It's a really interesting topic, bringing together two major thinkers from different fields and different countries to grapple with some truly fundamental questions about what it means to be human and how our societies work. We'll explore what brought them together, what pulled them apart, and what makes this debate, and the surrounding discussions, so thought-provoking. **Setting the Scene: The 1971 Debate** Imagine this: It's November 1971 in Holland. The air is still buzzing with the energy and upheaval from the events of 1968 – moments of significant social and political change that swept across the globe from Paris and Berkeley to Prague and Mexico City. These events had shifted the climate of debate, introducing new actors and divisions on an international scale. Amidst this backdrop, the Dutch thinker Fons Elders set up a series of televised debates bringing together pairs of philosophers from different, often opposing, backgrounds. For the third debate, he invited Noam Chomsky and Michel Foucault. Now, neither Chomsky nor Foucault were strictly philosophers in the traditional academic sense. Chomsky, known for his groundbreaking work in language, and Foucault, who studied language and discourse from a historical perspective, had both taken on prominent roles as political or public intellectuals. Chomsky spoke in English, Foucault in French, and the conversation was broadcast on Dutch television. Elders, the host, nicely framed the situation by picturing them as two people tunneling through a mountain from opposite sides with different tools, unsure if they were even heading towards each other. He noted they both had new ideas and a deep commitment to both philosophy and politics. The stage was set for a discussion that would move back and forth between language, creativity, power, and politics, crossing intellectual and political boundaries. **The Central Question: Human Nature** Elders kicked things off by asking about a big, perennial question: human nature. Are we primarily products of external factors, or do we share something common that allows us to recognize each other as human beings, despite our differences? This question really served to crystallize the core differences in their approaches. Chomsky, who often used the concept of human nature and even terms like "innate ideas" and "innate structures," was asked to draw arguments from linguistics to support this central position. He explained that when studying language, you look at a speaker who has acquired an "amazing range of abilities" – they can say and understand new things in a "highly creative" way. This isn't just random behavior; it's appropriate to situations and has characteristics of creativity. He argued that children learning a language are exposed to a limited amount of data but can generate infinitely many new sentences. This ability, which he called "normal creativity," can't be explained just by the input they receive, as behavioral theories like Skinner's suggested. Instead, you have to postulate an innate capacity. This "collection, this mass of schematisms, innate organizing principles, which guides our social and intellectual and individual behavior," is what he meant by the concept of human nature. He felt that a fundamental element of human nature is the "need for creative work, for creative inquiry, for free creation without the arbitrary limiting effect of coercive institutions". Foucault, on the other hand, expressed mistrust for the notion of human nature. He felt that not all concepts used by a science have the same degree of validity or historical foundation. He saw Chomsky's idea of "schematism" in relation to human nature, but viewed it through the lens of historical periods, each having its own "schematisms" or organizing principles. His historical studies, such as on madness, focused less on individual creativity or the capacity for inventing truths. He wasn't fighting against linguistic behaviorism like Chomsky; instead, he was concerned with the history of knowledge, where there was an emphasis on attributing discoveries to individuals ("inventors") while devaluing collective phenomena. He saw this as applying the principle of the sovereignty of the subject to the history of knowledge. Foucault was more interested in how, over time, transformations occur in the understanding of things, like medicine, not necessarily attributable to a single inventor. For him, studying the history of knowledge meant understanding how its formative rules modify themselves collectively, rather than focusing on individual creators discovering truth. **Creativity: Innate Potential vs. Historical Constraints** This led to a key divergence on the concept of creativity. For Chomsky, creativity was linked to the innate capacity to generate new sentences from a limited set of rules – a "normal creativity" shared by every language user. He saw this as an almost infinite possibility of application from a limited number of rules. He felt that in linguistics, the collective system of language had been analyzed, making it possible to allow the dilemma of the "speaking subject" (the individual language user) to reappear. Foucault, however, was more impressed by the constraints. Of the many things "normal creativity" allows us to say, only a few are actually spoken or written. These fall into discernible patterns specific to a time and place. He was interested in _les choses dites_, the things actually said. He believed rules or "regularities" governed not just what was talked about, but also the roles and positions of the people talking. These historical regularities, he argued, couldn't be explained by innate structures; instead, they conditioned and constrained the use of our minds across material and institutional practices. Foucault saw his problem in the history of knowledge as effacing the dilemma of the "knowing subject" to analyze how understanding and its rules transform collectively, rather than focusing on individual knowledge. He noted that creativity is only possible by engaging with a system of rules; it's not a simple mix of order and freedom. Where he differed from Chomsky was in locating the principle of these regularities not within the mind or human nature, but in the exterior social and historical conditions. Foucault even gently corrected Chomsky's historical reference, suggesting that Descartes' mind was more about perceiving and being "illuminated by evidence" than being creative, and that the idea of the mind developing potentialities ("virtualities") through unfolding itself was closer to Leibniz or the Augustinian tradition found in Pascal and the Port-Royal grammar. This difference over historical points illustrated how their fundamental opinions shaped their analysis. **Linguistics, History, and Politics** A core question emerged: how does the study of language or discourse relate to politics? Chomsky stated explicitly that his specialized knowledge as a linguist had "no immediate bearing on social and political issues". He believed no special expertise was needed for political analysis; anyone open-minded and willing to find facts could engage, using "Cartesian common sense". He saw a possible link between language universals and international justice as an abstract matter separate from this democratic premise of critical thought. This aligned with his optimistic view of technology quickly disseminating information and understanding to everyone. He felt that critical analysis in the political sphere relied on common assumptions about basic aspects of human nature, but didn't require specialized linguistic methods. He contrasted his experience discussing linguistics with mathematicians (who focused on content, not credentials) with discussions on social or political issues, where his credentials were often questioned if he departed from accepted thinking. This reliance on professional credentials in ideological disciplines, he argued, served to enforce conformity and ideological control, particularly in the mass media. He believed that exposing ideological distortions in social reality didn't require complex theoretical analysis like Jean Pierre Faye's study of totalitarian language; ordinary skepticism and application were enough. Foucault took a different path. He saw the 1968 events as a crisis not just in the university, but in knowledge itself – a crisis in how academic specialists related to the new questions raised by these events. He felt a new image of the intellectual and new ways of talking and seeing were needed, focusing on truth and power. He distinguished between the "universal" intellectual (like Voltaire or Sartre, appealing to higher values) and the "specific" intellectual (like J. Robert Oppenheimer, concerned with the consequences of their specialized knowledge). Foucault identified himself with the "specific" intellectual, trying to put this into practice with groups like the GIP (Prison Information Group), which collected information about prison conditions for a deeper analysis aimed at creating new ways of thinking about prisons, not just presenting information in the media. He saw this as inventing a new link between politics, truth, and speaking the truth, breaking with self-evident assumptions. His "analyses of discourse" aimed to interrupt and "problematize" taken-for-granted ideas, suggesting alternative possibilities through public discussion. For Foucault, the problem wasn't a shift from Marxist theory to common sense, but the "fabrication" of a new model and practice for linking politics and truth. **Justice vs. Power** This led to a key point of disagreement in the debate: the role of justice versus power in political struggle. Chomsky saw political action as trying to build a just and free society based on some notion of human nature. He believed that if a fundamental part of human nature is the need for creative work and inquiry without coercion, then a decent society should maximize these possibilities by overcoming repression and oppression. He argued that actions, including illegal acts, should be justified in terms of justice or a "superior legality". He didn't think the difference was between legality and _ideal_ justice, but between legality and _better_ justice. While not an absolute pacifist, he felt that any use of violence or creation of injustice could only be justified if it was assessed, with skepticism, as leading to a more just result. Without such grounding, he considered it immoral. He believed there is "some sort of an absolute basis" for justice, ultimately grounded in "fundamental human qualities". Existing systems of justice, while embodying class oppression, also contain "a kind of groping towards the true humanly valuable concepts of justice and decency and love and kindness and sympathy, which I think are real". Foucault, however, was skeptical of using notions of human nature or justice to justify political struggle, especially if they were conceived within the framework of the existing class system. He argued that in social struggles, justice is at stake "as an instrument of power," not in the hope of future rewards or punishments. He believed that instead of viewing social struggle through the lens of "justice," one should understand justice "in terms of the social struggle". Drawing on Spinoza, he suggested the proletariat wages war against the ruling class not because it considers it just, but because it wants to take power. He took a "Nietzschean" stance, suggesting the idea of justice itself was invented and used within class societies as an instrument of power or a weapon against it. He wasn't sure the notion of justice would even be used in a classless society. For Foucault, political problems should be thought of in terms of "truth and power," not "science and ideology". He argued that "truth" is a system linked circularly with systems of power that produce and sustain it, a "regime of truth". The political question isn't about error or ideology, but "truth itself". He felt that political philosophy needed to move beyond problems of sovereignty, law, and prohibition, effectively needing to "cut off the king's head" in theory. He argued that relations of power extend beyond the state apparatus, being rooted in networks that invest the body, sexuality, family, etc., and that the state codifies these existing relations. **Later Reflections and Continuations** The sources mention that the ideas explored in the 1971 debate were further developed in subsequent texts. Included in the volume are interviews with Chomsky from 1976 where he discusses politics and language (originally published in France), Foucault's interviews from 1976 on truth and power, a lecture given by Foucault at Stanford in 1978, and a brief statement by Foucault on human rights from 1984. These later texts act as a kind of aftermath and continuation, deepening the earlier exchange and complicating the terms. They reflect the informal nature of the original debate, with each thinker speaking from their expertise to a larger public, showing their transition from academic study to public political activity. For instance, Foucault's 1976 work shows a shift towards concerns like security, populations, welfare, and warfare, exploring the "political rationality" and expertise governments rely on, which he called "bio-power". His Stanford lectures moved towards an "an-archic" element in politics, suggesting an irreducible conflictual aspect because there's no pre-existing knowledge of a just society waiting to be revealed. He saw unforeseen events as causing us to rethink political habits, requiring originality or "creativity" in posing new questions to the forms of "political rationality". His later remarks connect political activity to the "bio-political" state and the idea of a "transnational" citizenship for those who share a "difficulty in enduring what is taking place". Chomsky's later interviews reiterate his view that his linguistic work has no _immediate_ bearing on politics, though it might derive from common assumptions about human nature. He maintained his skepticism about existing Marxist philosophy contributing substantially to the questions they discussed. He defended his program of "innate" universals, noting that linguists study idealized, abstract national languages, though acknowledging no individual speaks a perfectly well-defined language. The foreword notes that the dispute over "human nature" seemed to crystallize the differences in approach, at once linguistic, philosophical, and political. While polite attempts were made to find common ground, a divergence broke out and was ultimately left unresolved, as is common in such exchanges. Both men continued to examine the relation between language and power as they increasingly assumed political roles. **Wrapping Up (For Now!)** The debate, and the texts surrounding it, highlight core disagreements between Chomsky and Foucault regarding: - The existence and role of a fixed human nature. - The nature of creativity (innate capacity vs. historically constrained regularity). - The relationship between academic expertise and political analysis. - The foundation of political struggle (justice derived from human nature vs. power relations and social struggle). - The functioning of power in society (repression vs. production of truth/knowledge). It's a fascinating snapshot of post-1968 intellectual life, showing how thinkers wrestled with the practical demands of political engagement alongside their theoretical work. **Ideas and Questions for Further Exploration:** Thinking about this debate sparks all sorts of further questions! - How do contemporary scientific fields, like cognitive science or social neuroscience, inform or challenge Chomsky's ideas about innate human nature? - Could Foucault's analysis of historical "grids" or "regimes of truth" be applied to understanding the rise of certain dominant narratives or forms of expertise in today's digital age? - Are the concepts of "justice" and "power" fundamentally opposed, or can they be understood as interacting in complex ways in social change movements? - How does the role of the "specific" intellectual, as Foucault described it, manifest in current political and social issues, particularly concerning climate science, public health, or artificial intelligence? - Can we find empirical ways to test Foucault's ideas about the "positive mechanisms" of power or Chomsky's claims about the universality of certain intellectual capacities? - Considering Chomsky's point about ideological control in media and the reliance on credentials, how do we assess the reliability of information and expertise in a world awash in competing claims?