**I. Metaphysics and the Study of Being (Ens inquantum Ens)** - Aquinas defines **metaphysics** as the study of "being qua being," meaning the study of existence as such. - He considers metaphysics, along with ethics and other philosophical subjects, to be a **science (scientia)** in the Aristotelian sense – any mode of inquiry involving reasoning from principles to conclusions. - Metaphysics is unique because its subject matter (**being**) cuts across all other disciplines, studying fundamental properties in abstraction from specific instantiations. - It also addresses the nature and existence of the **highest being, God**, who is considered the first cause and ground of all being. **Key Concepts:** - **Form (Quiddity/Essence):** The organizing principle of a thing, its "whatness," which is abstract and universal, distinct from physical shape. Example: "goblet-ness" is the essence of all goblets. - **Material Cause:** What a thing is made of (e.g., silver for a goblet). - **Efficient Cause:** The agent that brings a thing into being (e.g., John the craftsman). - **Final Cause:** The purpose for which a thing exists or acts. Aquinas, following Aristotle, believes in objective purposes for all beings, imposed by nature (Aristotle) or God (Aquinas), in contrast to post-Darwinian notions of chance. **II. The Existence and Nature of God** - Aquinas, despite his deep faith, believed God's existence could be **philosophically demonstrated** through reason, not just accepted on faith. - He addresses common objections to God's existence, such as the **problem of evil**, which argues that the existence of suffering and wrongdoing is incompatible with an omnipotent and omnibenevolent God. - Aquinas refutes this by defining evil as a **privation** – an absence of goodness – rather than a positive entity. Thus, God's omnipotence (creating all that exists, which is good) is not contradicted by the existence of evil. - He also rejects the idea that God's existence must be taken solely on faith (fideism), which he associates with theologians like William of Ockham and Protestant Reformers. - Aquinas explicitly rejects St. Anselm's **Ontological Argument** for God's existence, which attempts to prove God's existence from the very concept of God as "something than which nothing greater can be thought." Aquinas argues this argument makes an illicit transition from the logical realm (the concept in the mind) to the realm of actual existence. As the text states: **"Aquinas was very familiar with Anselm’s argument, but he did not accept it, mainly because he thought that it involved an illicit transition from the logical realm to the realm of actually existing beings."** **Demonstrating God's Existence (Via Quia Demonstrations):** - Aquinas utilizes **quia demonstrations** (proofs from effect to cause) to establish God's existence, deriving knowledge of God from his effects in the created world. - The source highlights the **Fifth Way**, the argument from the governance of the universe, based on the observation that natural beings act in a regular, purposeful way, suggesting an intelligent director. - These demonstrations, while not providing a complete understanding of God's essence, allow for valid inferences about His nature. **Knowing and Talking About God:** - Aquinas addresses the challenge of talking about a transcendent God, rejecting both **univocity** (using terms like "being" or "wisdom" in the exact same sense for God and creatures) and **equivocity** (using terms in entirely different senses). - He proposes the doctrine of **analogy**, where terms applied to God and creatures are used in related, but not identical, senses. Creatures possess perfections as effects of God, who possesses these perfections in a supereminent, simple, and unified way. As the text notes: **"Hence, to apply predicates such as ‘wise’ and ‘good’ to both God and creatures univocally is impossible. This is not to suggest that certain terms cannot be used of both God and creatures, but only that they cannot be used in exactly the same sense given that the form of the creature is, at best, a pale reflection of the form in the creator."** - Through analogy, we can infer that perfections found in creatures exist in God as their efficient cause, even if we cannot fully comprehend the mode of their existence in Him. - Knowledge of God can be augmented by **grace**, divine interventions that enable a more perfect knowledge than natural reason alone. **III. The Nature of the Human Being: Soul and Body** - Aquinas's **psychology** is the study of the soul (anima), which is the explanatory principle for life and the powers of living things. - He views the soul as the **form and actuality of the body**, drawing on the Aristotelian concept of **hylomorphism** (all material substances are composites of matter and form). - Aquinas rejects the Platonic view that the human being is essentially the soul using a body, arguing that the definition of "human being" includes both matter (body) and form (soul), and that many human functions (sensory perception, locomotion) rely on the body. - While the human soul is **subsistent** (capable of existing apart from the body after death), this separated existence is considered incomplete and imperfect compared to its embodied state. - The **intellect (mind)** is a power of the rational soul, capable of knowing the natures of all material things. Aquinas argues it is not a bodily organ and cannot act through one, as its ability to take on the forms of all material things without distortion suggests it is not material itself. - The intellect has an **agent intellect** (active power to make things intelligible) and a **potential/possible intellect** (passive power to receive intelligible forms). Aquinas argues that the agent intellect is a power of each individual soul, not a single separate intellect. - The **will (voluntas)** is an intellectual appetite, a desire or inclination towards the **good**, which is its natural object. While the will pursues its natural object necessarily, this does not compromise freedom, as freedom lies in the choice of means to that end. **IV. Epistemology: The Acquisition of Knowledge** - Aquinas is an **empiricist**, believing that all our knowledge begins with the **senses.** - He distinguishes between **scientific knowledge (scientia)**, a reasoned understanding of things, and **cognition (cognitio)**, a mere awareness of things and their qualities acquired through the senses. - The external senses (sight, hearing, etc.) have limitations, perceiving only "proper objects" (accidental qualities like color) and not the complete substance. - Knowledge requires the processing of sensory information through the **internal senses**. - The intellect understands nothing without a **phantasm** (a likeness of the individual material thing formed from sensory data). The intellect's proper object is the universal nature ("quiddity") as it exists in corporeal matter. - The process of gaining knowledge involves **intellectual apprehension** (grasping the "what it is" from the phantasm) and **reasoning** (connecting propositions to arrive at new conclusions). - Perfect knowledge would require knowing the **cause** of a thing, demonstrating the link between cause and effect. As the text states: **"[T]o know something in an unqualified sense is to know it perfectly. This means knowing the truth about it perfectly . . . Therefore, in order to know it perfectly, we must know the cause of the thing . . . [T]o know in an unqualified way, we must know the cause as applied to the effect."** - While human knowledge grows through reasoning and is a social endeavor, it is limited and never reaches perfect comprehension of any one thing, let alone everything knowable. - Unlike angels, who know through innate intelligible species, humans acquire knowledge through perception and abstraction. **V. Happiness (Beatitudo) as the Final End** - Aquinas believes human life has an **ultimate end (finis ultimus)**, rooted in the purposive nature of human action. - Humans are "masters" of their actions through **free judgment (liberum arbitrium)**, the capacity to deliberate and choose from alternatives based on reason and will. This distinguishes human action from the instinct-driven actions of irrational creatures. - Moral responsibility arises from this freedom: **"Where actions are determined, as is the case with animals, there is no freedom. And where there is no freedom, so Aquinas thinks, there is no moral responsibility."** - Not all human actions are "human actions" in the moral sense; some are mere "actions of men" without moral significance. - While all creatures act purposively (striving to actualize potential and participate in divine perfection), rational agents do so through self-direction via their wills, while non-rational beings are directed by natural inclinations. - The ultimate end of human life is **happiness (beatitudo)**, which Aquinas defines as a "perfect and sufficient good that excludes every evil and fulfils every desire." - Happiness is not merely subjective contentment or an emotional state; it is an **objective state** achieved by actualizing the distinctively human potentialities of intellect and will to their fullest extent. - Happiness has both an **objective component** (the good that perfects the creature) and a **subjective component** (the operation by which this good is achieved and the accompanying satisfaction). - Aquinas argues that happiness cannot consist in external goods like wealth or honor, as these are either means to an end or signs of happiness, not happiness itself. **VI. Natural Law (Lex Naturalis)** - Aquinas believes in a **natural law**, a moral law whose principles are timeless and universal, knowable by reason, and independent of human convention or individual desire. This places him in the tradition of **moral realism**. - The natural law directs rational agents towards **happiness (self-perfection)** and regulates behavior for the **common good**. - Aquinas defines **law** generally as "nothing else than an ordinance of reason for the common good, made by someone who has care of the community, and promulgated." - Law is a command of **reason**, not simply the will of a superior (rejecting theological voluntarism), because reason and law both provide a rule and measure for actions. - Genuine law must serve the **common good**, contributing to the flourishing of all members of the community. Laws that benefit only a certain class are "perversions of law." - Lawmaking authority belongs to the entire populace or someone with care of the community, holding public office to possess the power of coercion for effectiveness. - Laws must be **promulgated** (widely disseminated) to impose obligations. Unjust laws are not true laws but acts of violence and do not generate obligations. - The **eternal law (lex aeterna)** is the most foundational law, reflecting God's rational governance of the universe. All other laws are derivations of it. - The natural law is the eternal law "inscribed in the human heart," an "imprint of the divine light" on rational beings, consisting of principles that guide them to self-perfection. - Humans apprehend the basic principles of natural law through a natural disposition called **synderesis**. - The first principle of practical reason, analogous to the principle of being in speculative reason, is **"good is that which all things seek after."** - This self-evident principle generates the command: **"good is to be done and pursued and evil avoided."** - The content of "good" is discovered by examining our **natural inclinations**. Things towards which we have natural inclinations are apprehended by reason as good and objects of pursuit. - Aquinas identifies three general types of inclinations giving rise to precepts: 1. **Self-preservation:** Shared with all living beings, leading to the moral dictate to preserve one's existence and avoid annihilation. 2. **Procreation and care of offspring:** Shared with animals, leading to the moral injunction to contribute to the continuation of the species and look after children. 3. **Inclination towards the good apprehended by reason:** Specific to humans, leading to obligations to live in society, worship God, pursue moral and intellectual virtues, and avoid anti-social acts. - Human laws are derivations of the natural law, adapting its general principles to specific circumstances. Legitimate variations in human law must be consistent with the natural law. - The **divine law (lex divina)**, revealed in scripture, is necessary because humans are ordered to a supernatural destiny (union with God) that exceeds their natural capacities, and because the natural law can be difficult to apply in specific cases. **VII. Virtue Ethics** - Aquinas, as a **virtue ethicist**, emphasizes the importance of having a **good character** in addition to doing the right thing. The central question is "What sort of person is it good to be?" - Virtues are **dispositions (habitus)** that make it easier to put moral knowledge into practice, directing agents towards their ultimate end "from within," complementing the external guidance of natural law. - Virtues perfect the will, intellect, and sensory appetites, helping agents achieve happiness. - Aquinas is influenced by Aristotle's definition of virtue as "the fulfilment of a capacity." - However, Aquinas adds **theological virtues** (faith, hope, and charity) to the naturally acquired moral and intellectual virtues, directing humans to the supernatural end of the beatific vision. He also allows for divine infusion of virtues. - Virtues are qualities of the soul incapable of being abused and incompatible with evil. Intellectual virtues alone do not guarantee moral goodness. - **Prudence (prudentia)**, or practical wisdom, is the one intellectual virtue inextricably linked to the moral virtues, being "right reason of things to be done" – the ability to make good practical judgments and discern appropriate ends. It is vital for the moral life. - The four **cardinal virtues** are prudence (intellectual), courage (moral, perfecting the irascible appetite), temperance (moral, perfecting the concupiscible appetite), and justice (moral, perfecting the will). - Aquinas holds the doctrine of the **unity of the virtues**: possessing one cardinal virtue implies possessing all of them. This is because prudence requires a correct assessment of ends, which depends on the appetites being in harmony with rational principles. As Aquinas states: **"the truth of the practical intellect depends on conformity with right appetite."** - Virtues are acquired through **habituation** – repeatedly performing virtuous actions, which makes them easier and more pleasurable. - True virtue involves acting rightly consistently, readily, and with pleasure, distinguishing it from **continence** (doing the right thing despite contrary desires) and **incontinence/weakness of will** (doing the wrong thing under the influence of passion despite knowing better). **VIII. The Foundations of Society and Human Law** - Aquinas's political thought is influenced by both Aristotle (naturalism) and Augustine (theology). - He views the **state (civitas)** as a product of **nature**, as man is a "social and political animal" inclined by nature to live in communities for survival and self-perfection. Reason teaches that communal life is a means to this end. - Human vulnerability and reliance on others is evidence of this natural inclination. - **Speech (locutio)** is further evidence, linked to reason and the ability to share abstract concepts and accumulated wisdom. - Aquinas identifies three natural forms of human association: the **household (familia)**, the **village (vicus)**, and the **state (civitas)**, with the state being the most perfect due to its greater self-sufficiency and orientation towards the **virtuous life**. - He moves beyond a purely Augustinian view that political authority is only necessary after the Fall due to human sin. Aquinas argues that political authority is necessary even in a state of innocence for two reasons: 1. **Coordination for the Common Good:** Even without malice, individual pursuits of self-interest can undermine the common good. Law restricts freedoms to benefit everyone in the long run (e.g., traffic laws). 2. **Paternalism:** If some individuals possess superior practical wisdom and integrity, it is ethical for them to use their talents to help others achieve their final end. This form of paternalism is justified because there is an objective human good, and fallen beings need assistance in achieving it. - Aquinas allows for different legitimate forms of government (monarchy, aristocracy, or a mixed constitution), but consistently emphasizes that a legitimate regime must always rule with a view to the **common good**. - When referring to "the people" having a share in government, Aquinas likely means participation by **corporate groups**, not the modern liberal concept of "one person, one vote." **The Institution of Human Law:** - Human laws exist to orient citizens towards the **common good** and to socialize human beings, who, despite a natural "aptitude to virtue," are also self-interested and subject to original sin. - When habituation through family and parental admonition fails, human law intervenes to enforce control through external constraint (force and fear) to prevent wrongdoing and eventually lead individuals to virtue. As the text states: **"Therefore in order that humans might have peace and virtue, it was necessary that laws be posited."** - Aquinas's view contrasts with **John Stuart Mill's anti-perfectionism**, which argues that the state should not aim to make men good, as this violates individual autonomy and that the common good is merely the aggregate of individual goods. Mill believes the law's sole purpose is to prevent harm to others. - Aquinas is a **perfectionist**, believing in an objective human good and that the state can assist in its achievement. - He defines the **common good** not as an aggregate of individual preferences (a subjective liberal view), but analogously to the individual good (flourishing). The common good is the **flourishing of the community** or the state. Actions contributing to society's well-being are virtuous. - **Justice (iustitia)** is the supreme cardinal virtue, involving giving others their due and vital for civic cohesion. It is "other-regarding," located in the will, and distinct from charity. - **Legal justice** (civic-mindedness) is a general orientation to the common good, essential for a flourishing society. Citizens must be willing to contribute to the common good (e.g., paying taxes, contributing to population replacement). - The purpose of positive law is to lead men to virtue, specifically to inculcate **civic-mindedness (legal justice)**. - Human laws cannot prohibit all vices or force perfect virtue due to the need to be applicable to the average citizen. Laws should focus on prohibiting more serious vices that threaten social preservation. As Aquinas notes: **"human laws do not prohibit all vices from which the virtuous abstain, but only the more serious ones from which it is possible for most people to abstain and especially those that seriously threaten others, without the prohibition of which human society could not be preserved."** - Well-ordered Thomistic society's laws are based on natural law, promoting the good life, including supporting institutions like the family and prohibiting acts contrary to natural inclinations shaped by reason (e.g., suicide, infanticide, restrictions on abortion, discouraging practices like gluttony or disordered sexual activity). **IX. The Morality of War (Just War Theory)** - Aquinas belongs to the tradition of **Just War Theory (JWT)**, which occupies a median position between realism (war is outside morality) and pacifism (war is never morally justified). - JWT holds that war can be morally justified if it meets several rigorous criteria. - Aquinas's discussion of war is found in _Summa Theologiae_, II–II, q. 40, a. 1, within the treatise on charity, suggesting that love for one's neighbors includes the obligation to defend oneself and one's community. - He provides three conditions for a war to be just (**ius ad bellum**): 1. **Legitimate Authority:** Only a **public person** (the sovereign or ruler) has the authority to declare war, not private citizens. This ensures the state's monopoly on coercion for the common good. 2. **Just Cause (Casus Belli):** Those attacked must deserve it "on account of some fault." This is often interpreted as some form of unjust aggression, a violation of basic rights. Aquinas also mentions punishing evil-doers and securing peace as legitimate reasons. 3. **Right Intention:** The belligerents must intend "the advancement of good or the avoidance of evil," being motivated by the just cause and not by vainglory, revenge, or plunder. - Aquinas's ideas likely influenced later natural law thinkers like Hugo Grotius, considered the "father of modern international law." - While not fully developed by Aquinas, the **Doctrine of Double Effect (DDE)**, which regulates the conduct of warfare (**ius in bello**), is also mentioned as a principle allowing bad effects where an action has both good and bad outcomes, provided certain conditions are met (act is good/neutral, good effect intended, bad effect accidental, bad effect not a means to the good, good effect outweighs the bad). This doctrine has applicability in both JWT and medical ethics.