and contingency, but this battle isn't futile. It's not a "turbulent stagnation" or a mere "game of illusions". Unlike Plato's world, where earthly things are mere copies of ideal forms, in the human world, meaning and value are created by human beings. If people attach value to things, ideas, relationships, they _have_ that value, absolutely. This ethics demands that we live in the **truth of life**, accepting its ambiguity and the risks it entails. It doesn't offer easy answers or abstract consolations. It asserts that despite our limitations and the vastness of the world, we are **absolutely free today if we choose to will our existence in its finiteness**, a finiteness that is paradoxically "open on the infinite". Our goals don't need outside guarantees; their certainty comes from our own commitment and drive. As the old saying goes, "Do what you must, come what may" – the result isn't separate from the willing that strives for it. If each person lived this way, willing their freedom and the freedom of others, existence would be saved not in some distant paradise, but "in each one". ### Further Ideas and Questions to Explore This briefing has covered a lot of ground, from the initial paradox of human existence to the demanding call to action and the complexities of living ethically in an ambiguous world. But Beauvoir's work is incredibly deep and raises many avenues for further thought. Here are just a few: 1. **Concrete Situations:** Beauvoir often uses examples (the child, the addict, the oppressor, the oppressed). How might we apply her method of "confronting the values realized with the values aimed at" to specific ethical dilemmas in our own lives or in current events? 2. **Different Forms of Bad Faith:** We touched on the "sub-man" and the "serious man". Beauvoir also describes the "nihilist" and the "adventurer" as ways people flee ambiguity. Exploring these in more detail could shed light on different forms of disengagement and their consequences. 3. **The Role of Emotion:** Beauvoir mentions anguish, joy, desire, boredom. How do these emotions function within her ethical framework? Are they impediments or guides? 4. **Relation to Sartre:** While Beauvoir builds upon Sartre's ontology, where do their ethical perspectives diverge or complement each other? What is the significance of her emphasis on ambiguity compared to Sartre's focus on the absurd? 5. **Feminist Readings:** Although this briefing focused on the general ethical argument, _The Ethics of Ambiguity_ is often read through a feminist lens, particularly in light of Beauvoir's later work _The Second Sex_. How does her concept of freedom and oppression relate specifically to the situation of women? Source touches on this briefly when discussing women inheriting a tradition of submission. 6. **Ethics and Politics:** Beauvoir insists her ethics isn't separate from politics, especially the struggle against oppression. How does her framework provide a basis for political action and critique? What are the practical challenges of maintaining the "tension of permanent liberation" in political movements? Beauvoir's _The Ethics of Ambiguity_ is a powerful invitation to live authentically, to embrace the inherent uncertainty of our existence, and to find meaning and purpose not despite this ambiguity, but precisely within it. It's a challenging but ultimately freeing philosophy that asks us to take responsibility for ourselves and for the world we constantly create with others.